Le armi nucleari dopo la Guerra Fredda

Nuclear weapons after the Cold War

We can distinguish two nuclear ages. The first one was a bipolar age in which the main important actors were the United States and the Soviet Union. In the second nuclear age, actors became many more, nuclear weapons became cheaper, and being a nuclear power was a sort of life insurance for the survival of the state. It is part of a Game Theory.

START Treaties and Post-Cold War Agreements

On July 31, 1991, the United States and USSR signed START I in favor of major control for reducing nuclear weapons. It was a major commitment for the creation of confidence between the two superpowers. Two years later, on January 3, 1993, Bush and Yeltsin signed START II, the treaty that eliminated heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and all other multiple-warhead (MIRVs).

When the USSR collapsed, its arsenal was spread in the other ex-Soviet states. The US Congress promoted the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (Nunn-Lugar Act) to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and their associated infrastructure in former Soviet Union states.

The Lisbon Protocol and the Budapest Memorandum

Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol in 1992. All these states decided to enter into the Non-Proliferation Treaty and not become a nuclear state by destroying their nuclear weapons or transferring them to Russia. The situation was very insidious, especially with Ukraine, which had most of the ex-Soviet nuclear warheads. But the situation was not easy; these states wanted assurance and, in 1994, they signed the Budapest Memorandum, which included security assurances against threats or use of force against their territorial integrity.

Clinton wanted Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal because it was simpler to deal with Russia than with Ukraine. Instead, Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defence, had different plans. He wanted to bring Ukraine into NATO, and if it would be a nuclear power, it would be better for the United States because Russia would become powerless.

South Africa and the NPT Revision

The first nuclear country that dismantled its nuclear arsenal was South Africa during the '90s, especially because they needed the "know-how" of Israel to make its weapons workable.

In 1995, a revision of the NPT was held as stated in Article 10 of the treaty. Countries and leaders decided to renew the treaty, which became permanent. Until 1995, the treaty had a limited duration to put more pressure on the states for the reduction of their nuclear weapons. During the same summit, they approved a declaration to promote a no nuclear zone in the Middle-East.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Nuclear Deterrence

In 1996, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) made a step forward to abolish all nuclear tests; indeed, the last French test was held in 1996. But to become effective, the test should be ratified by at least 44 countries, and only 26 countries ratified it. Clinton’s administration and China failed to do it.

During 1995-1996, we were moving toward a more stable and safe nuclear order, but then, the situation changed, and new issues showed that a stable order is not simple to achieve.

We can distinguish two conceptions about nuclear deterrence: vertical, according to which nuclear agreements should move towards zero nuclear weapons, and horizontal, according to which we should reduce the number of nuclear states near to zero. Scholars and experts developed various theories about nuclear deterrence. According to William Walker, a British political scientist, we can hope only for a stable nuclear order; it’s a kind of utopia to eliminate all the weapons. Instead, Kenneth Walls believes in the opposite idea; according to him, more nuclear weapons and nuclear states are necessary to create a stable nuclear order.

North Korea, India, and Pakistan

On February 1993, North Korea refused to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to do the inspections. There was a similar situation today with tensions between the United States and North Korea. On October 1994, it seemed that North Korea agreed to move toward nuclear development and accepted the IAEA inspections in exchange for the U.S. providing North Korea four energy underwater generators for civilian purposes, but the agreement was never put in practice.

In 1998, the governments of India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices. They made a united front against the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, and new sanctions were directed at New Delhi and Islamabad. In 1998, the new India’s prime minister, Atal Bihari, tried twice to test nuclear power. He began the Pokhran II test, influenced by the nationalistic feelings that were spread in South Asia. Pakistan replied with the announcement of a test of 5 nuclear missiles.

These events and tensions changed the Non-Proliferations regime because, so far, we had 5 nuclear powers that had the special status of permanent members of the Security Council, but now we have other states with nuclear power, like for example, Israel.

Pakistan and Iraq

Haku Kan was an important figure in the development of the Pakistani nuclear power. He worked at the center for uranium enrichment development in Germany, UK, and Netherlands. A couple of years later, he went back to Pakistan and offered his services to the government to reconstruct the plan he worked on in the Netherlands. The United States tried repeatedly to stop Pakistan, but Haku Kan developed a network in which he buys part of industrial products and sells his knowledge to the proliferation states.

In 1998, Saddam repeatedly obstructed the inspections carried out by the United Nations. Throughout this period, Iraq was subjected to heavy economic sanctions which hurt the Iraqi economy. Only for humanitarian reasons, the operation "Food for Oil" was installed by the UN, allowing Iraq to sell a limited amount of oil for its population. Saddam never fully disclosed his chemical activities and tried to hide them. Saddam was trying to appear as a victim of the UN sanctions; he did not want to appear weak. He was playing a dangerous game by not admitting that he had nothing left.