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Plato's Idea of Ideas
Plato defines the idea of ideas with the Greek word "agathon" that can be translated as the Good. It is the basis of ideas since every idea obtains its temper from it and is brought into a harmonic whole. The relation between the good and ideas is that these translate the goodness into a ground for the appearing of ideas. This notion satisfies the requirements of a philosophical principle because it satisfies both the whatness and the thatness. Idea of ideas = the Good - The good is the first ground because it "wakens" the view-offering.
element (namely, ideas)- the good can not be AN idea but rather THE idea because any idea is an idea thanks to the fact that itconsists in the good = it is the MOST BEING- + it is the HIGHEST BEING because it endows ideas with the 2 constitutive traits of the “that” and the “what”- philosophical interrogation requires beings to be grounded with regard to their being-character (the what) andwith regard to the ground of their being (the that) = philosophy wants to find a being that is at the same timeessence-granting and existence-granting, therefore the Good, insofar as it is the most-being and thehighest-being, satisfies the requirements of a philosophical principle- Plato’s idea of idea, which means the principle of ideas is the Good. It is not a moral good, but thefundamental fitting-ness: any idea is good for being an idea and any being is good for being thebeing it is.
Good gives steadiness to the ideas and the intelligibility, i.e. the capacity to being intellected, by man. Good is a philosophical principle. Philosophical because it requires man to be interrogated and to interrogate it; principle because it interrogates what is the origin in an ontological way, rather than chronologically.
Lay out the philosophical notion of contingency. Why don't we encounter this notion in the context of scientific reasoning? Contingency is a name for the relation between the things when their sense is not explicit and us when we do not explicitly sustain the sense of things. In contingency, we are in a natural state of obviousness in which no peculiar sense is needed and there is no time and space for a breaking of sense. In the encounter with what is contingent, the sense of that which is reduced to contingency is not interrogated, not sustained in knowledge and thus not clarified.
indeed that sense does not, inthe first place, ask to be interrogated or sustained in sufficient knowledge. In this state the ordinaryworld view is a basis for the scientific understanding. In this case the scientific understanding is areassurance and yet a modification of the ordinary world view of a precise epoch. However, we donot encounter this notion in the context of scientific reasoning because in that field we do notinterrogate ourselves about this about the breaking of the sense, even if in basic researcheveryscientific knowledge is the breaking of dis-contingencyContingency is a concept that can be defined in many different ways. It can be identified both as the point ofinception of philosophy and also as the name of the way things are in our everyday form of existence. It is acondition to leave things as brute things, meaning the incapacity to understand the sense of things but purelythe result. It is a
Danger for humanity since it is characterised by not getting the sense of things. In scientific reasoning we do not encounter this concept because, even if science is immersed in contingency, it is not aware of it. While philosophy is the knowledge of dis-contingency, so the taking knowledge of sense of things, science does not even interrogate itself on this so it is impossible to encounter the concept. For science the reality is the reality, it doesn't have a character of contingency or dis-contingency.
Secondo me (Martina) ma non sono sicura:
- In scientific reasoning we do not encounter this notion because there is no point of distinguishing between contingency and discontingency: science is a contingent knowledge in that it defines things and it determines what we can know and gives it for certain and responds to an already given sense.
State the guiding question of philosophy. Then show how Plato's notion of idea
answers to this question
The guiding question of philosophy is “what is the being [as being] that is what is ousia, beingness?”
Here the interrogation of the being is not about their general features, it is rather about beings as such and in whole, in the first place with the fact that beings are at all and simultaneously, by what it is to be.
According to Plato, the beingness of beings is the idea. Idea in Greek means something that looks like, in the sense of an outer appearance. Plato used this world, ordinarily used for referring to a character of beings, as the name of what is plainly extra-ordinary, that is the constitutive trait of the abiding, that is the beingness or abidingness.
In this case the IDEA no longer indicates an outer appearance, but rather the invisible look that offers the view of a being as such. Thus the idea is the look as the invisible view offering element.
Only thanks to the fact that we are
already beholding the look in which the view of beings (of what a being is) is offered to us, can we see them, perceive them and deal with them in an everyday manner or as objects of a thematic knowledge. Looking at the human world as a whole we realize that it is a sphere consisting of interrelated ideas, which are somehow already known and borne by man. We also realize that these ideas are more concrete than things in that they grant the view on these things as such and offer to our thinking what can be thought in respect to them. The realization that the world is fundamentally a whole of ideas, in which man knowing stands, through the relation to these ideas themselves remains mostly inert, this realization is the "discovery" of Plato.
The guiding question of philosophy is "what is the being, that is beingness?". It is evident that it interrogates the being insofar as it is flagrant as such and the interrogation is
About what is the beingness of being. Summarizing we can say that the answer is the ground of the being. Plato's answer defines this ground as ideas. He says that the world is based on ideas since it is impossible to have an idea of something without the relation to other ideas. For example, if I define this as a paper, firstly I need to know not only its definition but also all the characteristics that define it as such. The answer of Plato makes sense because without ideas, it would be impossible to live.
In Plato's Politei, Socrates claims "Anyone who's going to act intelligently in private or in public needs to have sight of [the good]. What justifies this claim? "Act intelligently": man's intelligence = man's capacity for minding → which is awakened by the Good - Greatest learnable thing = the look of the good - We cannot not know the good BUT questo è
native to us, not natural
Paideia is therefore necessary
Through paideia = growing into ingenuousness and preserving it → man is firm in his being (ovverofree, he becomes himself)
Only a man who has become himself can assume leadership
La polis infatti is for the sake of the principle itself = it functions iff the “good” is the pole
And since a man who has gained and preserved ingenuousness through paideia is fit (he is at theclosest to the principle of being, that is the good), he is the only one who can act intelligently
Socrates is speaking of paideia
Whoever has a sufficient paideia, meaning that have sight of the good, has the ability to govern the polis
Paideia is in fact about gaining a firmness
of being in which man can ever againawaken his ingenuousness; itisapathtowardsliberationinwhichmanbecomeshimself.Thisisafundamentalaspect since only after becoming himself, a man has the ability to govern the polis. Who actsintelligentlyinprivate orinpublicneedsissomeonewhohasthenotionofwhattheseconceptsareandisoutofthecave,inametaphoricalsense.Socratesusedthemythofthecavetodescribehowsomeonewhogetstheknowledgebeforeothers has power over all others who do not get this
knowledge.6. W hat is the difference between the common understanding of method and the notion ofmethod that, on the other hand, determines the form and scope of modern science?
There are two notions of method, the first one is the one which is more familiar to us and describesthe path by which a given aim is pursued. In this case the aim has in itself something of how topursue it.
The second notion of method is that form of knowledge that is also used in sciences and describeswhat is required in terms of a logically consistent chain of arguments, in order to demonstrate thistruth in an inconvertible way.
The greater difference between the two is that now method is no longer the way it helps to pursuethe aim, now method is itself the way the objective is established in its certain or absoluteobjectivenessMethod is now the way through which thinking must shape, direct and regulate itself in such a wayto
The common understanding of method is about how I treat the object so, recalling