Risk Analysis - Prof Carpignano - Appunti di Fabio Galizia

SOCIAL RISK TOLERABILITY

Rischio

Risk

Social Risk R1

F (ev./anno)

F (ev./y) R2

5.0 E-5 €

C1 C2 €

NON ACCETTABILE

UNACCEPTABLE

5.0 E-6 ALARA

ACCEPTABLE

5.0 E-7 1 10 100 D (morti)

D (deaths)

Ed. 2011/12

SOCIAL RISK TOLERABILITY

Ed. 2011/12

OVERALL RISK ASSESSMENT

NATURAL RISKS

Hydro-geological (land slips, flooding, …)

Forest fire

Exceptional meteo events (hurricanes, tornados)

Snow (snow slips)

Seismic (earthquakes)

TECHNOLOGICAL/ANTROPIC RISKS

Transportation

Industrial Risk

Health Risk (virus, bacteria)

Nuclear Risk

Ed. 2011/12

RISK AND LEGISLATION

IN ITALY:

In the past, the technical laws were prescriptive

(e.g. road code: the max speed is 50 km/h)

The new technical regulation, based on EU

Directives, is “goal setting” or “performance

based” (prestazionale) (i.e. based on the risk

analysis)

At the moment we have in EU good performance

rules for industry while transportation is still

based, mainly, on prescriptive rules (some

exception, for instance the new regulation for the

risk analysis of tunnels)

Ed. 2011/12

ON SHORE: 105 Directive Seveso/2015

OFF SHORE: 145/2015

PERSPECTIVE RULE: set of rules that must be follows the legislation has decides the good

approach for safety.

Starting from '20 there was changing in legislation; there is no precise rule but the organization can

"goal based rule" prestazionali)

decide the rules of safety with (leggi within the risk analysis.

This is the situation for industry. is not local problem.

For transport is different because

Must be agreeded the uniform change.

The evolution of legislation in transport is very low infact.

ADR License: International agreement and gives the rules for transportation (rules for construction

of truck and for the hours to transport: night or day).

RID: for trains.

IMO/SOLAS: marittim transportation.

ICAO: planes transportation.

Free prevention: is still prescriptive rule but there are some changing to goal based within risk

analysis.

Molte volte non si possono seguire le regole (museo con dipinti importanti alle pareti e non si

possono aprire uscite di emergenza) tramite risk analysis si può garantire e dimostrare la sicurezza

pur non seguendo le direttive.

FIRE FIGHTING: is not to shutdown

The goal of water

the fire but to cool the surround to

avoid the propagation.

FOAM: Useful if we have liquid that is flammable, to separate the vapor fase from liquid fase.

Other way to fire fighting:

We remove the air and insert CO2.

The fire is shutdowned; it must be

done if there is no people inside

(there is usually a door protection)

RISK AND LEGISLATION

Aims of the main rules

To check and guarantee the safety and

health in work environment (89/391 EC, …,

2004/40 EC, DLgs 81/2008).

To check the safety for the community in

Major Hazard Installations: Refineries,

Chemical plants, (2012/18 EU, DLgs

105/2015 “Seveso Directive") Nuclear

plants, Oil&gas plants (2013/30 EC, DLgs

145/2015)

Ed. 2011/12

RISK AND LEGISLATION

In transportation…:

To check and guarantee the safety

still

for the transportation of people (

prescriptive rules )

To check and guarantee the safety

for the transportation of dangerous

goods (flammable, explosive, toxic

substances …) (2004/54 EC for road

tunnels, DLgs 2006/264)

Ed. 2011/12

RISK AND LEGISLATION

In fire fighting…:

To design “ad hoc” fire emergency systems

prescriptive

where the regulation is not

applicable (e.g. historical buildings) (DPR

151/2011, DM 9/5/07)

During the machinery design and construction:

Risk analysis to identify the residual risk and

to prepare the technical documentation for the

commercialisation of the machine (2006/42 CE

- DLgs. 17/2010)

Ed. 2011/12

RISK AND LEGISLATION

What is the Seveso Directive?

It refers to Major Accident installations (i.e. the

installations storing or working with big quantities

of dangerous substances)

It provides obligations for the installation Manager

and for the local authorities (council

administration)

It asks for a Safety Management System (SMS)

It asks to analyse the Domino Effects in case of

accident

It obliges to inform the external population

Obliges and provides methods for the external

emergency planning

In introduces some tolerability limits for Risk in

order to plan the use of land

Ed. 2011/12

SEVESO DIRECTIVE

1. Label container of product/data sheet to describe

2. Local authority to build the plant

3. SMS Safety Management System: Risk Analysis

4. Domino Effects: the second accident may be worst than the first.

5. Obligation to inform the population

6. Ecc

PEI: set of procedures to follow inside the plant (piano di emergenza interno).

PEE: set of procedures to follow outside the plant (piano di emergenza esterno

Il prefetto decide le regole da prendere per un piano di emergenza esterno (stop traffic road ecc)

DM 9/5/2001 tell what can be built in the surrounding accordingly to the risk of the land.

MHIDAS: Major Hazard Incident data Service.

DM 9/5/01 EFFECTS

PROBABILITY HIGH LETHALITY LOW LETHALITY NOT REVERSIBLE REVERIBLE

INJURIES INJURIES

P<10-6 DEF CDEF BCDEF ABCDEF

10-4>P≥10-6 EF DEF CDEF BCDEF

10-3>P≥10-4 F EF DEF CDEF

P≥10-3 F F EF DEF

CAT. A: residential area characterised by a construction index greater than 4.5 m3/m2; places with

concentration of children or disable or sick people (more than 25 beds or 100 people); places with haigh

concentration of people outdoor (more than 500 people)

CAT. B: residential area characterized by a construction index between 1.5 and 4.5 m3/m2; places with

concentration of children or disable or sick people (up to 25 beds or 100 people); places with haigh

concentration of people outdoor ( up to 500 people) ……

…

CAT E: residential area characterized by a construction index lower than 1.5 m3/m2 ……

CAT F: area inside the factory or surrounding it but without relevant building or infrastructures and where

is not usual the presence of groups of people.

Ed. 2011/12

Safety Management System

• Fundamental tool for safety management

• It is a set of procedures aiming to guaranty that

all daily activities (operation, maintenance,

training, ect.) are planned, performed and

verified, sistematically

• Set in Italy by DM 9/8/2000

Norma Tecnica UNI n° 10617 del 11/12/2012 - Impianti a rischio di

incidente rilevante - Sistemi di gestione della sicurezza - Requisiti

essenziali

Norma Tecnica UNI n° 10616 del 11/12/2012 - Impianti a rischio di

incidente rilevante - Sistemi di gestione della sicurezza - Linee guida

per l’attuazione della UNI 10617 (explicit ref to SIL ANALYSIS)

Ed. 2011/12

Risk management (ISO 31000)

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Risk Management Safety (SMS)

Environment

Risk Management HR

… Financing

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Risk Management for Safety

Safety and Health for workers

Fire prevention

Major Accidents

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Major Accident

Major Accidents are events characterised by a low probability and

extensive damages

Usually, their occurrence is due to several/different contributors:

Equipment failures,

Human errors (organisational, operational, maintenance),

Errors in the control software,

External events (external impacts, natural events, etc.)

They provide extensive damage from different points of view:

Damage to people (killed, injured, evacuated)

Damage for the environment

Damage for Economics (investment, recovery, loss of production)

Damage for reputation

Ed. 2011/12

ACCIDENTS IN THE PAST

Flixborough, UK (1/6/74) 28m + 36f

Seveso, IT (10/7/76) 0m (delayed effects?)

San Carlos de la Rapita, SP (11/7/78) 211m

Bhopal, India (3/12/84) >2600m

Piper Alfa, UK (1988) 167m

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Ed. 2011/12

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

POLITECNICO DI TORINO DIPARTIMENTO ENERGIA

UK

Flixborough,

01/06/1974;

Continuous release of cyclohexane and unconfined

explosion;

28 Killed, 89 Injured and 3000 Evacuated;

$ 70.000.000 of damage;

General cause: mechanical-failure and human-

factor. Abstract:

A faulty reactor was replaced by a temporary Dog-Let

bypass at “Nypro(UK)Ltd” Caprolactam Plant. A

cyclohexane leak, from an inadequately designed bypass,

formed a large vapour cloud which ignited and caused a

vast explosion, devastating the plant and damaging

property 3 miles away. (Source: MHIDAS data bank)

Ed. 2011/12 ITALY

Seveso,

10/07/1976;

Continuous release of dioxine;

Over 200 Injured and 700 Evacuated;

Over $ 50.000.000 of damage;

General cause: human-factor and violent

reaction. Abstract:

TCP process was left dangerously at shutdown. Runaway

reaction formed 2 kg of highly Toxic TCCD. Reactor was

vented through safety valve. The toxic cloud covered 25

km2 of land, killing thousands animals and causing a

widespread chloracne in humans. Total decontamination

lasted 10 years. (Source: MHIDAS data bank)

Ed. 2011/12 San Carlos de la Rapita, SP

11/07/1978;

Continuous release of propylene and BLEVE

(boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion);

201 Killed, 101 Injured;

General cause: mechanical-failure and human-

factor. Abstract:

An overfilled roadtanker went off the road near a holiday

camp and releasing 23 tonnes of propylene caught fire and

blew. Fireball killed many scantily clad campers

immediately, many others died from burns later. Tanker

split into 4 major fragments, a portion travelling 300

metres. (Source: MHIDAS data bank)

Ed. 2011/12 Bhopal, INDIA

03/12/1984;

Continuous release of methyl isocyanate

(MIC) and gas-cloud;

Over 2000 Killed and 9999 Injured;

General cause: human-factor and violent-

reaction. Abstract:

Water entered the MIC storage tank at Union Carbide

pesticide plant, where 45 tonnes of MIC were being stored.

The addition of water to the tank caused a runway chemical

reaction. Gases formed could not be contained by safety

systems. It is been estimated that at least 2600 people died

and over 170000 people had to receive treatment.

(Source: MHIDAS data bank)

Ed. 2011/12 Piper Alpha Platform, UK

06/07/1988;

Release of gas and oil;

167 Killed;

General cause: routine maintenance

procedure;