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UNSCOP

the European Jews who survived WW2 was to settle in Palestine. Additionally, the UNSCOP

th

outlined a geographical division of Palestine, approved by the UN on the 29 of September

1947. The UN’s decision made many Palestinians voluntarily join the Arab League; the

65

beginning of the war was at that point inevitable .

2.4 The First Arab-Israeli War

The day after the UN assembly, violence spread through Palestine. The first Arab-Israeli

war had just started. It lasted until 1949, taking on the shape of a civil war between the Yishuv

and the Arab-Palestinian communities from 1947 to 1948 and a conventional war between

sovereign states from 1948 to 1949.

Although both sides had strengths and weaknesses, the key distinctive elements were the

mediocre support of the entirety of the Arab world towards Palestinians, opposed to the

motivation both Zionists in Palestine and all over the world felt for their own cause. On top of

that, the organization of the Yishuv first and the State of Israel later on contrasted with the

plethora of Palestinian militias lacking a central organization.

The civil war started positively for the Arabs, actively controlling a few Jewish districts,

66

but their achievements were swiftly nullified by the Jewish counteroffensive .

Nevertheless, it is true that, unlike the self-reliant Arab villages, the Yishuv did suffer

from its dependence on external supplies, undermined by the war.

62 Ivi, p. 221.

63 Ivi, p. 222.

64 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

65 Ivi, pp. 207-327.

66 Ibidem. 23 attempt to neutralize the widespread Arab

The war was later reshaped by the Haganah’s

defense,

cells, turning the Yishuv’s previously aimed for its own survival, to an opportunity for

conquest. Indeed, this is what split Jerusalem in half: West Jerusalem was conquered and

controlled by the Jewish forces; East Jerusalem was controlled by the Arabs.

Meanwhile, the Arab League and the Muslim Brotherhood jointly attacked several

kibbutzim. th

On the 14 of May 1948, David Ben-Gurion read the Israeli Declaration of Independence

at the Tel Aviv Museum: The State of Israel had just been established.

Despite the celebrations and the joy that took place on that historic day, Ben-Gurion

couldn’t help but feel the imminence of the conflict between the

himself, along with the Yishuv,

newborn Jewish State and the Arab States. The Yishuv did feel that such a conflict would have

resulted in a Jewish defeat. Although the Arab League intended on destroying the Jewish State,

the little organization and the embargo on war supplies implied that the Arabs would have rather

hoped for external help, possibly by the UN.

War rhetoric eventually took over. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria took part in the war;

the same would happen in every future conflict in the Middle East.

The UN appointed Folke Bernadotte as a mediator in the conflict. On top of forcing a

truce, he suggested Palestine’s partition into two states, but both sides rejected the proposal.

During Bernadotte’s truce, the Jewish State founded 67

the IDF , strengthened during the

ceasefire. The conflict, however, renewed after an offensive by the Egyptians.

The war eventually ended and was won by the State of Israel, but despite that, Jordan

came out of it with territory from central Palestine (the West Bank) and Egypt with the Gaza

strip. Furthermore, another outcome of the conflict was a considerable amount of Palestinian

68 69

refugees. Indeed, in 1950, the UNRWA was established for this very reason .

Around seven-hundred-thousand Palestinians became refugees and the reasons for that

being are many and still uncertain. This could be either due to inner conflicts between the Arabs,

due to the loss of ownership of lands, lack of political participation or lack of employment. The

problem could also have originated directly from the Zionist attempt to free the Arab lands of the

Arab Palestinians.

A progressive exodus had indeed taken place. The rich Arabs first fled on the eve of the

war, causing many schools to close and unemployment to spread. Alongside them, many

67 The Israel Defence Forces.

68 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

69 Ivi, pp. 207-327. 24

Palestinians were evacuated by Jewish military forces or fled themselves at the very beginning of

the conflict. Palestinians were eventually systematically displaced by the Israeli military, rather

than fleeing voluntarily. Day after day, this problem increased, especially due to the fact that the

Arab states were reluctant to grant access to the refugees, who nevertheless wished to return to

70

their homes .

2.5 The 1950s and the Suez Crisis

The years after the First Arab-Israeli War could have been an opportunity for both the

State of Israel and the Arab States to establish a significant diplomatic dialogue, but immediately

after the conflict, the situation was somewhat fluid: Arab media talked about revenge and

injustice, whilst some Arabs did think of coexistence as the only peaceful possibility.

Furthermore, The State of Israel felt the pressure of being encircled by its enemies. Peace was,

therefore, far from reality. The State of Israel eventually did not compromise by ceding territories

and the Arab States’ policy was influenced by public opinion, leading them to not recognize the

71

State of Israel .

The refugee issue worsened the relations between States even more when many refugees

eventually infiltrated Israel’s territory to either go back to their homes and recover personal

objects or to farm their old lands. Although both Jordan and Egypt condemned the illegal

infiltrations, the State of Israel was inflexible in seeing them as a form of guerrilla.

The Jewish State responded by destroying old Arab areas, by shooting any Arab

trespassing the borders and by expelling those on Israel’s ground.

A few, amongst the IDF too, questioned the moral efficacy of Israel’s reaction, especially

when the IDF’s Unit 101 was established. The unit often penetrated the Gaza strip and the West

Bank. In Qibya, in the West Bank, for instance, more than sixty Arabs were killed by the Unit

101, in response to the murder of two Israeli children and a woman. The IDF later explained that

they attacked, unaware of the presence of those people, but Jordan pathologists later denied this

after they had found out that the injuries on the bodies were caused by gunshots and not by the

72

collapse of rubble .

Nasser’s manifest Arab policy in Egypt, along with Moshe Dayan’s appointment to the

Ministry of Defence in Israel, heightened the already tense situation.

70 Ibidem.

71 Ivi, pp. 328-381.

72 Ibidem. 25

Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, caused the British and the French

(who had owned and operated the Canal since its construction) to jointly attack Egypt, with the

support of Israel.

The Suez Crisis is essential to understand the dynamics in the Middle East during the

73

Cold War. The USSR sided and protected Egypt against The State of Israel ; the USA was also

Western interests. Nevertheless, the Crisis’ biggest outcome was a

involved in protecting

widespread surge of radicalism through the entire region: after 1956, the Arab States’ aim was to

74

obliterate the State of Israel .

2.6 The Six-Day War

In May of 1967, the Egyptian military entered Sinai, causing concern amongst the Israeli

government and military forces. In addition to that, the USSR informed Egypt of suspect Israeli

75

military presence on the border with Syria. This is the scenario that led to the Six-Day War .

Mutual defense treaties between Egypt, Syria and Iraq developed due to Nasser’s

leadership, while the UN agreed on leaving both Sinai and the Gaza strip, as requested by Egypt.

This might have been a mere demonstration of power and strength on the Egyptian part, but it

triggered Israel’s response, supported by the USA.

The purpose behind the engage of the Jewish State, militarily more powerful, was strictly

defensive and aimed at defeating Egypt. The IDF later gave in to the hic et nunc of the conflict

and ended up crushing the Egyptian troops in just a few days, allowing Israel to easily conquer

the Gaza strip, Sinai and the Suez Canal. Hussein of Jordan also entered the war, despite both

Israel and the UN issued a non-intervention warrant. On top of the newly annexed Egyptian

territories, Israel managed to conquer the Old City of Jerusalem, as well as the West Bank in a

matter of two days.

The swift and unforeseen victory of the State of Israel generated a pervasive sense of

messianic extremism, resulting from the feeling that Eretz Yisrael had been granted to its ancient

inhabitants, at last. The conquered territories were, indeed, seen as a prelude to redemption.

On a diplomatic level, the Six-Day War made the State of Israel a regional power, allied

76

with the Western world .

73 Nikolaj Bulganin, head of the government, once told the Israeli that hate towards their State was spreading.

74 Benny Morris, Vittime. Storia del conflitto arabo-sionista 1881-2001, tr. it. di Stefano Galli, RCS Libri S.p.A.,

Milano 2002 [2001], pp. 328-381.

75 Ivi, pp. 382-437.

76 Ibidem. 26

Jewish settlements sprung near the new borders, like the one of Kiryat Arba, in the

outskirts of Hebron. The new Jewish communities were often raised on public ground,

preventing Indigenous people in the Gaza strip and the West Bank from growing and thriving.

The enormous conquests made by Israel awakened a sense of identity within the

under Israel’s control since 1948, a military

Palestinian people. Although they had been living

occupation was established following the Six-Day war of 1967.

Although the IDF was willing to allow the West Bank to keep in touch with the Arab

world, Moshe Dayan’s uncompromising policy prevailed: a colonialist economy was put in

place, manifesting itself in the form of Indigenous labor for the State of Israel, as well as in the

form of evictions. The local Palestinian economy was therefore compromised due to the absence

of competition and the dependence on Israeli products.

The occupation was immediately despised by Palestinians, whose resistance was opposed

to resignation. Despite Israel’s

by Israel; Palestinians either engaged in armed combat or gave in

attempt to depict the occupation as benign, it involved torture, humiliation and intimidation.

Israel’s measures to counteract the dissent ended up amplifying Palestinian nationalism.

The Arab States, now under the aegis of the USSR, were reluctant to admit their own

defeat, strengthening their opposition to dialogue; Israel was nevertheless averse to it, as well.

The Resolution 242, issued by the UN, demanded Israel to leave the occupied territories and

77

pressured the Arab States to reject belligerency .

2.7 The Yom Kippur War

A few years later, new Egyptian president Anwar Sadat considered war to be the only

a

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I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher pileggigabriele di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Storia della fotografia e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Università degli Studi di Udine o del prof Villa Paolo.