Philosophy of Law - concetti generali terza parte

Intuitively, a domain can be characterized as the least restrictive concept that can explain an agent's preferences.

If we consider an individual agent's preferences, we can interpret them as the observable choices that the agent makes based on their motivations. Preferences can be objective or subjective, depending on whether they are based on observable evidence or on the agent's own interpretation of their well-being.

Sometimes, an agent's preferences may be influenced by concerns for the well-being of others (altruistic preferences) or solely focused on their own well-being (self-interested preferences). The concept of preferences can be broad or narrow, depending on whether we consider preferences in terms of goods and services or in a more general sense.

It is often argued that preferences should be understood in a broad sense, as encompassing both consumption preferences and preferences regarding well-being in general. However, it can also be argued that preferences should be understood in a narrow sense, as referring only to choices related to consumption.

In summary, the concept of preferences is complex and can be interpreted in different ways, depending on the context and the specific motivations of the agent.

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In the legal system, schools have a dual role: they must follow the rules set by officials and also influence the creation of appropriate rules. Schools may indirectly influence the behavior of individuals through rewards and sanctions. The analysis of the legal and private rules assumes that officials maximize their self-interest and that the contents of the rules reflect the interests of the public. Law is seen as a product of coalitions among self-interested groups, and economic analysis can explain the incentives and motivations behind the rules. However, the analysis of schools goes beyond narrowly economic considerations and also takes into account political institutions and legislation. The problem is that schools are not only doing public policy, but also private policy.

In rule-based political institutions, the analysis maintains that individuals have an obligation to follow the law. However, this obligation is not necessarily based on the content or conventions of the law, but rather on the existence of legal sanctions. According to this analysis, the law derives its normativity from the incentives and sanctions it imposes on individuals. It argues that individuals are bound by the law not because of any inherent moral or ethical obligation, but because of the internal forces of the legal system.

On the other hand, Hart's concept of law extends beyond the idea of sanctions and argues for a more content-independent and binding nature of legal rules. He defends the idea that legal obligations are not necessarily peremptory in nature and that they can be displaced by other normative forces. Hart's analysis focuses on the internal logic and ordering of legal systems, rather than the preferences or interests of individuals.

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