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Philosophy of Law - concetti generali

Appunti in inglese del corso del Professor Rotolo Philosophy of Law. Nello specifico gli argomenti trattati sono i seguenti: Competing Principles in Tort Law, Competing Principles: an Example, Competing Principles: Analogical Extension of a Principle.

Esame di Philosophy of Law docente Prof. A. Rotolo

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DETTAGLI
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea magistrale in giurisprudenza
SSD:
Università: Bologna - Unibo
A.A.: 2009-2010

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Sara F di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Philosophy of Law e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Bologna - Unibo o del prof Rotolo Antonino.

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