Riassunto esame Relazioni internazionali, Prof. Hanau Santini Ruth Maria, libro consigliato Manuale in inglese, Letture di Morgenthau, Thomas C. Schelling, Michael Cox

The Diplomacy of Violence

Thomas C. Schelling

In "The Diplomacy of Violence", Thomas C. Schelling observes that force can be used to hurt and destroy. To wield the threat of such pain and destruction is to exercise vicious diplomacy. The diplomacy of force is most effective when, rather than practicing actual violence on the enemy, it uses the mere prospect of such violence to bend the enemy to its will. Coercion requires the real possibility of violence as well as a credible reassurance that such violence can be avoided by capitulation. Furthermore, coercion is distinguished from brute force by the presence of at least some mutual interest. In its absence, the opposing parties have no choice but to hurt each other.

Modern military strength resides not in power to conquer the enemy and occupy his lands but in slaughtering his people and destroying his infrastructure. Warfare has thus become not a contest of skill but a game of extortion. We should not make the mistake of

assuming that wholesalebrutality is always exercised as a consequence of such a game. In ancienttimes, total war was practiced as a matter of course, and in our day, it hasbeen employed as an instrument of vengeance. Bargaining by the threat of violence is often seen between states ofunequal power, such as Germany and Austria, or at the end of a war, whenthe losing side has been weakened. But it is also seen in the midst of warbetween parties of similar strength, one of which has gained a suddentechnological advantage. Such was the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,where pure violence was inflicted not in order to compromise theinfrastructure of Japan but to compel its people and government intocomplete surrender. The distinguishing feature of nuclear weaponry is not the scale ofslaughter it can achieve, which could just as well be carried out with bulletsor knives, but the great speed with which it can exterminate a population.This makes it imperative to exercise restraint not at the end.

of war, as in the past, but in its midst or at the very beginning. The present danger is that victory is no longer a prerequisite to inflicting vast damage on the enemy. The skillful manipulation of the threat of violence has become the focus of antagonistic foreign policy when the threat itself is too destructive to be exercised without putting all warring parties at risk. Today, civilians and not enemy soldiers are the ultimate target of warfare, because the prospect of annihilating the enemy's population, rather than defeating its armed forces, is the greater act of violence and hence the more effective threat. The decisive element in modern conflict is not the ability to conquer but the power to hurt. Power Shifts, Economic Change, and the Decline of the West?Michael Cox

It has become the new truth of the early twenty-first century that the Western world we have known is fast losing its pre-eminence to be replaced by a new international system shaped either by the so-called BRICs

Comprising Brazil, Russia, India, and China, the 'rest', or more popularly by that very broadly defined geographical entity known as Asia. This at least is how many economists, historians, and students of world politics are now viewing the future of the larger international system.

This essay does not dispute some self-evident economic facts. Nor does it assume that the world will look the same in 50 years' time as it does now. It does, however, question the idea that there is an irresistible 'power shift' in the making and that the West and the United States are in steep decline.

Specifically, it makes a number of critical arguments concerning the new narrative. First, it suggests that this story, by reasonably focusing on what is obviously changing in the world, unfortunately, ignores what is not; as a result, it underestimates what might loosely be termed the continued structural advantages still enjoyed by the United States and its major Western allies. Second,

while it is true that many new states are assuming a bigger role in the world economy, their rise needs to be looked at more carefully than it has been so far; indeed, when such an examination is undertaken, it becomes increasingly clear that the rise of others – including China – is still hemmed in by several obstacles, internal as well as external.

Third, though the Asian region, and China as part of it, is assuming an ever more important role in the wider world economy, this development should not be seen as marking the beginning of a new Asian Century. This now popular idea is not only conceptually problematic, it inevitably leads to an underestimation of other key areas in the world, including the Transatlantic region.

Finally, the writer suggests that if the dubious idea of a power shift is taken to be true, this could very easily lead to greater international insecurity and conflict. Understanding the modern world better than many seem to be doing right now is therefore not only

intellectually important; it is strategically necessary too.