Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
Scarica il documento per vederlo tutto.
vuoi
o PayPal
tutte le volte che vuoi
LAW AS KNOWLEDGE, KNOWLEDGE AS SCIENCE
But the typical modern idea of law finally represented by Kelsen is to look at
a special kind of formal knowledge just as science.
law as
What does "science" mean? If we look to empirical sciences or to inductive
science it is possible to claim the existence of something called science
particular kind of knowledge.
because it is absolutely a In this knowledge
specifical way:
we expect to find out that all the propositions are linked in a per modum
they are part of a system. And the link between them is given
dedutionis; so it is a deductive method. We may believe that in empirical
science there is induction and not deduction, but induction has to do not
but with the way we do know the world in itself.
with the theory itself In
fact in physic and biology and so on we use mathematic, which is a
deductive science using the language of number. Deduction in this case
in which there is a principle (axiom) at
refers to a particular type of system,
the beginning and a link between all the proposition and that principle
(axiom). And this is the idea we do find in Kant and then in Kelsen too. Don’t
neokantian philosopher!
forget that Kelsen is
Mario Losano wrote:
punti di contatto fra la concezione sistematica di Christian Wolff e
«I
quelli di Immanuel Kant scaturiscono dal comune interesse per le
scienze esatte e dal fatto che l’insegnamento di Wolff giunge a Kant
attraverso uno dei più importanti allievi di questo filosofo: Martin
Knutzen, che fu professore di filosofia a Königsberg nel periodo in cui il
giovane Kant frequentò l’università. Queste considerazioni permettono
di situare le concezioni sistematiche di Kant nel filone che partendo
dalla teologia protestante attraverso Leibniz, Wolff e Lambert ultima
nella filosofia classica tedesca».
We don’t have to forget that at the basis of science, of the scientific way of
there is Protestant theology.
thinking Do not forget that a certain idea of
hierarchy was developed by Dionigi Aeropagita. In Protestant theology the
idea of knowledge as system came out.
We cannot understand the philosophical debate of our era without looking at
the classical german philosophy.
If we remember Protestant theory, we know that it does not exist any
you may have a direct
Protestant church. The very basic idea is that
access to God's truth: you don't need a Pope, or a priest or someone able
to explain to you the real meaning of Holy Bible. You have to understand
self-made man religion.
everything by yourself: you may have a sort of But
how is it possible this kind of conception at the very basic and material
level? Everyone can read the Bible because it is printed; you need
Gutenberg. Before Gutenberg it is impossible to conceive Protestant theory,
because only priests and Pope had the possibility to have a Bible.
To have Luther you must have Gutenberg: it is not a case that the very first
book printed by Gutenberg was the bible.
Just think at the same way for law: it is possible to conceive law in the
we do have a Code.
modern way because Just imagine how without sense
would be the idea given by Bentham that everyone may know the content of
law without a code. You as a man must have the possibility to reach the
source of law by yourself, so you don’t need interpretation. Then, after a
it does not exist a text in itself
couple of century, the idea is that (as
but only different interpretations that is in the
Stanley Fish claimed)
interpretation itself.
Without Gutenber's invention we may not be able to understand Luther.
Without Gutenberg no idea of the law produced by the Code civil. But again,
according to Mario Losano without Luther is impossible to conceive the idea
of system we do find in Leibniz, Wolff, Lambert, in Kant and then in Kelsen.
Lozano wrote:
Kant il concetto di sistema subisce un’ulteriore duplice
«In
specificazione che verrà fatta propria dai filosofi successivi; il sistema
diviene l'ideale cui deve tendere ogni scienza: non v’è scientificità senza
sistematicità; in secondo luogo il sistema non è soltanto un insieme
deduttivo di proposizioni, ma è un insieme di proposizioni che deve
essere dedotto da un unico principio. Nel far coincidere la sistematicità
con la scienza Kant prende per modello la matematica»
To have science we must have a systematic knowledge. To have a system
deduct every
means not only to use the deductive method but also to
proposition from a single principle. The principle is the Grundnorm which
principle of knowledge.
is not only the basis of pyramid but the We must be
able to create a link between every kind of norm in that system and the
grundnorm and if it doesn't exist the link it means that that law is outside the
system. To have deduction mean this: you have one principle and all legal
propositions are deducted from that principle. From this point of view Mario
Losano is clear in saying:
[dottrina di Kelsen può essere considerata la] più esauriente
«La
descrizione del sistema giuridico realizzata in linguaggio naturale e il
punto d’arrivo della concezione sistematica del Novecento»
We are so involved in this conception that nowadays, again and again, we
if it has something to do with science;
think that we do have a knowledge
we do have a knowledge if we do have a system. It is clear in the so-called
«dogmatica giuridica», and one of the best example is given by civil
procedure. System in itself must be coherent without hole or antinomies. It is
possible in Kelsen because he is not involved in the problem of the real
meaning of norm but he sustains a formal theory of norm. We have only to
look at the norm in connection to Grundnorm: it is a pure theory of law.
Remember that this is a conception typical of legal positivism because there
is a great distinction between “is” and “ought” (between “essere” e “dovere
law morality.
essere”), and so between and To have a moral judgement on
would mean to look to the
law; to ask from a moral point of view on law,
content of law: is it just or is it unjust? The problem for Kelsen was not
morality in law, but validity of norms and validity in a system: this is why he
adopts a formalistic account, avoiding completely the question about
morality.
THE FAILURE OF KELSEN’S MODEL
As we already know this kind of conception is completely unable to be
considered valid. First of all because it is contradictory in itself: a pure theory
of law is not possible because or we make reference to metaphysical
assumption (as Grundnorm) or we make reference to empirical concepts (as
efficiency). If we say that law has nothing to do with fact we can't limit to say
that it works. Mirelle-Delmas Marty said that the idea of Kelsen is now
completely unable to explain the real state of affairs of our legal world. Just
have a look to the relation between the law made by the State and the
European law and International law. Imagine to be a Kelsenian and have a
look at Italian legal system and European legal system: which kind of
relationship is there between Europe law and Italian law? If we think as
Kelsen we are able to conceive only a hierarchical relation, but we know it is
We have to think, as Mirelle-Delmas Marty remembered us,
not true.
about cooperation: but the fact that Court of Justice can sanction us makes
the Kelsenian idea fall down.
As Mario Losano said:
il diritto interno e il diritto internazionale fanno parte del mondo
«Poiché
del diritto, la scienza giuridica non li può considerare due elementi
paritetici, cioè paralleli, come spesso avviene nella dottrina
internazionalistica tradizionale. Se fossero due ordinamenti distinti e
paritetici, ognuno discenderebbe da una sua norma fondamentale:
avremmo allora due norme fondamentali, due ordinamenti giuridici e
due scienze giuridiche. Questa dualità sarebbe però in contrasto con il
postulato dell’unità della scienza. Quest’ultimo esige che vi sia un’unica
norma fondamentale, da cui discendono sia il diritto interno, sia il diritto
internazionale; e di entrambi si occupa un’unica scienza giuridica.
All’interno della piramide discendente da un’unica norma
fondamentale, il diritto interno e il diritto internazionale non potranno
mai essere paritetici: uno dei due dovrà essere superiore all’altro. Qui
sta il problema: quale dei due deve essere considerato il superiore? Per
Kelsen, la posizione preminente spetta al diritto internazionale; negli
anni del totalitarismo egli si schierava così a favore del pacifismo e del
federalismo»
For Kelsen we cannot accept that European system and national system are
needs to point out that only a single Grundnorm
equal and parallel. He
exists and so one of the two system has to be superior to the other. And the
according to Kelsen the superior position is to be found in
fact is that
international law! Unfortunately, this theory can’t work: federalism and
pacifism are moral assumption, realized only because there was a bad
person called Hitler who stated laws that, according to the Stufenbau theory,
were valid! Kelsen thought that international system was superior because
but this has nothing to do with pure theory of
of pacifism and federalism,
law, which he had the aim to demonstrate: were
the fact is that nazist law
valid according to the theory of Kelsen, and that’s why he claimed (in a
way that is incoherent) that international law was superior. So the pure theory
of law doesn’t explain not only international law in relation to the law of the
in any case this conception of system is so rooted in
State; it is clear that
our mind that today too when we think about a good picture of law we
think about a system also if we know that the image by Kelsen is not a
good one. look to what happen in the real
The reaction of this was that we should
world. Again, as we see there is a problem between law and morality. Kelsen
is not able to avoid morality in his system even if he claimed he wanted.
LAW AND MORALITY IN POSITIVISM AND IN NATURAL LAW THEORY
According to Hart law may be confused with morality: they both aim to
govern human conduct, to give a bit of rules about what is better to do and
what not. We may criticize moral rules from a legal ground but according to
it is impossible to criticize legal rule from a moral ground.
someone
Maybe you may find that moral values are inside the legal system, but it
would be very difficult to say that moral norms are in some way legally
enforced. Law and morality seem to be the same thing but they have a lot of
difference.
Accordi