Prospettive per una difesa europea comune: come la guerra in Ucraina ha rinviato l'esigenza di sicurezza

Prospects for a common European defence: how the war in Ukraine has rekindled the need for security

University of Catania Department of Political and Social Sciences Master's degree course in Global Politics and Euro-Mediterranean Relations LM-62 Ettore Diego Verde

Thesis Supervisor Prof. Emeritus of Political Science Fulvio Attinà

Anno accademico 2021-2022

Table of contents

• Table of Contents..............................................................................................................................................................1
• Introduction..........................................................................................................................................2
• Chapter 1: The Defence Organization in the European Union.............................................................6
• Political and Historical Background.................................................................................................6
• Institutional Framework.................................................................................................................13
• Legal Basis.....................................................................................................................................21
• Chapter 2: Critical issues and limits of European Defence................................................................28
• Political and Operational Limits.....................................................................................................28
• Toxic relationship with NATO........................................................................................................33
• Industrial Economic Limits............................................................................................................38
• Chapter 3: European Union Action in support and defense of Ukraine.............................................44
• The crisis in Ukraine: context and recent developments................................................................44
• EU intervention..............................................................................................................................51
• The energy issue and the new trade routes.....................................................................................62
• Chapter 4: Future EU defence and security initiatives.......................................................................72
• Strategic Compass EU and direction given by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.............................72
• EU Technological innovation: Fincantieri e Leonardo within the project MALE and Tempest....76
• ........................................................................................................................................................82
• European Union Strategy in the Global Era: What the EU should be able to do...........................83
• Conclusion..........................................................................................................................................90
• Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................91
• Webography........................................................................................................................................93

1

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, most EU Member States have not really felt threatened in their sovereignty and security, given that European collective military power is among the most important in the world and that they could still count on the protection of United States. But today China is becoming more and more assertive, Russia is on the rise again, America focuses more on the Indo-Pacific than on Europe, and other non-state powers and actors present a series of asymmetrical threats, so that many Member States are facing new challenges to security against which they do not have the capacity to defend themselves.

However, security will remain the responsibility of the Member States, which will continue to have most of the capabilities for action, and Europeans will continue to rely on US cooperation and assistance. But Europe needs more cooperation and internal interaction to strengthen Member States' security capabilities and reduce dependence on the United States. The needs in this sense are becoming more and more urgent.

In addition to exploiting traditional European vulnerabilities, Russia has begun testing with innovative ways to remodulate asymmetric interdependence into a competitive advantage in security. So-called "hybrid" efforts range from attacks on critical information systems to the suspension of essential services such as energy supply and financial services, to the erosion of public trust in government institutions and accentuation of social division.

The European Union is experiencing a period of great unpredictability. The process of integration, based on the founding treaties of the three Communities, that of Paris in 1951 and those of Rome in 1957, changed and integrated by the subsequent Single European Act and then by the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, lies in these years marking time.

In the preamble of the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957, establishing the European Economic Community, the governments of the six founding states declared themselves "determined to lay the foundations for an ever-closer union between the peoples of Europe"[CITATION tre \l 1040 ]. Within the preamble of the written Treaty, in force today, the reference to "ever nearer union"[ CITATION Rom57 \l 1040 ] (moreover attenuated by that to the principle of subsidiarity) has slipped from first point to last.

It cannot be denied that the combination method, launched with enthusiasm by the last nice European statesmen, is nowadays in a very deep crisis. Those statesmen have mostly been replaced by politicians without vision and references to the values that instead inspired those who, in the aftermath of the tragedy of the conflict, thought of a future of peace and prosperity entrusted to supranational institutions.

The economic and monetary crisis, the challenges of economic process, the pressure of migratory phenomena, terrorism, conflicts within the Moslem world, Brexit, the robust competition between China and the United States and, lastly, the Russian attack in Ukraine lead governments to make choices far from that noble and ambitious goal.

The aggression of Ukrainian territory by the Russian army has shaken the West to the European Union's traditional conception of common security and defence.

2

After February 24, values such as democracy and rule of law that have underpinned the European Union have been called into question. More generally, it is questioning the role that the EU is and will be called upon to play in defending the security of its citizens and the Union’s response to requests for military aid from neighboring countries. The contribute of lethal weapons to a State under military attack in Europe, decided by Decision 2022/338, is a turning point from the past.

The promotion of the Strategic Compass is, in turn, an important general rule for the future of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Well timed as its adoption may seem, its content risks being already ill-suited to the needs arising from the conflict in Ukraine. A recent, efficacious Common Security and Defence Policy could foresee abandoning unanimity in the decision-making process and can, in any event, only be accompanied by major reforms in the EU's institutional governance, especially in terms of external model. Ukraine's possible joining to the EU would pose further significant challenges, also in the defence sector, in the light of Art. 42 TEU. These missions would make more necessary to set up a self-standing European defence, within the wider framework.

"National sovereignty" leads some politicians to renounce the choices of integration (with the necessary renunciation of significant elements of state sovereignty) and the consequent returns to borders, barriers, obstacles, national solutions. The international European political moment shows signs of discouragement and confusion even within national political parties. We have witnessed the crisis of the Draghi government in Italy, Macron's loss of power over Le Pen's nationalism, all signs of a profound identity crisis.

Despite these issues, security is also the most conceptually developed aspect of the agenda of sovereignty. The long debate on European defence and strategic autonomy has resulted in the Strategic Compass which aims to identify the general priorities that can be implemented through the strategy the EU's global capabilities and the capabilities that the EU should possess for this purpose. The starting point is a shared threat analysis, the first attempt of its kind at European level. The process of Strategic Compass could help develop the much-needed culture of common European security and help bridge the gap between real security risks and the development of adequate European response capacities. In this process, the ultimate ambition of the EU should be to achieve strategic sovereignty in security and defense.

The Union is highly vulnerable to threats from China, Russia, and other state and non-state actors and is highly dependent on the United States for its security. The efforts made so far, such as PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), the European Defense Fund and the European Peace Facility, are heading in the right direction but, while considerable from an institutional perspective, they are inadequate with respect to the security vulnerabilities of Europe. The situation is not destined to change significantly with the current Biden administration and compared to the original ambitions the financial endowment of these instruments is decidedly modest.

However, the financial aspect is not the main issue. The perceived lack of security by many Member States is making it much more difficult for Europeans to develop common approaches in geopolitics and making it easier for external actors to interfere to divide and rule in Europe. The European Recovery Fund offers some opportunities to increase or at least restore funding for defense initiatives, although this remains politically difficult. Although the economic element is certainly important, the problem is not so much the availability of resources as the fact that those available must be spent to promote European solidarity and acquire adequate capacities to counter emerging threats to Europe's security. According to the European Parliament, more than 80% of defense purchases remain confined to the national sphere. [CITATION Par22 \l 1040 ]

3

In the fervor of the early years of the Communities, the six original Member States had conceived a truly demanding project, which had led to the signing of the Treaty establishing the European Defense Community (hereinafter EDC). The failure of the French National Assembly to authorize ratification suffocated the new institutional creature in the cradle, and the treaties that, in the following decades, had just outlined new commitments in the sphere of a "common foreign and defense policy" had brought little results.

Almost fifteen years after the Treaty of Lisbon, the promise of permanent structured cooperation in defense matters has finally come to life. The first unified command center for European military missions was also established. The EU has equipped itself with a military committee, currently chaired by the Italian general Claudio Graziano, former chief of defense staff. Some progress has also been made to encourage research and technological innovation (with related funding).

The European Union is gradually establishing itself as not only a regional but also a global security actor, capable of having an impact on the international scene, albeit in very different ways according to the areas and issues in question. Peace and security have become essential principles and objectives of the project of building a united Europe, also regarding EU relations with the rest of the world.

The present analysis aims to explain how the EU’s external action is configured, around security, understood in an inclusive and multi-dimensional way. Starting from the basic theories of European integration, the instruments and procedures of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP, redefined Common Security and Defense Policy CSDP), are first examined, taking into account the innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, to then offer, on the basis of the progress made by European foreign and security policy, a conceptual examination of the EU as an international actor, in the light of the most recent theories.

Following, in order, after a mention on the historical evolution of the Union, the analysis of the policies and regulations used by the EU to stabilize the neighboring areas, of the methods and mechanisms used by the EU in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. And the structures, mechanisms, and operations of civil and military crisis management, as well as the institutional and coordination profile of the EU with global international organizations – such as the UN – or regional ones such as NATO – and the African Union.

The second chapter will analyze the difficulties that the Union had to face to establish itself on the international scene, and which put a strain on the common defense project to name a few: NATO’s skepticism in the aftermath of the Treaty of Saint Malo, obsolete technology in European weapons systems during the war in Iraq and also, the conflict in Kosovo in which the EU confirmed NATO’s superiority, and finally the conflicting views of the founding countries regarding PESCO, inclusive policy of Germany in contrast to that of effectiveness of France. Today’s challenges and objectives to which the Union is called to commit itself will follow. First of all, energy independence, commercial relations and the defense industrial technical innovation investment program.

The third chapter will address the issue of the conflict in Ukraine from a purely European point of view. For the first time the European Union has reacted not only as a civil actor through economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia but also under the point of defense, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Borrell has approved the strategic compass that provides the European Union with a real opportunity to strengthen the EU’s security and defense policy.

4

Finally, the fourth chapter outlines the perspectives in which the European Union, through future defense and security policies, will succeed in affirming itself in the international context. The article uses content and historical analysis as its approach to draw attention to key occasions in the escalating supranationalization of security and defense industry research. To demonstrate how EU institutions and organized interest groups have shaped policy decisions that resulted in hybridization between EU civilian research and technology projects and security and defense, the analysis cites pertinent official documents, important texts, and expert and policy reports. In the chapter is used a qualitative research strategy based on inductive reasoning. Last, the chapter analyzes how the European Union is investing in the defense and security sector in the years to come and whether the European Army will be established or whether it will remain just a utopia.

5

Chapter 1: The defence organization in the European Union

Political and historical background

In recent years, a process for the development of a common security and defense policy has been launched within the European Union (EU), which signals the recognition of this area as an essential component of a broader common foreign policy, already extensively experienced in the sectors of commercial relations, cooperation with other states, association with non-EU countries and international organizations and aid to developing countries.

The need to equip the EU with the structures, means and institutions to deal directly with crisis management, carving out a role on the sidelines of today's security and defense system guaranteed by NATO, has also unequivocally resulted from the wars that have broken out in Europe in the 1990s, which showed the almost non-existence of a common line on the part of the member countries of UE.

Before examining the recently sketched answers, it is appropriate to mention some meanings that the terms defense and security evoke. The concept of defense mainly refers to a protection action carried out under a strictly military profile, but it can also indicate the protection of the territory undertaken with alternative means or external intervention. Defining what can be understood by safety is, on the other hand, more difficult, since it involves a significantly more varied and complex spectrum of actions and guarantees to be applied to individual policies and requires a much broader set of conditions to be met jointly.

Security and defense identify concepts that are not coincident but complementary to each other: the "security and defense policy" is aimed at providing adequate responses in the presence of different threats, dangers, emergencies that the simple military-type defense policy is not suitable to deal with. The term "security" has been defined in various ways and there are many meanings to which it can be traced; international events have exerted a not negligible influence on the formulation of the different meanings that have been

1

attributed to this term. The objectives of national security "are pursued through a complex of diplomatic, economic, military activities and implemented internally and externally, in which the means of war are used directly or indirectly (as means of persuasion or deterrence)( ...) with activities aimed at influencing the international structure in which a government finds itself operating, resolving tensions and obtaining, possibly, at the same time, more favorable conditions

2

for the exercise of power".

The horizons of historical-political and sociological reflection on security have expanded following the international changes generated by the collapse of the USSR and the advent of democracy in Eastern European countries which have contributed to enriching perspectives and methods. European foreign and security policy has been on