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EMOTIONS ARE FLUIDS
EMOTIONS ARE FLUIDS IN A CONTAINER (THE BODY)
Rationale behind the expression “I flipped my lid”. When the fluid in the container is too much
or too agitated, the container overflows. If there is a lid on the container, the pressure in the
container causes the lid to pop open.
Anger is an emotion.When there is too much anger in the body the emotion is represented as
boiling, rising and causing the top (the head) to pop open. That is where the expression “I
flipped my lid” (meaning “I was extremely angry”) comes from.
I flipped my lid.
I blew my top
I blew my stack
I hit the ceiling.
CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS
-A set of conceptual metaphors organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one
another
CM: LOVE IS MADNESS FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION: I’m crazy about her.
CM: LOVE IS WAR FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION: He fled from her advances.
CM: LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION: I could feel the electricity
between us..
A concept is structured by the metaphor PARTIALLY and it can be EXTENDED in SOME ways but
not in others.
MORE IS UP LESS IS DOWN
The figurative expression: He attacked every weak point in my argument
is motivated by The CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR (CM): AN ARGUMENT IS A BATTLE
LOVE IS FIRE
He was on fire with emotion
They were ablaze with emotion
Seeing her every day kindled his passion for her
He was burning with desire
She fanned the flames of his desire
She was consumed by passion
He was all burned out
Time extinguishes passion
Happy is up; sad is down.
Conscious is up; unconscious is down.
Health and life are up; sickness and death are down.
ECONOMY IS WAR inflation is my biggest enemy
Idiomatic expression
-a polylexical (partially fixed) unit whose meaning cannot be derived from its component parts
I flipped my lid
TIME IS MOTION
In cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor, or cognitive metaphor, refers to the
understanding of one idea, or conceptual domain, in terms of another, for example,
understanding quantity in terms of directionality (e.g. "prices are rising"). A conceptual domain
can be any coherent organization of human experience. The regularity with which different
languages employ the same metaphors, which often appear to be perceptually based, has led
to the hypothesis that the mapping between conceptual domains corresponds to neural
mappings in the brain.
One of the commonly used conceptual metaphors is "argument is war". This metaphor shapes
our language in the way we view argument as war or as a battle to be won. It is not
uncommon to hear someone say "He won that argument" or "I attacked every weak point in
his argument". The very way argument is thought of is shaped by this metaphor of arguments
being war and battles that must be won. Argument can be seen in many other ways other than
a battle, but we use this concept to shape the way we think of argument and the way we go
about arguing.
Conceptual metaphors are used very often to understand theories and models. A conceptual
metaphor uses one idea and links it to another to better understand something. For example,
the conceptual metaphor of viewing communication as a conduit is one large theory explained
with a metaphor. So not only is our everyday communication shaped by the language of
conceptual metaphors, but so is the very way we understand scholarly theories. These
metaphors are prevalent in communication and we do not just use them in language; we
actually perceive and act in accordance with the metaphors.
There are two main roles for the conceptual domains posited in conceptual metaphors:
Source domain: the conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions (e.g.,
love is a journey).
Target domain: the conceptual domain that we try to understand (e.g., love is a journey).
A mapping is the systematic set of correspondences that exist between constituent elements of
the source and the target domain. Many elements of target concepts come from source
domains and are not preexisting. To know a conceptual metaphor is to know the set of
mappings that applies to a given source-target pairing. The same idea of mapping between
source and target is used to describe analogical reasoning and inferences.
A primary tenet of this theory is that metaphors are matter of thought and not merely of
language: hence, the term conceptual metaphor. The metaphor may seem to consist of words
or other linguistic expressions that come from the terminology of the more concrete conceptual
domain, but conceptual metaphors underlie a system of related metaphorical expressions that
appear on the linguistic surface. Similarly, the mappings of a conceptual metaphor are
themselves motivated by image schemas which are pre-linguistic schemas concerning space,
time, moving, controlling, and other core elements of embodied human experience.
Conceptual metaphors typically employ a more abstract concept as target and a more concrete
or physical concept as their source. For instance, metaphors such as 'the days [the more
abstract or target concept] ahead' or 'giving my time' rely on more concrete concepts, thus
expressing time as a path into physical space, or as a substance that can be handled and
offered as a gift. Different conceptual metaphors tend to be invoked when the speaker is trying
to make a case for a certain point of view or course of action. For instance, one might
associate "the days ahead" with leadership, whereas the phrase "giving my time" carries
stronger connotations of bargaining. Selection of such metaphors tends to be directed by a
subconscious or implicit habit in the mind of the person employing them.
The principle of unidirectionality states that the metaphorical process typically goes from the
more concrete to the more abstract, and not the other way around. Accordingly, abstract
concepts are understood in terms of prototype concrete processes. The term "concrete," in this
theory, has been further specified by Lakoff and Johnson as more closely related to the
developmental, physical neural, and interactive body (embodied philosophy, embodied realism,
experientialism).
Although Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) developed the basic idea here in different ways
(see also Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Johnson 2007), the general flavor of the view they share
can be conveyed by considering a well-known example they discuss: that of love as a kind of
journey. Those in a romantic relationship are often said to head off together, travel the same
path, take wrong turns, retrace their steps, check their bearings, and pack their bags. For
Lakoff and Johnson, this non-literal language is not merely peripheral expression useful for
adding bells and whistles to the bustle of communication, but reflects something deep about
how love is conceptualized. Importantly, the central organizing metaphor—love is a journey—
involves a mapping from one domain (journeys) to another (love), where the source domain is
informed by our bodily physicality and the embodied experience that we have as creatures who
move through the world to achieve purposes and goals.
cross-cultural
As previously mentioned, one type of cross-cultural variation occurs when languages
differ with respect to the particular source that is conventionally mapped onto a common
target domain. In other words, a given conceptual metaphor may be common in one culture
but uncommon in another. Not all conceptual metaphors seem susceptible to this type of
variation, though. Following Grady(1997, 1999), we suggest dividing the set of conceptual
metaphors that have so far been identified by cognitive semanticists into two broad categories:
primary and complex metaphors. Many primary metaphors map image-schemas onto abstract
experience (e.g., Lakoff, 1990). Examples of image-schemas are UP-DOWN, IN-OUT, and
so on. These “bare” image-schemas are used to lend structure to abstract domains through
general conceptual metaphors like the following: “MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN” (e.g., “An IQ
of over 150,” “An income below the average”), and “THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE
EMOTIONS” (e.g., “She was filled with hatred,” “Don’t keep all that anger inside you”). These
metaphors are motivated by correlations in the domain of general physical experience. For
example, if you add objects to a pile, the pile will grow (hence MORE IS UP”). Because this
kind of general physical experience is universal, we would expect to find similar image-
schema-based conceptual metaphors in communities around the world. Other primary
metaphors, whose experiential grounding also seems universal, include cases like “STRONG
DESIRE IS HUNGER”(e.g., “We are hungry for a victory;” Grady, 1999, p. 85).
The second category of metaphors, however, is more likely to be susceptible to culture-specific
influences. These are more complex conceptual metaphors that combine (or compound)
different primary metaphors. For example, “THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS” (e.g., “Without a
solid foundation, your theory will soon collapse”) combines the primary metaphors
“ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE” and “PERSISTING IS REMAINING ERECT”
(Grady, 1997).
Complex metaphors result in “richer” imagery. For example, although “LIFE IS A JOURNEY”
(e.g., “We’ll have to get round many obstacles to get married,” “The quest for love and
happiness”) is clearly based on the MOTION image schema, it can be “enriched” by specifying
the kind of vehicles involved, such as trains (e.g., “It’s about time you got back onto the right
track”), ships (e.g., “She’s been drifting without a real purpose in life”), cars (e.g. “He’s in the
fast lane to success”), and so on. “ABSTRACT COMPETITION IS RACING” (e.g., “Running for
president,” “Staying ahead of our economic competitors”) also belongs here, because the
metaphor imposes a richer scenario on the “bare” MOTION schema. Other examples of
complex metaphors are those that map our knowledge of man-made things onto abstract
domains: “THE MIND IS A COMPUTER”(e.g., “This amnesic patient processes input, but
cannot retrieve the data afterwards”), COMPETITION IS WARFARE” (e.g., “To
conquer market share”), and so on.
Unlike the general physical experience that underlies primary metaphors, complex experiential
domains are more likely to be culture-dependent and thus to vary from place to place. As a
result, such a particular domain may not be (equally) available for metaphorical mapping in all
cultures. It follows that cross-cultural variation is more likely to occur when metaphors of the
second category (i.e., complex metaphors) are involved. For example, one would not expect
an isolated community in the