Q&A philo
1. W
hat is the difference between operative and ontological concepts? Are these concepts
related?
- Operative concepts are those concepts that are apt for operating, ready for use in the sense that
one can immediately operate it and on its basis. Operating here means to obtain an effect.
Operative notions are notions with which I can operate, however these are never original notions,
they are always derived from other notions in ways whose implications are not within the scope of
what a functional theory can envisage.
- Those concepts from which operative concepts are derived are called ontological concepts and they
are related in this way. In literal terms they are concepts that “say being”, where being is an element
that as such concerns the being of man and is only given within its relation to man. In other words,
“being” is a matter of sense and there is sense only where there is man, just as everything which
human beings conceive and of which they partake is, somehow sense. In other words, ontological
concepts draw their transparency from the clarification of a being-relation that must always be
interrogated and anewed through these concepts themselves.
- In the transition from an ontological concept to an operative one, the relation to the dimension of
being is lost or cut off. In fact, operative concepts obtain their peculiar evidence and manageability
precisely because this relation to being is cut off and the trait of man’s being that consists in
engaging in, and attending to, that relation remains inert. In fact, in the domain of operative
concepts, the only thing that counts is operating and there is no need to question the origin and the
implications of the concepts involved, in other words there is no need for philosophising.
-
C
oncepts can be operative and ontological. The two differ in most traits, but are connected since the
former originates from the latter.
- Operative notionsare such that are ready to use andto operate with them, obtaining a steerable
effect. They seem to be unworthy of further analysis, in the sense that the principle of being will not
be interrogated. This cuts off the relation to the sense and man, since his peculiar trait consists in
engaging, i.e. think and say, in the sense, remains inert in front of the sense. He does not feel the
necessity to interrogate the sense and to be interrogated by it.
- Operative concepts are therefore shaped thanks to this truncation of the sense. This
operation is called formatting and the concepts derived from such operation are also called
formats
- Ontological conceptsare those that “say being”. Saymeans here to gather and to make
something appear, while being - l’essente - indicates the element that concerns the being of man
and is given as far as it is in relation to man. Being is a matter of sense. In front of ontological
concepts man is asked to explicitly sustain the sense, which means that man has to interrogate the
sense and has to be interrogated by the sense. It is a further analysis at the origin of the being,
where origin means the fundamental ground of the being.
T
o analyse the difference between these two concepts it is important to focus on the etymology of the two.
The first, operative, refers to the practical and concrete aspects of things, its aim is to obtain an effect. The
second, instead, is referred to the ontical aspect of beings, it is an interrogation of beings and operative
concepts derives from ontological. As it is possible to see, the concepts are different because one focuses on
the first and essential trait of the being, the sense, while the other focuses on its usefulness. Since the
importance of philosophical work is the constant effort of tracing back commonly employed concepts from
the operative to the ontological dimension. We can conclude by saying that yes, they are related and that
ontologicals are at the basis of operative ones.
2. H
ow does Plato define the idea of ideas? In what way does this notion satisfy the
requirements of a philosophical principle?
Starting from the idea of the good (meant not in a moral sense but in the sense of good for\ fitting) , Plato
says that the good is that thanks to which any idea is “good for being an idea” thanks to the fact that it
consists and is referred to the good. The good is the principle of ideas, in the sense that the idea of the
good harmonises all ideas as such and constitutes them as a well-tempered whole. Moreover, the idea of
the good constitutes the ground for the “that ''-trait of the good, as the good itself must display an ultimate
thatness to constitute the ground for the good as such, that is the steadiness of any idea. Therefore, for
Plato the idea of the good is the idea of the ideas. Since ideas are not visible, but only intelligible or
understandable, ideas obtain their capacity for being intellected from the good. This notion satisfies the
requirements of a philosophical principle as the relation between ideas and thinking is original, in that ideas
and thinking do not pre-exist in this relation, but are simultaneously originated as this relation, thus the
flgrancy of the good is the relation between flagrant ideas and awakened thinking. In Plato’s thinking
alétheia is the flagrancy of the good which, as the ultimate source of the beingness of beings, lightens ideas
and man’s regard for ideas.
:
P
latodefinestheideaofideaswiththeGreekwordagathonthatcanbetranslatedastheGood
.Itisthebasis
of ideas since every idea obtains its temper from it and is brought into a harmonic whole. The relation
betweenthegoodandideasisthatthesetranslatethegoodnessintoagroundfortheappearingofideas.This
notion satisfies the requirements of a philosophical principle because it satisfies both thewhatnessandthe
thatness.
-
I
dea of ideas= the Good
- The good is the first ground because it “wakens” the view-offering element (namely, ideas)
- the good can not be AN idea but rather THE idea because any idea is an idea thanks to the fact that it
consists in the good = it is the MOST BEING
-
+ it is the HIGHEST BEING because it endows ideas with the 2 constitutive traits of the “that” and the “what”
- philosophical interrogation requires beings to be grounded with regard to their being-character (the what) and
with regard to the ground of their being (the that) = philosophy wants to find a being that is at the same time
essence-granting and existence-granting, therefore the Good, insofar as it is the most-being and the
highest-being, satisfies the requirements of a philosophical principle
-
P
lato’s idea of idea, which means the principle of ideas is the Good. It is not a moral good, but the
fundamental fitting-ness: any idea is good for being an idea and any being is good for being the
being it is. Good gives steadiness to the ideas and the intelligibility, ie.e the capacity to being
intellected, by man.
- Good is a philosophical principle. Philosophical because it requires man to be interrogated and to
interrogate it; principle because interrogates what is the origin in an ontological way, rather than
chronologically.
3. L
ay out the philosophical notion of contingency. Why don’t we encounter this notion in the
context of scientific reasoning?
Contingency is a name for the relation between the things when their sense is not explicit and us
when we do not explicitly sustain the sense of things. In contingency we are in a natural state of
obviousness in which no peculiar sense is needed and there is no time and space for a breaking of
sense. In the encounter with what is contingent, the sense of that which is reduced to contingency is
not interrogated, not sustained in knowledge and thus not clarified, indeed that sense does not, in
t
he first place, ask to be interrogated or sustained in sufficient knowledge. In this state the ordinary
world view is a basis for the scientific understanding. In this case the scientific understanding is a
reassurance and yet a modification of the ordinary world view of a precise epoch. However, we do
not encounter this notion in the context of scientific reasoning because in that field we do not
interrogate ourselves about this about the breaking of the sense, even if in basic researchevery
scientific knowledge is the breaking of dis-contingency
C
ontingency is a concept that can be defined in many different ways. It can be identified both as the point of
inception of philosophy and also as the name of the way things are in our everyday form of existence. It is a
condition to leave things as brute things, meaning the incapacity to understand the sense of things but purely
the result. It is a danger for humanity since it is characterised by not getting the sense of things. In scientific
reasoning we do not encounter this concept because, even if science is immersed in contingency, it is not
aware of it. While philosophy is the knowledge of dis-contingency, so the taking knowledge of sense of
things, science does not even interrogate itself on this so it is impossible to encounter the conc
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