Domestic governance of PRC

Conclusion

This analysis began with the assertion that the parameters and content of the policies pursued

by the major actors in the Taiwan Strait have been the product of history. During the period

from the end of World War II until the 1990s, cross-strait relations were largely an issue in

Sino-American relations. It was during this time that the fundamental positions of each side

which remain largely in force today were defined. In these years, the irreconcilable nature of

the American and Chinese positions was demonstrated by conflict, misunderstandings, and

shaky compromises.

By the last decade of the twentieth century, the focus shifted to relations across the strait

between Taiwan and the mainland. The democratization of Taiwan ended the island's wartime

stance and fostered a broad range of exchanges across the strait. However, democratization

meant popular reaction against previous policies of the KMT. This was directed at weakening

the assumption of Taiwan's political connection to the mainland and seeking to establish the

island's distinctive, sovereign status.

Since democratic Taiwan began to reshape relations, the United States and China have found

themselves interacting with each other and the island's government largely on the basis of the

principles established earlier. We have seen that the challenges to Sino-American relations

were the greatest during the administration of Chen Shui-bian. His efforts to establish greater

political distance from the mainland and to enhance Taiwan's international sovereign status

were seen by the mainland as upsetting the status quo as they defined it – that Taiwan was a

part of China. For the United States, the danger was a different one. When President George W.

Bush criticized Chen for upsetting the status quo, he had in mind a situation of peace and

stability in the Taiwan Strait and a concern that military action by the mainland would entrap

the United States. Chen's policies, thus, produced the unusual result of some parallelism in the

strait policy of the two powers.

When Ma Ying-jeou became president, relations took a very different turn. In contrast to Chen,

he took a position that, ironically, seemed consistent with the definition of the status quo held

by China and the United States while also being consistent with public opinion in Taiwan. For

Washington, he promised not to be a “troublemaker”; for the mainland, he accepted the concept

of one China while differing on its definition; and, for the Taiwanese public, he asserted that

the Republic of China was already an independent, sovereign country.

As we have seen, the change in cross-strait relations was dramatic and new. During the early

years of the Ma administration commentators predicted various outcomes for the new stability

in the Taiwan Strait. Some saw Taiwan drifting inexorably into the arms of the mainland but

differed over whether this would be a blow to American interests in Asia or the removal of a

major irritant in Sino-American relations. Others, more cautiously, saw the beginnings of a

process of institution-building that might lead to a more constructive and peaceful future

emerging out of the new status quo.

As the transition from the Ma Ying-jeou administration begins, it appears that these outcomes

have not materialized. Rather a very different kind of status quo has emerged.

The Ambiguity of “Status Quo”

As we have seen, all three actors in the Taiwan Strait define the status quo in a manner that

supports their positions. This renders the term unhelpful as a descriptor of the current state of

cross-strait relations. However, the term can be useful if we explore the implications of the

concept rather than its content.

The term status quo simply refers to things as they are. It tells us nothing about stability or

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durability. The status quo is robust or peaceful when the parties agree on the rules of the

game, but it is unstable when one (or more) of the parties involved is forced to accept

suboptimal situations because favored options are not possible. Finally, it is conflicted if one

(or more) of the parties considers the status quo to be unacceptable and pursues disruptive

policies. In a condition of a robust status quo, all parties are satisfied with conditions and are

committed to their indefinite continuation because it is consistent (or at least not inconsistent)

with their objectives, while the third condition is exactly the opposite, as competing and

irreconcilable objectives generate conflicting policies. The middle alternative is an

approximation of Leon Trotsky's “neither war nor peace.” It is a condition of stalemate or

deadlock where one (or more) of the parties accepts a status quo that doesn't conform to their

ultimate goals but is not prepared or able to challenge or disrupt it.

Why would one or more of the actors continue to accept a status quo that falls short of their

ultimate objective? One reason might be that the less than optimal situation would be seen as

possibly leading to one that conforms directly with ultimate goals. A second rationale might be

that external constraints make the cost of opposing such a condition prohibitive. The final

reason for accepting a suboptimal situation would be for short-term gains or needed stability

despite concerns that the continued maintenance of such a status quo might damage or erode the

chances of arriving at a favorable, or more permanent, solution at some later point. In such a