Cina e Taiwan

8

The Security Dimension

The previous discussion has depicted a cross-strait relationship that embodies a number of

contradictory and ambiguous threads. Economic relations have thrived between the two sides

for more than two decades, yet efforts to institutionalize that relationship or move it into non-

economic areas have encountered difficulties. Beijing has continued to reserve the right to use

force should unfavorable trends develop, the most egregious of which would be a declaration

of independence by the government in Taiwan – this, despite the fact that both major parties in

Taiwan have already declared that the ROC already is a sovereign and independent state

(albeit that one party says the state includes the mainland and the other does not). The United

States stands by President Clinton's formula that the issues between Taiwan and the mainland

“must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwan people,” but insists that it

“does not support” the island's independence – a possible choice by those people.

These contradictions reflect the reality that, while the three major actors appear to accept the

current situation in the Taiwan Strait, they all see it as less than ideal – even potentially

damaging to their interests. Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a vulnerable structure that persists

only because all sides are forced to accept an unacceptable status quo.

But what if this acceptance is challenged? Suppose the leadership in Beijing concludes that any

further continuation of the situation of stalemate will result in Taiwan's permanent separation

from the mainland and decides to resolve the situation before it comes to that. Or what if some

future government in Taipei actually provokes Beijing by pursuing policies suggesting a lurch

toward independence? If armed conflict results from these circumstances, what would the

response of the United States be?

This is a conflict that no side seeks, but it is one for which all sides are preparing. Indeed, as

we shall see, the nature of these preparations adds considerable volatility to any future crisis

situation. Not only are there signs of an arms race, but the strategic planning regarding the use

of those weapons indicates that any conflict there will not only escalate quickly but also

expand beyond the cross-strait area into East Asia.

China: Preparing on Two Fronts

Preparing for a Taiwan contingency has been a major driver of China's military modernization

over the past three decades. Specifically, the events of 1995–6, when the United States first

sailed an aircraft carrier undetected through the Taiwan Strait and then sent two carrier battle

groups to the area in response to Chinese missile tests, are generally identified as prompting

this effort. This modernization intensified during the Chen Shui-bian administration and,

despite the improved atmosphere that followed the election of Ma Ying-jeou in 2008,

continues until the present time. The result has been a radical transformation in the cross-strait

military balance and, with it, increasingly pessimistic appraisals of Taiwan's ability to resist

efforts by the mainland to use force to achieve its goals in the strait.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, most commentators considered that Taiwan had a good

chance of resisting a military campaign launched by the mainland (Shlapak 2009: 223). Today,

Annual Report

that has all changed. According to the 2013 United States Defense Department

to Congress, China has more than three times as many troops in the area as Taiwan (which

number 400,000) and possesses not only an imposing submarine force but also various types of

surface vessels, which can both assist in amphibious operations and serve as platforms from

which to launch missiles against other vessels at sea or in support of land operations (US

Department of Defense 2014). Considering only Taiwan's forces, the mainland has also

achieved supremacy in the air. It possesses a large number of advanced aircraft that have been

purchased from Russia or developed within China, as well as a sophisticated air defense

system that extends beyond the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps most dramatically, on the east coast

there are approximately 1,600 missiles (both ballistic and land attack), representing the bulk of

China's total inventory, which are capable of reaching not only Taiwan but certain American

bases in the Pacific. Finally, significant progress has been made by China in areas ranging from

cyber and electronic warfare to command and control. In short, without taking account of

American capabilities, the military balance in the strait has shifted decidedly in favor of the

mainland.

This imposing array of forces performs two functions in the mainland's management of cross-

strait relations. The first is as a deterrent – a threat of the consequences that might result from

any actions considered unacceptable to Beijing. In this sense, the mainland's military power

plays a passive role, standing as a warning of action that might be taken should Taipei act in a

provocative fashion. The second function is more active. It is compellence – using the threat of

force or its use to compel the government on Taiwan to take certain actions, such as acceding

to China's terms for unification, or to desist from unacceptable policies, such as moving

toward formal independence. It is this actual use of force and its consequences that is of

greatest concern and that has been a significant issue in Sino-American relations for decades.

We have seen that, ever since the ambassadorial talks in the 1950s, the United States has sought

Beijing's agreement to abandon the use of force in resolving cross-strait issues. China has

refused to do so, arguing, on the one hand, that it has the right to resolve a domestic matter

without outside interference and, on the other, that, without the continuing threat of force as the

ultimate solution to cross-strait matters, authorities on Taiwan would opt for independence.

Over the years Beijing has identified a number of actions short of independence, such as

occupation by foreign troops or Taipei's acquisition of nuclear weapons, that might require it

to respond with force. However, there have been suggestions that it might resort to coercion

under conditions that are even more ambiguous and subjective.

This is the case with both the 2000 White Paper and the Anti-Secession Law of 2005. In the

former, Beijing declared that, “if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die [indefinitely], to the

peaceful settlement of cross-Strait reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese

Government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of

force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of

reunification” (Taiwan Affairs Office 2011). In the latter, it was stipulated that

In the event that the “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act under any name

or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents

entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful

reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means

and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

(National People's Congress 2005)

A number of ways in which the leadership in Beijing might exercise military pressure have

been suggested. A blockade of the island might be declared, disrupting foreign trade, including

necessary imports for the island's economy. There could be a demonstration of cyber warfare

that would disrupt necessary civilian and military communications. Climbing further up the

ladder of coercive tools, Beijing could decide to use its considerable force of short-range

ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles on vital military and economic targets, which

might be followed up by a limited invasion by air or sea. Finally, should all else fail to secure

the necessary compliance with mainland demands, the final option would be a full-scale

missile attack, possibly accompanied by an invasion.

In the judgment of most military analysts, with the exception of a full-scale amphibious landing,

all of these options are presently available to mainland leaders should they decide that

deterrence has failed and coercive means must be used to change the behavior of the

government in Taipei. However, in contemplating these options, other factors would surely be

considered. The first would be the immediate disruption of the complicated strands of

production chains of which Taiwan and the mainland are a part (discussed in the last chapter),

as well as the probability of curtailment of global economic ties. Another would be the

reputational costs for China of resorting to compellence. For, to many observers, how Beijing's

leaders handle the Taiwan issue is a litmus test of future international behavior. A resort to

force, even if successful, would send an unfavorable signal in this respect. On the other hand,

should compellence fail, not only would the reputational costs be high, but the failure to

deliver on its decades-long commitment to unify the Chinese nation would undoubtedly impact

the legitimacy of the Communist Party and its leadership.

The success or failure of compellence would not be determined simply by the extent of China's

military might, as the resistance such efforts would encounter would also be a factor. Such

resistance would come in the first instance from the military and the people of Taiwan. The

island's military preparedness would determine the extent to which it could defend against or,

at least, diminish the full impact of a mainland assault, thus not only minimizing the destruction

of the island's defenses and infrastructure but also sustaining the morale of the population to

resist. Accomplishing both would also be necessary to allow time for international pressure

and/or support from the United States to come to the aid of Taiwan.

Of course, assistance from the United States is not a certainty. The Taiwan Relations Act does

not guarantee American intervention, and getting into conflict with China would certainly be

controversial within the United States. However, in light of past behavior and statements, a

prudent Chinese leadership would have to assume that aid would be forthcoming from the

United States, quite possibly including direct military involvement. Should it decide to resort

to coercive diplomacy to resolve the cross-strait issue on its own terms, Beijing would have to

consider the likelihood of a two-front conflict, as it sought not only to break Taiwan's

resistance but to prevent the United States from coming to its aid with supplies or through

military intervention.

Chinese military planning has focused on developing what is referred to in US military

parlance as an “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) force” to meet this eventuality (US

Department of Defense 2013). This assumes asymmetry between a more powerful American

and a weaker Chinese military. Its purpose is to slow the deployment of US forces into a

combat area or compel them to operate at a distance from it (A2) and, failing that, to disrupt

their operation within the area (AD). The methods employed would encompass a wide range

of actions intended to delay or diminish the impact of any intervention to assist Taiwan.

According to Chinese military writings, the focus of such an effort would be primarily on

deployed American naval and air forces as well as on the communications and command

1

systems that support them.

At sea, the Chinese focus would be on American aircraft carriers. Anti-ship ballistic missiles,

sea- and air-launched guided munitions, and submarines would all be mobilized to disable the

vessels or keep them at a distance. An advanced and complex anti-aircraft system would be

utilized to deal with any aircraft that might be carrier launched as well as aircraft from nearby

American bases in Guam, Okinawa, Korea, and possibly Japan. Finally, the expectation would

be that cyber warfare would be utilized in an attempt to disrupt intelligence as well as

command, control, and communications capabilities. In short, it is assumed that the Chinese

would seek to attack on the widest scale feasible in order to diminish the American advantage.

The manner in