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TABLE 1.8. Preliminary estimates of additional funding needs in 2011–2013 (as a share of GDP)

Draft Federal budget law

2008 2009 2010 2011–2013

Original Revised Actual

Actual Actual 2011 2012 2013

law law (Jan-June)

Total deficit ................................................... -4.1% 5.9% 6.8% 5.4% 2.0% 3.6% 3.1% 2.9%

1. Drawdown from the oil funds -4.8% 5.2% 5.2% 3.2% 1.9% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%

.....................

2. Net external financing -0.3% -0.3% 1.0% 0.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%

...............................

3. Net domestic financing 1.0% 1.1% 0.6% 2.1% -0.6% 3.0% 2.9% 2.7%

Source: World Bank staff estimates.

Reliance on domestic fi

nancing of the defi

cit presents at least two sets of challenges.

First, although there is enough liquidity in the domestic market to fi nance an overall fi

scal

defi cit below 3 percent of GDP, even if the 2011–2012 budgets are implemented as planned,

there is a real risk that interest rates will rise and crowd out bond issues by SOEs or large

enterprises. Second, the fi

scal adjustment on the expenditure side could become slower and

the defi

cit higher in the election cycle in 2011–2012, putting further pressure on the domestic

market, aggravating the interest rate and crowding out effects.

Given the fi scal constraints, some post crisis priorities might be fi nanced by off-budget

vehicles, increasing contingent liabilities. The budget code limits the government’s ability

to lend directly to commercial entities, so the Vneshekonombank (VEB) has become a de

facto source of long-term fi

nancing for large investment projects in infrastructure and other

strategic sectors. It is expected in the medium-term that the VEB will support government’s

priorities in fostering innovation, modernization, and diversifi

cation (including addressing

the The VEB is also supporting preparations for Sochi Olympic Games in 2014. In

monotowns). 32

recent years it has benefi ted from capital injections fi

nanced by the federal budget.

Overall, fi

scal risks have increased, suggesting the need to rethink the fi scal strategy in

the face of heightened uncertainty and downside risks in the oil market. First, the pace of fi s-

cal adjustment in the 2011–2013 budgets is slower than initially envisaged, pushing the hard

decisions on expenditure adjustments into the future. As discussed in the RER22, a more

rapid adjustment would lead to a faster convergence of the non-oil fi scal defi cit to a long-

term sustainable level of about 4.3 percent of GDP. Second, as in other countries, expenditure

pressures may increase in the election cycle 2011–2012 leading to further weakening of fi scal

adjustment. Third, with high budgeted price of oil close to the current forecast, Russia’s bud-

get has lost the cushion it had in previous years, becoming more vulnerable than in the past

to sudden drops in the price of oil. A sustained USD20 dollar drop from the current levels

could raise Russia’s fi scal defi cit in 2011 by two percentage points of GDP.

3 RUB 180 billion in 2007, RUB75 billion in 2008, RUB121 billion in 2009.

16 | Russian Economic Report. № 23. November, 2010 II

Economic and Social Outlook for Russia,

2010–2012

Summary: With moderating global and Western European growth, uncertain oil prices and capital

fl ows, Russia is likely to grow by 4.2 percent in 2010, followed by 4.5 percent in 2011 and 3.5 percent in

2012 as domestic demand expands in line with gradual improvements in the labor and credit markets.

With such moderate growth prospects, unemployment situation is likely to get worse before it gets

better later in 2011.

Preliminary updates to the World Bank’s forecast suggest global GDP growth of about

3.5 percent this year, slowing to 3.2 percent in 2011 before recovering to around 3.6 percent

in 2012. Developing countries are expected to continue outperforming high-income countries

by a wide margin, with GDP growth of about 6.6 percent in 2010 and just less-than 6 percent

in 2011 before fi rming somewhat in 2012 (table 2.1). This compares favorably with the

2.5, 2.3 and 2.8 percent anticipated for high-income countries. Excluding China and India,

developing countries are projected to grow at 5.2, 4.5 and 4.8 percent, with average growth

above 4 percent in all regions (except Sub-Saharan Africa), and above 7 percent in East- and

South Asia. TABLE 2.1. The summary of the global outlook

2009 (actual) 2010 2011 2012

World ................................................................................... -2.1 3.5 3.2 3.6

High income countries ......................................................... -3.3 2.5 2.3 2.8

Developing countries ............................................................ 1.8 6.6 5.9 6.1

China .................................................................................... 8.7 9.5 8.5 8.2

Japan ................................................................................... -5.2 2.4 1.6 2.0

The United States ................................................................. -2.6 2.6 2.3 2.9

Euro area .............................................................................. -4.1 1.3 1.7 2.1

Russia .................................................................................. -7.9 4.2 4.5 3.5

Global Economic Prospects, The World Bank.

Source:

The global transition from today’s very loose macro policies to a more neutral stance

is a key challenge for all countries. Too abrupt a tightening could cut into the recovery—too

slow a response could see demand outstripping supply. The latter point is of special concern

given uncertainty over potential output—especially in high-income countries at the heart of

the fi

nancial crisis. If recent research suggesting that fi nancial crises tend to reduce potential

output by between 4 and 6 percent of GDP is correct, then the U.S. and European economies

could be close to their potential, with high structural unemployment. If so, an excessive de-

mand stimulus and low interest rates could be counterproductive, leaking out imports and

recreating earlier imbalances. For developing countries, many of them already at or closing

in on potential GDP, tightening may attract unwanted and potentially destabilizing capital

infl ows, as the difference between their interest rates and the low interest rates in high-income

countries widen. | 17

II. Economic and Social Outlook for Russia 2010–2011

Box 2.1. World Oil Market: Recent Developments and Prospects

Oil prices (WB average) have been relatively stable over the past 13 months,

Developments.

averaging around $77/bbl. Prices have been supported by strong demand in China and the U.S., and large

production restraint by OPEC producers. However, prices have been unable to rise sustainably higher

because of large stocks, substantial surplus capacity of oil production and refining, strong increases in

non-OPEC supply, and concerns about the outlook for the global economy. In October, prices rose above

$83/bbl, partly due to a weak dollar and tight distillate market. A strike at the large French Mediterranean

th , and spreading strikes closed most of France’s refineries, while

port of Fos-Lavera began September 27

protestors blocked oil product depots resulting in fuel shortages at many of France’s petrol stations. So

far the impact has been local and had limited impact on global crude and product markets, a reminder

that supply is plentiful. Crude stocks on-land remain high, especially in the U.S., while much of the large

floating storage earlier in the year has been brought ashore. Product inventories remain high on-land and

at-sea, particularly middle distillates, but a lengthy strike in France could pull product stocks lower.

The price of Urals crude has fallen dramatically relative to Brent from its recent highs because of the

French strikes. With millions of barrels blocked at the French Fos-Lavera terminal, refiners are limiting

their spot purchases, and Urals sellers have to find alternative buyers.

World oil demand growth has been strong this year, with OECD demand turning positive in 2Q 2009

and joining very strong gains in non-OECD countries, particularly China. Global oil demand is projected

to increase by 2.1 mb/d or 2.5% in 2010, topping the pre-crisis peak in 2007, and recording the largest

volumetric increase in more than 30 years with the sole exception of 2004. Meanwhile, non-OPEC sup-

plies have recorded very strong growth, with output up more than 1 mb/d in the first three quarters of

year. Russia’s oil production has risen by 0.2 mb/d in each of 2009 and 2010 due to new fields coming on

stream, such as Rosneft’s Vankor field in East Siberia, and TNK-BPs Uvat project in West Siberia

OPEC producers have largely maintained their production cuts in an effort to keep prices within a

$70–80/bbl range, which they deem acceptable. OPEC’s spare capacity is around 6 mb/d, with about

5 mb/d of the surplus is in the Gulf, and nearly two-thirds of the total in Saudi Arabia.

Oil prices are expected to remain relatively constant in real terms over the forecast period,

Prospects.

with the WB average currently projected at $76.4/bbl for 2010. Nominal prices are projected to drop to

$73.2/bbl, owing to a large drop in the WB MUV index. The market is expected to remain well supplied

going forward with large spare capacity in OPEC production and global refining. Oil demand is expected

to increase by 1.2 m/bd or 1.4% in 2011, with all of the growth in developing countries. Non-OPEC

supply is projected to grow by at least 0.5 mb/d, and OPEC NGLs are expected to increase by more than

0.6 mb/d. This leaves a very modest call on OPEC crude oil production, and thus the oil market balance

is not expected to change materially. This suggests that oil prices will continue trading around levels

of the past year. Downside risks would be slower growth in oil demand, a further climb in inventories,

and leakage of OPEC oil onto the market. Upside risks would include stronger demand in developing

countries—including emergency stock building in China when its new strategic petroleum tank capacity

comes online in the middle of next year—disappointing non-OPEC supply, further depreciation of the

dollar, and lack of an OPEC response should prices rise above the $70-80/bbl range.

Figure 2.1. World Bank oil price forecast; Average crude

(Brent, Dubai and WTI), simple average, $/bbl

World Bank Staff

Source:

18 | Russian Economic Report. № 23. November, 2010


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DESCRIZIONE DISPENSA

Materiale didattico per il corso di Economia Politica del prof. Roberto Pasca di Magliano. Trattasi della sezione del rapporto della Banca Mondiale "Russian Economic Report 23" avente ad oggetto le politiche agro-alimentari della Russia , la siccità del 2010, il grain shock e il rialzo dei prezzi dei prodotti alimentari; l'esportazione dei prodotti agricoli; il ruolo della Russia nel mercato mondiale del petrolio; le prospettive di crescita future.


DETTAGLI
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea in scienze politiche e relazioni internazionali (POMEZIA, ROMA)
SSD:
A.A.: 2011-2012

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Economia politica e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università La Sapienza - Uniroma1 o del prof Pasca di Magliano Roberto.

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