Che materia stai cercando?

Parlamentarismi - Siaroff Appunti scolastici Premium

Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies", riguardante la tipologia di democrazia parlamentare, le sue componenti elementari e le diverse forme di parlamentarismo... Vedi di più

Esame di Politica comparata docente Prof. M. Giuliani

Anteprima

ESTRATTO DOCUMENTO

T 1. 452

Factor Loadings

ABLE

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8

Eigenvalues 6.540 3.394 2.719 2.694 2.252 1.957 1.689 1.482

Percentage of total variance explained 23.356 12.121 9.711 9.620 8.042 6.988 6.031 5.292

Powerful prime minister 0.650

Downloaded Elected president – 0.828

Bicameralism 0.824

Lack of judicial review – 0.833 International

from Independent central bank 0.938

http://ips.sagepub.com Pluralism 0.442 0.602

Length of parliamentary term 0.768

Single-member system 0.476

0.689

Size of legislature – 0.445

0.657 Political

Speaker versus bureau or presidium 0.439 0.609

Positive parliamentarianism – 0.828

at

Biblioteca Lack of difficulties with early dissolution 0.598 Science

Ministerial– compatibility 0.783

MP

Ministers as generalists 0.556

0.661

Scienze Leader of the opposition 0.688 Review

Politiche Nonconfidence difficulties 0.466 – 0.541

Government control of plenary agenda 0.794

Restrictions on private members’ bills 0.416

0.460

on 24(4)

October Government control of committee chairs 0.720

Plenary first determines principles 0.734

3, Closure 0.731

2009 Money bills are a government prerogative 0.869

Weakly institutionalized committees 0.594

Inability of committees to rewrite legislation 0.720

Low committee influence on parties 0.876

Lack of nonconstitutional minority vetoes 0.801

Effective number of parliamentary parties – 0.821

Size of largest party (seat percentage) 0.446 0.752

Principal components analysis, varimax rotation. Only absolute values of at least 0.400 are shown. Bold indicates where the variable

Note:

has the strongest effect.

S : 453

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

“economic” variables is the independence of the central bank. Where this is

limited or weak, this is scored “0”; where this is moderate, it is scored “1”; and

where this is high, it is scored “2.” The other “economic” variable is whether

interest-group behavior and intermediation is pluralist or corporatist. In fact, this

variable has an affinity with strictly institutional features of the parliament, since

there seems to be a relationship between sharing policy-making with the

opposition and sharing it with organized interests. That is, as Döring (1996: 44–5)

notes, the stronger the corporatism, the greater the authority of parliamentary

committees. Here, a country that is corporatist at the end of a given year is scored

“0” and one that is pluralist is scored “2.” The measurement of corporatism and

most of the scores are drawn from Siaroff (1999), wherein I prefer the term

“integration” to corporatism (and these are the scores used).

Next is a general sense of the power of the prime minister, taken from King’s

(1994) analysis of western Europe. Systems where the prime minister has low

power are scored “0”; systems where the prime minister has medium power are

scored “1”; and systems where the prime minister has high power are scored “2.”

Lastly, there is the issue of whether there is an elected president and, if so, how

powerful she or he is, given that this may be an alternative to prime ministerial

power. Here, there seems to be four relevant categories (taken from Siaroff, 2000:

9–11). Systems without an elected president (such as the United Kingdom or

Australia) are scored “0”; systems with an elected president, but a weak one (such

as Austria) are scored “1”; systems with a moderately strong elected president

(such as Finland until 2000) are scored “2”; and systems with a strong elected

president (such as the French Fifth Republic) are scored “3.”

The very last area for measurement is the fragmentation of the legislature. This

is measured in two ways, based normally on the last election preceding the end of

the year concerned. The first measure here is the effective number of

parliamentary parties. The second measure is the size, that is, the seat percentage,

of the largest parliamentary party alone.

Factors of Parliamentarianism

Factor analysis was conducted using all of the aforementioned variables. The

consequent results of the eight factors with eigenvalues above one are reported in

Table 1. As noted therein, for readability only absolute values of at least 0.400 are

shown. In some cases a variable will have such a value on more than one factor, but

in all cases the greatest value is indicated in bold.

The first factor is far and away the most important. It involves the greatest

number of the variables included—and of these, 10 in their most significant

capacity (those indicated in bold). The vast majority of these factors speak to

executive dominance in the political system, be it through a powerful prime

minister, government control of the legislative process, or the weakness of

s. Indeed, the highest values here are for deputies repeating or

individual MP

“towing” the party position on a committee (low committee influence on parties)

and for money bills being a government prerogative. Given the nature of these

variables, it is reasonable to call this factor a measure of executive dominance over the

Two other variables which load strongly on this factor are also worth

legislature.

noting: a single-member electoral system and a formal leader of the opposition.

Neither of these is part of executive dominance over the legislature strictly

speaking, but a single-member electoral system can be seen to facilitate it (and to

Downloaded from http://ips.sagepub.com at Biblioteca Scienze Politiche on October 3, 2009

454 24(4)

International Political Science Review

make s more oriented to debating and personal re-election), whereas a formal

MP

leader of the opposition perhaps parallels a strong prime minister.

The second factor involves six key variables: pluralism as opposed to

corporatism, the lack of difficulties with early dissolution, ministerial– MP

compatibility, ministers as policy generalists, government control of committee

chairs, and weakly institutionalized committees (not having more than 10 standing

committees corresponding to government departments). It is notable that

government control of committee chairs and weakly institutionalized committees

load here and not on the first factor. A committee chair, let us suggest, should be

viewed as a position of influence (like a cabinet minister), rather than as a

procedural role. In any case, this second factor can be better understood if one

imagines the alternative extreme: a situation of corporatism, in which there are

difficulties (or even impossibilities) with early dissolution, where ministers cannot

be s and are policy specialists, and where the chairs of strongly institutionalized

MP

committees are shared proportionately with the political opposition. These factors

seem to speak to a situation, wherein the government and

checks and balances

parliament are not so asymmetrical in power, but rather constrain each other, and

where opposition parties are relevant to the policy process through their control

of committee chairs (as are key interest groups through corporatism). In contrast,

where the government can “easily” (in an institutional sense) call early elections,

where ministers sit in parliament, where government s run what committees

MP

there are, and where interest groups can be marginalized, a situation of what may

be called seems to evolve. Certainly

fused parliamentarianism with policy centralization

in 19th-century parliamentarianism, the development of the government’s (as

opposed to the monarch’s) right to dissolve parliament became its “legal counter-

balance to Parliament’s right to censure governments” (Markesinis, 1987: 179).

Lastly, the fusion of the executive and legislative powers is often presumed to be a

definitional feature of parliamentarianism, in contrast to the separation of powers

involved in presidential systems. However, it seems that parliamentary systems can

have their own sort of separation of powers, or at least checks and balances.

It should also be noted that the factor analysis and resulting Factor 2 (see Table

1) confirm the above-discussed affinity between sharing policy-making with the

opposition and sharing it with organized interests. Döring’s (1996: 44–5) finding

that the stronger the corporatism, the greater the authority of parliamentary

committees is thus confirmed for the advanced industrial democracies as a whole

(at least using a dichotomous division of corporatism versus pluralism).

Factor 3 in Table 1 is certainly relevant, but does not appear to be as insightful:

combining (strong) bicameralism, judicial review, and a large lower house, this

factor speaks to Lijphart’s federal–unitary dimension, although central bank

independence (one of the component measures in his 1999 book) does not load

significantly here. Factor 4 is driven by a low effective number of parliamentary

parties, the lack of nonconstitutional minority vetoes, and the large size (seat

percentage) of the biggest party. What is perhaps most interesting is that the

measures of parliamentary fragmentation load much more strongly on this factor

than on Factor 1 (executive dominance over the legislature), since the effective

number of parliamentary parties is a key variable in Lijphart’s (1984, 1999)

measure of majoritarianism.

Factor 5 has four relevant aspects, the strongest of which is the absence of a

(powerful) elected president. This factor also includes a speaker-run legislature,

ministers as generalists (although not as strongly as in Factor 2), and the absence

Downloaded from http://ips.sagepub.com at Biblioteca Scienze Politiche on October 3, 2009

S : 455

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

of nonconfidence difficulties. The inclusion here of nonconfidence difficulties

doubtless comes from the reality that the three cases which require a

“constructive” motion of nonconfidence (Germany, Spain, and Belgium since

1993) also have either a figurehead president or a monarch. The overall

combination may, however, simply be driven by shared British traditions.

The remaining factors in Table 1 are, of course, weaker statistically, and tend to

contain just one or two key variables. Factor 6 involves the lack of positive

parliamentarianism (that is, negative parliamentarianism) and to a lesser extent a

single-member electoral system; again, this is a British-type combination. Factor 7

is driven by an independent central bank, but it also includes a small legislature. It

thus seems that Lijphart’s federal–unitary dimension is split between Factors 3 and

7, rather than being one distinct factor. Lastly, Factor 8 simply revolves around the

length of the parliamentary term.

Clusters of Parliamentary Systems

Let us now focus more on the interplay of what are the two strongest factors in

Table 1: executive dominance over the legislature and fused parliamentarianism

with policy centralization. To this end, I have established additive indices of the

relevant variables in each case. For Factor 1, this involves the 10 variables which

are most significant in this factor, but also the speaker versus bureau or presidium

variable, since this is relevant here even if not as significant as in Factor 5. An

additive index of these 11 factors, then, is straightforward, since each of the factors

have the same positive sign in Table 1. They are also all coded the same way, with a

maximum score of 2, a score always indicating the more executive-dominant (or

majoritarian) situation. Lastly, these 11 items form a highly reliable index: the

standardized Cronbach’s alpha for them is 0.9350. Table 2 gives the data for each

of these variables in the briefest space possible, listing each country by the year(s)

when all scores are the same. The combined additive value here can range from 0

up to 22—although as Table 2 shows, the lowest actual scores are 1 and 2 in the

French Fourth Republic, and 3 in pre-1992 Finland, the Netherlands, and Norway.

“Perfect” high scores of 22 occur in Australia, New Zealand (until its electoral

system change of 1996), and the United Kingdom.

The six significant components of Factor 2 also each have a maximum of 2.

These six items, each with the same positive sign, form their own reliable index:

the standardized Cronbach’s alpha for them is 0.8266. Table 3 gives the data for

7

each of these variables. The resulting Factor 2 scores thus range from 0 in

Norway and 1 in Sweden (since 1970) up to the maximum of 12 in Australia

(except for the corporatist Hawke–Keating Labor era), Greece, Iceland (through

1990), Ireland, Italy (through 1970), Malta, New Zealand, and the United

Kingdom.

Figure 1 then groups the scores for each of these two factors into five

categories: very high, high, medium, low, and very low. Combining the categories

from Factor 1 on executive dominance over the legislature and Factor 2 on fused

parliamentarianism with policy centralization does produce a basic global pattern,

in that these two factors are certainly related. Specifically, the intercorrelation of

the two additive indices for the 1190 country-years is a highly significant 0.633.

That said, the relationship is far from perfectly linear. Rather, it seems that most

postwar parliamentary systems fall into one of three clusters, as has been indicated

with boxes in Figure 1.

Downloaded from http://ips.sagepub.com at Biblioteca Scienze Politiche on October 3, 2009

456 24(4)

International Political Science Review

T 2. Scores on First Factor Variables

ABLE Restrictions

Government on the Plenary first Ability of

control of introduction determines committees

plenary of private the principles to rewrite

agenda members’ bills of a bill legislation

Australia since 1946 2 2 2 2

Austria since 1945 1 2 0 1

Belgium since 1946 1 1 0 0

Canada since 1945 2 2 2 2

Denmark since 1945 0 0 1 2

Finland 1945–91 0 1 0 0

Finland since 1992 0 1 0 0

France IV 1946–51 0 0 0 0

France IV 1952–58 0 0 0 0

France V 1959–73 2 2 0 2

France V 1974–85 2 2 0 2

France V 1986–87 2 2 0 2

France V since 1988 2 2 0 2

Germany since 1949 1 2 0 0

Greece 1974–86 2 2 0 2

Greece since 1987 2 2 0 2

Iceland since 1946 0 1 0 0

Ireland since 1948 2 2 2 2

Israel 1949–95 2 0 0 0

Italy since 1948 0 2 0 0

Japan since 1946 2 2 0 1

Luxembourg since 1945 2 2 0 1

Malta since 1966 2 2 2 2

The Netherlands since 1946 0 0 0 2

New Zealand 1946–95 2 2 2 2

New Zealand since 1996 2 2 2 2

Norway since 1945 1 0 0 0

Portugal 1976–81 2 1 0 1

Portugal since 1982 2 1 0 1

Spain since 1977 1 2 2 0

Sweden since 1948 0 1 0 0

United Kingdom since 1945 2 2 2 2

In the very upper right of Figure 1, one finds a group of basically pure

“Westminster democracies”: Australia (most of the time), Malta, New Zealand, and

the United Kingdom. Close to these, and crucially still within the upper right box,

are slightly imperfect variants of the Westminster model: Australia (when it was

corporatist), Canada (due essentially to its institutionalized committee system),

Greece (due especially to its lack of a single-member electoral system and lack of a

second reading debate), and Ireland (due to its use of a single transferable vote

] in multimember constituencies and lack of a leader of the opposition). Also

[

STV

just within this box is the French Fifth Republic (France V), except during its brief

switch to list proportional representation (list ). These are all cases with both a

PR

clear cabinet dominance over the legislature and (France V excepted) a strong

Downloaded from http://ips.sagepub.com at Biblioteca Scienze Politiche on October 3, 2009

S : 457

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

Influence of Money

committee bill a Curtailing Recognized Single- Power

members prerogative of debate Parliamentary leader member of the

on party of before the bureau or of the electoral prime

positions government final vote presidium opposition system minister Total

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22

0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6

1 0 1 1 0 0 1 6

2 2 2 1 2 2 2 21

1 0 1 1 0 0 1 7

1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2

2 2 2 0 0 2 0 14

2 2 2 0 0 2 1 15

2 2 2 0 0 0 1 13

2 2 2 0 0 2 1 15

1 0 1 1 0 0 2 8

2 1 2 1 0 0 2 14

2 1 2 1 1 0 2 15

0 0 1 1 0 0 1 4

2 2 2 2 0 0 2 18

2 0 1 0 0 0 0 5

0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4

2 0 1 1 0 0 0 9

1 0 1 1 0 0 1 9

2 2 2 2 2 0 2 20

0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22

2 2 2 2 2 0 2 20

0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3

2 2 1 0 0 0 0 9

2 2 1 0 0 0 1 10

2 2 1 0 0 0 2 12

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4

2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22

fusion of the executive and legislature. Since it is cabinet dominance over both the

legislature and the policy process that is apparently its most unique feature, this

cluster can be classified as such—as “cabinet dominance,” although “Westminster

systems loosely defined” is also appropriate. It should be stressed that New

Zealand’s 1996 switch from single-member plurality to mixed-member

proportional ( ) was not a sufficient overall change to cause the country to

MMP

change its placement in Figure 1 in the absence of any changes to its legislative

procedures, ministers, and so on. For the moment, New Zealand has perhaps

become largely like Malta, a long-standing “Westminster with ” system (although

PR

New Zealand’s governments have usually been coalitions since 1996).

In the lower right of Figure 1 are several systems with legislative balance with

Downloaded from http://ips.sagepub.com at Biblioteca Scienze Politiche on October 3, 2009

T 3. 458

Scores on Second Factor Variables

ABLE

Not over ten Government Lack of Ministers are

standing committees control of difficulties Ministers can generalists Pluralism [2]

corresponding committee with early be MPs [2] or [2] or or corporatism

to government departments chairs dissolution cannot be [0] specialists [0] [0] Total

Australia 1946–82 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Downloaded Australia 1983–95 2 2 2 2 2 0 10

Australia since 1996 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Austria since 1945 0 2 2 2 0 0 6

Belgium since 1946 0 0 2 2 2 0 6 International

from Canada since 1945 0 2 2 2 2 2 10

http://ips.sagepub.com Denmark 1945–71 2 0 2 2 2 0 8

Denmark since 1972 0 0 2 2 2 0 6

Finland 1945–65 2 0 2 2 0 2 8

Finland since 1966 2 0 2 2 0 0 6 Political

France IV 1946–58 0 1 1 2 2 2 8

at France V since 1959 2 2 2 0 0 2 8

Biblioteca Germany since 1949 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 Science

Greece since 1974 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Iceland 1946–90 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Scienze Iceland since 1991 0 2 2 2 2 2 10 Review

Ireland since 1948 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Politiche Israel 1949–95 2 1 2 2 2 0 9

Italy 1948–70 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

on 24(4)

Italy since 1971 0 2 2 2 2 2 10

October Japan 1946–48 0 1 2 2 2 2 9

Japan since 1949 0 1 2 2 2 0 7

3,

2009 Luxembourg since 1945 0 0 2 0 0 0 2

Malta since 1966 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

The Netherlands since 1946 0 0 2 0 0 0 2

New Zealand since 1946 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Norway since 1945 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Portugal since 1976 0 0 2 0 0 2 4

Spain since 1977 0 1 2 2 0 2 7

Sweden 1948–69 0 0 1 2 0 0 3

Sweden since 1970 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

United Kingdom since 1945 2 2 2 2 2 2 12

Fused parliamentarianism with policy centralization (versus checks and balances)

Very low Low Medium High Very high

0–1 2–4 5–7 8–10 11–12

Executive

dominance S

Downloaded Very high Australia 1983–95 Australia 1946–82 IAROFF

19–22 Canada since 1945 Australia since 1996

Malta since 1966 :

from Varieties

New Zealand since 1946

http://ips.sagepub.com United Kingdom since 1945

High France V 1959–85 Greece since 1974 of

Parliamentarianism

14–18 France V since 1988 Ireland since 1948

at Medium Luxembourg since 1945 Japan since 1949 France V 1986–87

Biblioteca 9–13 Portugal since 1976 Spain since 1977 Japan 1946–48

Scienze Low Sweden since 1970 Germany since 1949 Austria since 1945 Denmark 1945–71 Iceland 1946–90

4–8 Sweden 1948–69 Belgium since 1946 Iceland since 1991 Italy 1948–70

Politiche Denmark since 1972 Israel 1949–95 in

Finland since 1992 Italy since 1971 Democracies

on

October Very low Norway since 1945 The Netherlands since Finland 1966–91 Finland 1945–65

0–3 1946 France IV 1946–58

3,

2009 F 1. Clusters of Parliamentarianism

IGURE 459

460 24(4)

International Political Science Review

(or even dominance over) the cabinet, but still exhibiting fused parliamentarianism

with policy centralization: Denmark until 1972, Finland until 1966, the French

Fourth Republic, Iceland, Israel, and Italy. None of these are completely “ideal

types” in the extreme lower right, however. Some of these cases were centrifugal

parliamentary systems, especially the French Fourth Republic and postwar Italy.

More broadly, though, these have all been rather polarized political systems

(although “polarized” is probably too strong a term for Iceland). Still, let us call

this box a situation of “polarized systems with a central role for a fragmented

parliament”—importantly, with the stress on the parliament as a whole (versus, say,

a key role for parliamentary committees). As we shall see, the cases in this box

have tended to have low cabinet durability.

Lastly, in the box on the lower left of Figure 1, one finds Germany, the

Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, with Norway being the strongest variant of this

box. The countries in this cluster score the same on Factor 1 (executive

dominance over the legislature) as do those in the second cluster; that is, these

countries also lack such a pattern. However, the extent of policy-making diffusion

and checks-and-balances elements in this third cluster, such as corporatism,

ministerial specialization, and opposition influence on and through parliamentary

committees, separate this cluster from other clusters. Moreover, Arter (1999:

both

213–5) has noted that, of the Nordic cases, Norway and Sweden best fit the model

of a “working parliament,” in which the “action” occurs in standing committees

and where legislators are oriented to detailed policy matters rather than debating

or being drawn to the media spotlight. Let us thus call those systems in this cluster

ones of “cooperative policy-making diffusion” with a working parliament.

I shall now measure these three clusters in terms of cabinet durability. To this

end, following Lijphart (1999: 131), one can define a change of cabinet as

involving any of: (1) a change in party composition; (2) a change in prime

minister; (3) a parliamentary election; or (4) a shift to majority or minority status

8 One can also use just the first event, a change in party

due to by-elections.

composition. This is the succinct, if more controversial, definition of Dodd (1976:

6), which allows cabinets to exist (indefinitely) across elections. Lastly, the average

of these two measures can be combined, as Lijphart (1999: 132–3) does. Table 4

shows the values for each of these three measures for each case in each of the

9

three clusters in Figure 1. Table 4 also gives the averages for each cluster. These

averages are both unweighted and weighted by total years; in fact, weighting

makes little difference. Overall, one sees that no matter the measure or

calculation, it is the cluster of polarized systems in the lower right of Figure 1

which has the lowest cabinet durability. The lower left cluster of Figure 1, in fact,

benefits from cooperation even in the face of fragmentation, and thus is actually

in the middle in terms of cabinet durability.

Conclusions

Parliamentary systems have a wide variety of variables and resulting factor

groupings, but some of these are more or less self-evident, such as executive

dominance over the legislature versus executive–legislative balance, federalism

versus a unitary system, and variations in the nature and role of the head of state.

However, this analysis has shown that executive dominance over the legislature is

the broadest dimension, since it is, in fact, a composite of no less than 11

measures. Moreover, there is a key second dimension of parliamentary systems,

Downloaded from http://ips.sagepub.com at Biblioteca Scienze Politiche on October 3, 2009


PAGINE

21

PESO

148.19 KB

AUTORE

Atreyu

PUBBLICATO

+1 anno fa


DESCRIZIONE DISPENSA

Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies", riguardante la tipologia di democrazia parlamentare, le sue componenti elementari e le diverse forme di parlamentarismo sviluppatisi dal secondo dopoguerra ad oggi.


DETTAGLI
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea in scienze internazionali e istituzioni europee
SSD:
Università: Milano - Unimi
A.A.: 2011-2012

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Politica comparata e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Milano - Unimi o del prof Giuliani Marco.

Acquista con carta o conto PayPal

Scarica il file tutte le volte che vuoi

Paga con un conto PayPal per usufruire della garanzia Soddisfatto o rimborsato

Recensioni
Ti è piaciuto questo appunto? Valutalo!

Altri appunti di Politica comparata

Democrazia - Dahl
Dispensa
Scala di astrazione dei concetti
Dispensa
Sistema istituzionale ed elettorale in Bosnia - Erzegovina
Dispensa
Democrazia maggioritaria e consensuale - Lijphart
Dispensa