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Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies", riguardante la tipologia di democrazia parlamentare, le sue componenti elementari e le diverse forme di parlamentarismo... Vedi di più

Esame di Politica comparata docente Prof. M. Giuliani

Anteprima

ESTRATTO DOCUMENTO

(2003), Vol 24, No. 4, 445–464

International Political Science Review

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced

Industrial Democracies

A S

LAN IAROFF

A . This article outlines what is meant by a parliamentary form of

BSTRACT

government and analyzes how such regimes vary in the postwar advanced

industrial democracies. A wide range of variables are discussed and

measured annually. Factor analysis is used to produce eight different

aspects of parliamentarianism. The first two of these yield a two-

dimensional analysis. Based on these two key factors, it is argued that

there are three main types of parliamentary systems: (1) those of cabinet

dominance; (2) those that are polarized with a central role for a

fragmented parliament; and (3) those of cooperative policy-making

diffusion with a working parliament. Generally, the first and third of

these are polar opposite types, yet they each manifest greater cabinet

durability than the cluster of polarized systems.

• Cabinet durability • Executive dominance •

Keywords: Parliamentarianism • Policy-making diffusion

Introduction

In recent decades, political science has placed increasing emphasis on institutional

factors as explanations of (or constraints on) political outcomes. In this vein, it is

contended that democracies, especially new ones, should consciously choose (or

avoid) certain institutional features (see, for example, Sartori, 1994a). Perhaps the

central debate in this regard is the argument about whether a parliamentary

system should be established instead of a presidential one, inasmuch as

“presidentialism seems to involve greater risk for stable democratic politics” (Linz,

1994: 70). A parliamentary system is seen to offer both better accountability and

greater flexibility than a presidential one. Yet this conclusion (or argument) is

based on essentially treating parliamentarianism and presidentialism each as a

fixed ideal type. However, parliamentary democracies in particular do not all

function the same way, and some are less effective than others.

0192-5121 (2003/10) 24:4, 445–464; 035231 © 2003 International Political Science Association

S Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi)

AGE CA

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446 24(4)

International Political Science Review

In his analyses (most recently in 1999), Arend Lijphart has argued that there

are two central dimensions for measuring the majoritarian (or Westminster)

versus consensus nature of a democracy—one an executives–parties dimension

and the other a federal–unitary dimension. One of the aspects of his

executives–parties dimension is the relationship between the executive and the

legislature, which Lijphart (1999: 3) argues involves the contrast between

executive dominance and executive–legislative balance. This institutional aspect is

thus seen as a unidimensional continuum. Moreover, Lijphart (1999: 129) stresses

that for parliamentary systems the “best indicator” of the relative power of the

executive and legislative branches is cabinet durability. Cabinet durability is

frequently measured by political scientists, as by Von Beyme in his recent historical

analysis of parliamentary democracy (2000: 190–1).

Of course, Lijphart has made his measurements for all democracies, regardless

of their institutional features. In this article, I will limit the scope to the postwar

parliamentary systems of the advanced industrial democracies, thus allowing for a

more comprehensive analysis of the varieties of parliamentary government. Data

on a wide range of variables have been measured across 23 countries, noting the

score on each variable annually. Each annual national pattern will be treated as a

distinct case of parliamentarianism. The article will then use factor analysis to

determine which variables group together, thereby producing eight different

aspects (factor loadings) of parliamentary systems. Of these loadings, the first and

strongest two (“executive dominance over the legislature” and “fused

parliamentarianism with policy centralization”) will be used to provide a two-

dimensional analysis. Each case will then be measured in terms of these two

aspects, which will yield three main types of parliamentary system. The division

into three different categories will be further supported when one compares the

resulting three system clusters in terms of cabinet durability.

Definitions of a Parliamentary System

Parliamentary systems seem to lack the intuitive definitional features of

presidential systems. This thus leads to a range of definitions. At one extreme,

some scholars attribute to parliamentary systems an often long list of

“propositions” (Verney, 1992), “features” (Heywood, 2000: 172–3), or “common

institutional criteria” combined with “essential social-structural features” (Von

Beyme, 2000: 9–11), some of which are more “likely” than “essential.” Conversely,

for various scholars (Brunner, 1996: 76; Sartori, 1994a: 101, 1994b: 107–8; Steffani,

1996: 45) there is but a single defining feature of a parliamentary system, namely,

the accountability of the government to the parliament, which requires the

government to have the support or trust of the parliament in order to remain in

office, and which gives the parliament the right to remove any government

without such support or which has lost such support.

A reasonable compromise between these analytical extremes seems to be the

definition of Lijphart (1999: 117–18), who considers parliamentary systems to be

defined by three factors. First, as noted, the government is responsible to the

parliament; ultimately, this means that the parliament can remove the government

through a vote of nonconfidence. That said, removal may involve the resignation

of the government or it may simply force an election which the government could

win and so remain in office. Second, in a parliamentary system, the head of

government (normally called the prime minister) is not directly elected by the

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S : 447

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

voters as in a presidential system, but instead is selected by the legislature. Lijphart

notes that this process of selection can take many forms. However, it seems the key

distinction here is whether “selection” takes the form of parliamentary “election”;

in other words, whether there is a formal vote of investiture on a new prime

minister or not. Third, and finally, Lijphart notes that parliamentary cabinets are

collective or collegial, in contrast to the formal one-person executive of a

presidential system.

Based on these three criteria, one would not include Switzerland as a

parliamentary system, since there the government is chosen for a fixed (four-year)

term and cannot be removed by motions of nonconfidence. Nor can one consider

Israel to be parliamentary since 1996, inasmuch as the prime minister has been

1

directly elected by the voters since then. However, one can (and I shall) include

as ultimately parliamentary those systems that have been called “semi-presidential”

(Finland, France, and Portugal), since these not only have a prime minister, but in

fact meet Lijphart’s aforementioned three conditions.

Variations within Parliamentary Systems

In his analysis of parliamentary systems, Von Beyme (2000: 9–10) speaks to

Lijphart’s first point, and discusses the extent of votes of investiture and the

practice of dissolution if the prime minister has lost the confidence of the

parliamentary majority. However, Von Beyme’s initial criteria deal with the factors

facilitating cooperation between the parliamentary majority and the executive:

first, the compatibility of parliamentary mandate and ministerial office (although

he notes some exceptions); and second, the fact that prime ministers are normally

members of parliament. These two factors tend to produce a fusion between the

parliament and the government, in contrast to the separation between the

congress and the president involved in a presidential system. This fusion seems

further reinforced by Lijphart’s first point about the accountability of the

government to the parliament. In this vein, Von Beyme (2000: 9) notes how in a

general sense “Parliament controls the government by raising questions,

exercising the right to interpellate, and setting up committees of enquiry, which

facilitate the decision about whether the strongest sanction—a vote of non-

confidence—should be used.” However, the extent of such fusion can in fact vary

while still respecting the three criteria of parliamentarianism.

Indeed, Von Beyme’s point about parliament controlling the government will

no doubt strike many readers (especially in the English-speaking advanced

industrial democracies) as being formalistic rather than reflecting the actual

power dynamics of contemporary parliamentary systems. On the other hand,

parliamentary control was certainly a feature of systems such as the French Fourth

Republic. Thus, it seems that the issue of whether the parliament controls the

government or whether the reverse is basically true is central in terms of variations

within parliamentary systems. As noted, Lijphart (1999: 129) argues that the best

measure of executive dominance, especially for parliamentary systems, is cabinet

durability, that is, that powerful cabinets (vis-a-vis the legislature) will last a long

2 Although this is a

time, whereas weak cabinets will not last very long at all.

commonly accepted point, it does not really get to the nature of and

how why

executives are strong. In other words, the duration of cabinets seems more a

consequence of other factors. What is needed is a more institutional study, which

can then, in turn, be linked to cabinet durability.

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448 24(4)

International Political Science Review

The best such institutional examination of parliaments is the work on western

Europe found in Döring (1995a), which looks at varying ways in which

governments and legislatures coexist. Building on this book, Döring (1996: 46–7)

goes on to suggest that government control, and conversely the weakened power

of the average member of parliament ( ), has arisen due to what he calls the

MP

“rationalization” of parliamentarianism—a development which he notes is

associated with the French Fifth Republic and to a lesser extent Greece, but which

really began in 19th-century Britain. Döring measures the “rationalization” of

parliamentarianism through three factors: (1) difficulties in removing a

government through a nonconfidence vote; (2) government control of the

plenary agenda; and (3) restrictions on the introduction of private members’ bills.

Another line of research, begun by Strøm (1984, 1990), focuses on the nature of

parliamentary committees, and their consequent ability or inability to control

policy. What happens when these and other factors for all the advanced industrial

parliamentary democracies are assessed?

Variables for Analysis

To measure both aspects and subtypes of parliamentary systems, I have measured

27 different variables for the postwar advanced industrial democracies. The

measures have been made annually (at the end of each year up to and including

3

2002), beginning with the year of the first postwar (democratic and independent)

elections in each case. The raw data have been taken from key chapters in Döring

(1995a) and chapters in Ismayr (1999), with national sources as additions. Indeed,

many of the measured variables are taken from the Döring (1995a) volume. Most

variables are of the “yes/no” type, although some allow for an intermediate

measure. Generally, then, scores of “2” and “0” (and sometimes “1”) are used.

Perhaps controversially, the more majoritarian patterns are given the same score

where possible, which means that for some measures “yes” equals “2” and for

others “yes” equals “0.” In any case, the key findings will be determined by factor

analysis. Each country at each year-end has been treated as a separate case, thus

producing 1190 cases as of the end of 2002.

The first three factors measured are the component measures of Döring’s

“rationalized” parliamentarianism. In terms of nonconfidence motions, no extra

difficulties (scored as “2”) means that a simple majority (really a plurality) is all

that is needed for a successful motion. A score of “1” is used when an absolute

majority of all deputies is needed; that is, where abstentions or absentees count on

the government’s side. Lastly, a score of “0” is used in the most difficult cases,

where a nonconfidence motion must be “constructive” or “positive”; that is, where

it must also specify a new prime minister.

Next, there is government control of the plenary agenda. This is scored a “2”

where this is strong, “1” where moderate, and “0” where weak. Last in this area are

restrictions on the introduction of private members’ bills. This is scored a “2” where

these restrictions are severe, “1” where mild, and “0” where non-existent and thus

where it is common for private members’ bills to be introduced and debated.

The next area involves aspects of parliamentary committees. Here, there are

many key factors, including the number of committees and whether these match

the structure of government departments. Although one can treat these two as

separate measures, here I use the analysis of Powell (2000: 33–4), who notes

whether there are more than 10 standing committees corresponding to

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S : 449

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

government departments, which are thus able to exercise collective oversight over

most, if not all, of the government. In a sense, we are speaking here of a strongly

versus a weakly institutionalized committee system. This leads to a dichotomous

variable, where a “0” indicates such a committee situation and a “2” its absence,

with consequent greater government autonomy. Pre-1971 Italy, let us note, is

scored a “2” here, since its parliamentary committees had little oversight ability

and individual committee members were basically more concerned with

promoting private members’ bills to their own clientelistic ends (the so-called

or “little laws”).

leggine,

The next variable in this area is whether the government controls the

committee chairs, or whether these are shared proportionately with the

opposition, which obviously produces much greater opposition influence. This is

scored a “2” where the government controls all or almost all of the committee

chairs, “1” where the opposition controls some and the government still has a

disproportionate amount, and “0” where these are shared proportionately with the

opposition. I used a category of “all or almost all” because in Westminster systems

it is the norm for the opposition to control the public accounts committee;

however, this is, of course, only one committee.

Next is measured whether the assembly first determines the principles of a bill

before it goes to committee, which thus tends to constrain the committee. In

Britain and Canada, for example, this establishment of principles occurs during a

“second reading debate”; however, many parliamentary systems do not have such a

legislative stage. This variable is scored “2” where the plenary clearly determines

the principles of a bill first, “1” where this occurs sometimes, and “0” where this

does not occur. Related to this is the ability of committees to rewrite the legislation

they receive. This is scored a “0” when they can, “2” when they cannot, and “1”

where their substitute texts are considered by the government against the original

draft (Döring, 1995b: 236).

Lastly in this area is the issue of the influence of committee members on party

positions; that is, whether being on a committee and accepting the committee’s

views of a policy then leads the deputy to go back and try to affect her or his party’s

position on the issue. This is, in a sense, the opposite of a deputy merely repeating

or “towing” the party position on a committee. This is scored a “2” where there is

low committee-member influence on party positions, “1” where this is medium,

and “0” where this is high (from Damgaard, 1995: 316).

Next, we turn to some other executive–legislative aspects. The first of these is

the basic distinction between positive and negative parliamentarianism: the

former requires a vote of investiture before a government can take office, whereas

in the latter a government is simply appointed and it is up to the opposition to

remove it after the fact. Negative parliamentarianism is found in Britain, in its

4 most other systems use positive

former colonies, and in the Nordic countries;

parliamentarianism. Here, I score positive parliamentarianism a “2” and negative

parliamentarianism a “0.” For its part, Sweden after 1976 is scored a “1.” This is

because although Sweden has a vote of investiture, absences and abstentions count

on the government’s side. In other words, unless an absolute majority votes against

a new Swedish government, it passes its vote of investiture and is confirmed. In

contrast, the standard practice in positive parliamentarianism is simply that if

there are more votes against than for, the investiture fails.

The second aspect here is whether there are any restrictions on early

dissolution of the assembly by the government, or whether there are effectively

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450 24(4)

International Political Science Review

none—making early dissolution a power of the government and ultimately the

prime minister. Where there are no such restrictions (true almost everywhere),

the system is scored “2.” Where there are restrictions on early dissolution, the

system is scored a “1.” This situation occurs in Germany (where one needs a

supermajority to have early elections) and in Sweden (where this is limited

temporally in the parliamentary term and where the “next” scheduled elections

would still take place). This situation also occurred in the French Fourth Republic,

where dissolution could only occur following two defeats of a government (of at

least two weeks’ duration) within 18 months of each other, and with the first

defeat coming after 18 months of the legislative term had expired (Williams, 1964:

236–7). Lastly, where early dissolution is simply not allowed (for example, in

Norway), the system is scored a “0.”

The next aspect is whether “money bills” are a prerogative of the government,

thus forbidding any opposition or private members’ bills which affect

expenditure. This is scored a “2” where these are a prerogative of the government,

“1” where there are some restrictions on the introduction of money bills (as in

Greece, where these are delayed if there is no accompanying report by the

minister of finance [see Döring, 1995b: 232]), and “0” where there are no

restrictions on who may initiate money bills.

Next is the issue of closure; that is, whether debate on a bill can be curtailed

early. Where this can be done by majority vote (and thus usually by the

government of the day) this is scored a “2.” Where this can occur, but only by

mutual agreement of the parties, it is scored a “1.” Lastly, systems without any real

procedure for closure, and thus where governments are weakest, are scored “0.”

On this variable, see Döring (1995b: 239–41).

The final question here is that of minority vetoes on nonconstitutional

legislation. Many countries require a supermajority for changes;

constitutional

however, constitutional procedures are beyond the purview of this analysis. In

contrast, granting a minority blocking power on (certain) nonconstitutional

matters is very rare. Yet until 1992 this was the case in Finland, where one-third of

the parliament could block legislation on economic matters (Arter, 1999: 213). In

Belgium since its 1970 constitutional reforms, matters affecting the cultural

autonomy of linguistic groups have required a two-thirds majority overall, but also

a majority of each linguistic group—thus giving the French-speaking minority a

veto (Lijphart, 1984: 30). In these situations where there is such a blocking

minority it is scored “0,” while the (normal) absence of this is scored “2.”

We now turn to broader aspects of the (lower house of the) legislature. The first

of these is simply the maximum length of the parliamentary term, coded in years

5 Next is the size of the legislature in a conceptual

(ranging from three to six).

sense. Here, legislatures of 100 members or less are deemed tiny and scored “0”;

those of 101–200 members are called small and scored “1”; those of 201–400

members are considered medium-sized and scored “2”; and lastly, those of more

than 400 members are deemed large and scored “3.” Intuitively, the role of the

individual member should differ between larger and smaller bodies (Mattson,

1995: 469). Of course, legislative size tends to relate closely to national population

size: the large parliaments are those of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the

United Kingdom. Third, there is the issue of whether the legislature is run

individually by a speaker or collectively by a collegiate presidency of parliament,

the latter being usually called either the “bureau” or the “presidium”

(Bergougnous, 1997: 92–4). Where there is no collegiate body, just the speaker,

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S : 451

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

this is scored a “2.” Where there is a collegiate body, but the speaker is still

dominant, this is scored a “1.” Lastly, where there is a powerful collegiate body that

collectively is clearly in charge of the legislature, this is scored a “0.”

Next is the nature of cabinet ministers, which has two aspects. The first of these

is the relationship of ministers to the assembly in an office-holding sense; that is,

whether ministers are also s. The compatibility of parliamentary mandate and

MP

ministerial office was noted by Von Beyme (above) as a central feature of

parliamentarianism. Where ministers may be s (and conversely s can become

MP MP

ministers without giving up their seats) this is coded “2,” and where ministers

cannot be s (that is, these are incompatible positions) this is coded “0.” The

MP

second aspect here is whether cabinet ministers tend to be “generalists” or

“specialists” (Davis, 1997: Ch. 4). Generalists come up through the parliamentary

ranks, change cabinet positions frequently (and thus serve in various portfolios),

and exist in a more hierarchical environment (even within the cabinet). In

contrast, specialists are experts in their particular ministerial area, tend to keep

s or even politicians.

the same portfolio for a long time, and may not be MP

The next issue is whether there is a recognized leader of the parliamentary

opposition, which would tend to imply the more adversarial nature of the

parliament. Where this is a formal state appointment with various privileges and a

6

“rank” equal to a cabinet minister (the British model), this is scored a “2.” Where

this is a recognized position with some privileges but no “rank” (that is, Greece

since 1987), this is scored a “1.” Otherwise, where there is no recognized leader of

the opposition, this is scored a “0.”

Lastly, there is the issue of the electoral system used to elect members to the

assembly (that is, the lower house). Although there are many different types of

electoral systems, I wish to make a distinction between single-member systems (of

whatever calculation) and all other systems, since only in single-member systems

does each member represent a given territory and represent this exclusively. Thus

I have created a dichotomous variable in which a single-member system is coded

“2” and all other systems (including mixed member) are coded “0.”

The last multivariate area to be included is what I call other factors beyond the

lower house which may affect, or have affinities with, the workings of the

parliamentary system. The first of these is bicameralism and its nature. Given the

range of possibilities here, there are several categories coded. Where there is no

bicameralism, the system is scored “0.” Where there is partial bicameralism in the

sense that part of the (lower) house turns into a separate upper house (as in

Norway and, until 1991, Iceland) this is scored “1.” Where there is clear

bicameralism in the sense of two separately elected chambers, but where the

upper house is weak, this is scored “2.” Lastly, in those rare cases where there is

clear bicameralism and the upper house is strong in Lijphart’s (1999: 205ff.)

sense, this is scored “4.” Somewhat related (via federalism) there is the issue of

whether the political system has judicial review. Lijphart makes this a separate

variable in his 1999 book, and Ackerman (2000) considers an independent

constitutional court to be a key part of what he calls “constrained

parliamentarianism.” Where there is no judicial review or where this is weak

(sometimes this is not a clear national distinction) the system is scored “0.” In

contrast, where there is strong judicial review, this is scored “2.” Lastly, where the

level of judicial review is of medium strength, this is scored “1.”

The next two variables were not in Lijphart’s 1984 analysis of democracies, but

were included in his 1999 version (Lijphart, 1999: Chs 9, 13). The first of these

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T 1. 452

Factor Loadings

ABLE

Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8

Eigenvalues 6.540 3.394 2.719 2.694 2.252 1.957 1.689 1.482

Percentage of total variance explained 23.356 12.121 9.711 9.620 8.042 6.988 6.031 5.292

Powerful prime minister 0.650

Downloaded Elected president – 0.828

Bicameralism 0.824

Lack of judicial review – 0.833 International

from Independent central bank 0.938

http://ips.sagepub.com Pluralism 0.442 0.602

Length of parliamentary term 0.768

Single-member system 0.476

0.689

Size of legislature – 0.445

0.657 Political

Speaker versus bureau or presidium 0.439 0.609

Positive parliamentarianism – 0.828

at

Biblioteca Lack of difficulties with early dissolution 0.598 Science

Ministerial– compatibility 0.783

MP

Ministers as generalists 0.556

0.661

Scienze Leader of the opposition 0.688 Review

Politiche Nonconfidence difficulties 0.466 – 0.541

Government control of plenary agenda 0.794

Restrictions on private members’ bills 0.416

0.460

on 24(4)

October Government control of committee chairs 0.720

Plenary first determines principles 0.734

3, Closure 0.731

2009 Money bills are a government prerogative 0.869

Weakly institutionalized committees 0.594

Inability of committees to rewrite legislation 0.720

Low committee influence on parties 0.876

Lack of nonconstitutional minority vetoes 0.801

Effective number of parliamentary parties – 0.821

Size of largest party (seat percentage) 0.446 0.752

Principal components analysis, varimax rotation. Only absolute values of at least 0.400 are shown. Bold indicates where the variable

Note:

has the strongest effect.

S : 453

Varieties of Parliamentarianism in Democracies

IAROFF

“economic” variables is the independence of the central bank. Where this is

limited or weak, this is scored “0”; where this is moderate, it is scored “1”; and

where this is high, it is scored “2.” The other “economic” variable is whether

interest-group behavior and intermediation is pluralist or corporatist. In fact, this

variable has an affinity with strictly institutional features of the parliament, since

there seems to be a relationship between sharing policy-making with the

opposition and sharing it with organized interests. That is, as Döring (1996: 44–5)

notes, the stronger the corporatism, the greater the authority of parliamentary

committees. Here, a country that is corporatist at the end of a given year is scored

“0” and one that is pluralist is scored “2.” The measurement of corporatism and

most of the scores are drawn from Siaroff (1999), wherein I prefer the term

“integration” to corporatism (and these are the scores used).

Next is a general sense of the power of the prime minister, taken from King’s

(1994) analysis of western Europe. Systems where the prime minister has low

power are scored “0”; systems where the prime minister has medium power are

scored “1”; and systems where the prime minister has high power are scored “2.”

Lastly, there is the issue of whether there is an elected president and, if so, how

powerful she or he is, given that this may be an alternative to prime ministerial

power. Here, there seems to be four relevant categories (taken from Siaroff, 2000:

9–11). Systems without an elected president (such as the United Kingdom or

Australia) are scored “0”; systems with an elected president, but a weak one (such

as Austria) are scored “1”; systems with a moderately strong elected president

(such as Finland until 2000) are scored “2”; and systems with a strong elected

president (such as the French Fifth Republic) are scored “3.”

The very last area for measurement is the fragmentation of the legislature. This

is measured in two ways, based normally on the last election preceding the end of

the year concerned. The first measure here is the effective number of

parliamentary parties. The second measure is the size, that is, the seat percentage,

of the largest parliamentary party alone.

Factors of Parliamentarianism

Factor analysis was conducted using all of the aforementioned variables. The

consequent results of the eight factors with eigenvalues above one are reported in

Table 1. As noted therein, for readability only absolute values of at least 0.400 are

shown. In some cases a variable will have such a value on more than one factor, but

in all cases the greatest value is indicated in bold.

The first factor is far and away the most important. It involves the greatest

number of the variables included—and of these, 10 in their most significant

capacity (those indicated in bold). The vast majority of these factors speak to

executive dominance in the political system, be it through a powerful prime

minister, government control of the legislative process, or the weakness of

s. Indeed, the highest values here are for deputies repeating or

individual MP

“towing” the party position on a committee (low committee influence on parties)

and for money bills being a government prerogative. Given the nature of these

variables, it is reasonable to call this factor a measure of executive dominance over the

Two other variables which load strongly on this factor are also worth

legislature.

noting: a single-member electoral system and a formal leader of the opposition.

Neither of these is part of executive dominance over the legislature strictly

speaking, but a single-member electoral system can be seen to facilitate it (and to

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DESCRIZIONE DISPENSA

Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies", riguardante la tipologia di democrazia parlamentare, le sue componenti elementari e le diverse forme di parlamentarismo sviluppatisi dal secondo dopoguerra ad oggi.


DETTAGLI
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea in scienze internazionali e istituzioni europee
SSD:
Università: Milano - Unimi
A.A.: 2011-2012

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Politica comparata e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Milano - Unimi o del prof Giuliani Marco.

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Scala di astrazione dei concetti
Dispensa
Sistema istituzionale ed elettorale in Bosnia - Erzegovina
Dispensa
Democrazia maggioritaria e consensuale - Lijphart
Dispensa