Hight Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU Report
TABLE OF CONTENTS
AVANT-PROPOS .................................................................................................................... 3
CHAPTER I: CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS...................................................... 7
CHAPTER II: POLICY AND REGULATORY REPAIR................................................. 13
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 13
II. THE LINK BETWEEN MACROECONOMIC AND REGULATORY POLICY .... 14
III. CORRECTING REGULATORY WEAKNESSES..................................................... 15
IV. EQUIPPING EUROPE WITH A CONSISTENT SET OF RULES............................ 27
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.................................................................................. 29
VI. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION........................................................ 32
CHAPTER III: EU SUPERVISORY REPAIR................................................................... 38
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................ 38
II. LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS: WHAT WENT WRONG? ..................................... 39
III. WHAT TO DO: BUILDING A EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF SUPERVISION
AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT.................................................................................. 42
IV. THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN SYSTEM
OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION ............................................................................... 48
V. REVIEWING AND POSSIBLY STRENGTHENING THE EUROPEAN
SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (ESFS).................................................. 58
CHAPTER IV: GLOBAL REPAIR ..................................................................................... 59
I. PROMOTING FINANCIAL STABILITY AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL.................... 59
II. REGULATORY CONSISTENCY .............................................................................. 60
III. ENHANCING COOPERATION AMONG SUPERVISORS ..................................... 61
IV. MACROECONOMIC SURVEILLANCE AND CRISIS PREVENTION ................ 63
V. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION........................................................ 66
VI. EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL...................... 67
VII. DEEPENING THE EU'S BILATERAL FINANCIAL RELATIONS ........................ 67
ANNEX I: MANDATE FOR THE HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON
FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU ................................................. 69
ANNEX II: MEETINGS OF THE GROUP AND HEARINGS IN 2008 - 2009 ........... 70
ANNEX III: AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED SINGLE EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL MARKET ................................................................................ 71
ANNEX IV: RECENT ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN SUPERVISION
IN THE EU .................................................................................................... 75
ANNEX V: ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN NATIONAL
SUPERVISORS AND THE AUTHORITIES IN THE ESFS………. ....... 78
I would like to thank the President of the European Commission, José Manuel
Barroso, for the very important mandate he conferred on me in October 2008 to
chair an outstanding group of people to give advice on the future of European
financial regulation and supervision. The work has been very stimulating. I am
grateful to all members of the group for their excellent contributions to the work,
and for all other views and papers submitted to us by many interested parties.
This report is published as the world faces a very serious economic and financial
The European Union is suffering.
An economic recession.
Huge government spending to stabilize the banking system – debts that future
generations will have to pay back.
Financial regulation and supervision have been too weak or have provided the
wrong incentives. Global markets have fanned the contagion. Opacity,
complexity have made things much worse.
Repair is necessary and urgent.
Action is required at all levels – Global, European and National and in all
We must work with our partners to converge towards high global standards,
through the IMF, FSF, the Basel committee and G20 processes. This is critical.
But let us recognize that the implementation and enforcement of these standards
will only be effective and lasting if the European Union, with the biggest capital
markets in the world, has a strong and integrated European system of regulation
In spite of some progress, too much of the European Union's framework today
remains seriously fragmented. The regulatory rule book itself. The European
Unions' supervisory structures. Its crisis mechanisms. 3
This report lays out a framework to take the European Union forward.
– to reduce risk and improve risk
Towards a new regulatory agenda
management; to improve systemic shock absorbers; to weaken pro-cyclical
amplifiers; to strengthen transparency; and to get the incentives in financial
Towards stronger coordinated supervision – macro-prudential and micro-
prudential. Building on existing structures. Ambitiously, step by step but with a
simple objective. Much stronger, coordinated supervision for all financial actors
in the European Un ion. With equivalent standards for all, thereby preserving
fair competition throughout the internal market.
Towards effective crisis management procedures – to build confidence among
supervisors. And real trust. With agreed methods and criteria. So all Member
States can feel that their investors, their depositors, their citizens are properly
protected in the European Union.
In essence, we have two alternatives: the first "chacun pour soi" beggar-thy-
neighbour solutions; or the second - enhanced, pragmatic, sensible European
cooperation for the benefit of all to preserve an open world economy. This will
bring undoubted economic gains, and this is what we favour.
We must begin work immediately.
Jacques de Larosière
The views expressed in this report are those of
the High-Level Group on supervision.
The Members of the Group support all the recommendations.
However, they do not necessarily agree on all the detailed points
made in the report. 5
1) Since July 2007, the world has faced, and continues to face, the most serious and
disruptive financial crisis since 1929. Originating primarily in the United States, the crisis
is now global, deep, even worsening. It has proven to be highly contagious and complex,
rippling rapidly through different market segments and countries. Many parts of the
financial system remain under severe strain. Some markets and institutions have stopped
functioning. This, in turn, has negatively affected the real economy. Financial markets
depend on trust. But much of this trust has evaporated.
2) Significant global economic damage is occurring, strongly impacting on the cost and
availability of credit; household budgets; mortgages; pensions; big and small company
financing; far more restricted access to wholesale funding and now spillovers to the more
fragile emerging country economies. The economies of the OECD are shrinking into
recession and unemployment is increasing rapidly. So far banks and insurance companies
have written off more than 1 trillion euros. Even now, 18 months after the beginning of
the crisis, the full scale of the losses is unknown. Since August 2007, falls in global stock
markets alone have resulted in losses in the value of the listed companies of more than
€16 trillion, equivalent to about 1.5 times the GDP of the European Union.
3) Governments and Central Banks across the world have taken many measures to try to
improve the economic situation and reduce the systemic dangers: economic stimulus
packages of various forms; huge injections of Central Bank liquidity; recapitalising
financial institutions; providing guarantees for certain types of financial activity and in
particular inter-bank lending; or through direct asset purchases, and "Bad Bank" solutions
are being contemplated by some governments. So far there has been limited success.
4) The Group believes that the world's monetary authorities and its regulatory and
supervisory financial authorities can and must do much better in the future to reduce the
chances of events like these happening again. This is not to say that all crises can be
prevented in the future. This would not be a realistic objective. But what could and should
be prevented is the kind of systemic and inter-connected vulnerabilities we have seen and
which have carried such contagious effects. To prevent the recurrence of this type of
crisis, a number of critical policy changes are called for. These concern the European
Union but also the global system at large.
5) Chapter 1 of this report begins by analysing the complex causes of this financial crisis, a
sine qua non to determine the correct regulatory and supervisory responses. 6
CHAPTER I: CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
6) Ample liquidity and low interest rates have been the major underlying factor behind the
present crisis, but financial innovation amplified and accelerated the consequences of
excess liquidity and rapid credit expansion. Strong macro-economic growth since the mid-
nineties gave an illusion that permanent and sustainable high levels of growth were not
only possible, but likely. This was a period of benign macroeconomic conditions, low
rates of inflation and low interest rates. Credit volume grew rapidly and, as consumer
inflation remained low, central banks - particularly in the US - felt no need tighten
monetary policy. Rather than in the prices of goods and services, excess liquidity showed
up in rapidly rising asset prices. These monetary policies fed into growing imbalances in
global financial and commodity markets.
7) In turn, very low US interest rates helped create a widespread housing bubble. This was
fuelled by unregulated, or insufficiently regulated, mortgage lending and complex
securitization financing techniques. Insufficient oversight over US government sponsored
entities (GSEs) like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and strong political pressure on these
GSEs to promote home ownership for low income households aggravated the situation.
Within Europe there are different housing finance models. Whilst a number of EU
Member States witnessed unsustainable increases in house prices, in some Member States
they grew more moderately and, in general, mortgage lending was more responsible.
8) In the US, personal saving fell from 7% as a percentage of disposable income in 1990, to
below zero in 2005 and 2006. Consumer credit and mortgages expanded rapidly. In
particular, subprime mortgage lending in the US rose significantly from $180 billion in
2001 to $625 billion in 2005.
9) This was accompanied by the accumulation of huge global imbalances. The credit
expansion in the US was financed by massive capital inflows from the major emerging
countries with external surpluses, notably China. By pegging their currencies to the
dollar, China and other economies such as Saudi Arabia in practice imported loose US
monetary policy, thus allowing global imbalances to build up. Current account surpluses
in these countries were recycled into US government securities and other lower-risk
assets, depressing their yields and encouraging other investors to search for higher yields
from more risky assets…
10) In this environment of plentiful liquidity and low returns, investors actively sought higher
yields and went searching for opportunities. Risk became mis-priced. Those originating
investment products responded to this by developing more and more innovative and
complex instruments designed to offer improved yields, often combined with increased
leverage. In particular, financial institutions converted their loans into mortgage or asset
backed securities (ABS), subsequently turned into collateralised debt obligations (CDOs)
often via off-balance special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and structured investment vehicles
(SIVs), generating a dramatic expansion of leverage within the financial system as a
1 Evidenced by a current account deficit of above 5% of GDP (or $700 billion a year) over a number of years. 7
whole. The issuance of US ABS, for example, quadrupled from $337 billion in 2000 to
over $1,250 billion in 2006 and non-agency US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) rose
from roughly $100 billion in 2000 to $773 billion in 2006. Although securitisation is in
principle a desirable economic model, it was accompanied by opacity which camouflaged
the poor quality of the underlying assets. This contributed to credit expansion and the
belief that risks were spread.
11) This led to increases in leverage and even more risky financial products. In the macro
conditions preceding the crisis described above, high levels of liquidity resulted finally in
risk premia falling to historically low levels. Exceptionally low interest rates combined
with fierce competition pushed most market participants – both banks and investors – to
search for higher returns, whether through an increase in leverage or investment in more
risky financial products. Greater risks were taken, but not properly priced as shown by the
historically very low spreads. Financial institutions engaged in very high leverage (on and
off balance sheet) - with many financial institutions having a leverage ratio of beyond 30 -
sometimes as high as 60 - making them exceedingly vulnerable to even a modest fall in
12) These problems developed dynamically. The rapid recognition of profits which
accounting rules allowed led both to a view that risks were falling and to increases in
financial results. This combination, when accompanied by constant capital ratios, resulted
in a fast expansion of balance sheets and made institutions vulnerable to changes in
valuation as economic circumstances deteriorated.
13) There have been quite fundamental failures in the assessment of risk, both by financial
firms and by those who regulated and supervised them. There are many manifestations of
this: a misunderstanding of the interaction between credit and liquidity and a failure to
verify fully the leverage of institutions were among the most important. The cumulative
effect of these failures was an overestimation of the ability of financial firms as a whole to
manage their risks, and a corresponding underestimation of the capital they should hold.
14) The extreme complexity of structured financial products, sometimes involving several
layers of CDOs, made proper risk assessment challenging for even the most sophisticated
in the market. Moreover, model-based risk assessments underestimated the exposure to
common shocks and tail risks and thereby the overall risk exposure. Stress-testing too
often was based on mild or even wrong assumptions. Clearly, no bank expected a total
freezing of the inter-bank or commercial paper markets.
15) This was aggravated further by a lack of transparency in important segments of financial
markets – even within financial institutions – and the build up of a "shadow" banking
system. There was little knowledge of either the size or location of credit risks. While
securitised instruments were meant to spread risks more evenly across the financial
system, the nature of the system made it impossible to verify whether risk had actually
been spread or simply re-concentrated in less visible parts of the system. This contributed
to uncertainty on the credit quality of counterparties, a breakdown in confidence and, in
turn, the spreading of tensions to other parts of the financial sector. 8
16) Two aspects are important in this respect. First, the fact that the Basel 1 framework did
not cater adequately for, and in fact encouraged, pushing risk taking off balance-sheets.
This has been partly corrected by the Basel 2 framework. Second, the explosive growth of
the Over-The-Counter credit derivatives markets, which were supposed to mitigate risk,
but in fact added to it.
17) The originate-to-distribute model as it developed, created perverse incentives. Not only
did it blur the relationship between borrower and lender but also it diverted attention away
from the ability of the borrower to pay towards lending – often without recourse - against
collateral. A mortgage lender knowing beforehand that he would transfer (sell) his entire
default risks through MBS or CDOs had no incentive to ensure high lending standards.
The lack of regulation, in particular on the US mortgage market, made things far worse.
Empirical evidence suggests that there was a drastic deterioration in mortgage lending
standards in the US in the period 2005 to 2007 with default rates increasing.
18) This was compounded by financial institutions and supervisors substantially
underestimating liquidity risk. Many financial institutions did not manage the maturity
transformation process with sufficient care. What looked like an attractive business model
in the context of liquid money markets and positively sloped yield curves (borrowing
short and lending long), turned out to be a dangerous trap once liquidity in credit markets
dried up and the yield curve flattened.
The role of Credit Rating Agencies
19) Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) lowered the perception of credit risk by giving AAA
ratings to the senior tranches of structured financial products like CDOs, the same rating
they gave to standard government and corporate bonds.
20) The major underestimation by CRAs of the credit default risks of instruments
collateralised by subprime mortgages resulted largely from flaws in their rating
methodologies. The lack of sufficient historical data relating to the US sub-prime market,
the underestimation of correlations in the defaults that would occur during a downturn and
the inability to take into account the severe weakening of underwriting standards by
certain originators have contributed to poor rating performances of structured products
between 2004 and 2007.
21) The conflicts of interests in CRAs made matters worse. The issuer-pays model, as it has
developed, has had particularly damaging effects in the area of structured finance. Since
structured products are designed to take advantage of different investor risk appetites, they
are structured for each tranche to achieve a particular rating. Conflicts of interests become
more acute as the rating implications of different structures were discussed between the
originator and the CRA. Issuers shopped around to ensure they could get an AAA rating
for their products.
22) Furthermore, the fact that regulators required certain regulated investors to only invest in
AAA-rated products also increased demand for such financial assets. 9
Corporate governance failures
23) Failures in risk assessment and risk management were aggravated by the fact that the
checks and balances of corporate governance also failed. Many boards and senior
managements of financial firms neither understood the characteristics of the new, highly
complex financial products they were dealing with, nor were they aware of the aggregate
exposure of their companies, thus seriously underestimating the risks they were running.
Many board members did not provide the necessary oversight or control of management.
Nor did the owners of these companies – the shareholders.
24) Remuneration and incentive schemes within financial institutions contributed to excessive
risk-taking by rewarding short-term expansion of the volume of (risky) trades rather than
the long-term profitability of investments. Furthermore, shareholders' pressure on
management to deliver higher share prices and dividends for investors meant that
exceeding expected quarterly earnings became the benchmark for many companies'
Regulatory, supervisory and crisis management failures
25) These pressures were not contained by regulatory or supervisory policy or practice. Some
long-standing policies such as the definition of capital requirements for banks placed too
much reliance on both the risk management capabilities of the banks themselves and on
the adequacy of ratings. In fact, it has been the regulated financial institutions that have
turned out to be the largest source of problems. For instance, capital requirements were
particularly light on proprietary trading transactions while (as events showed later) the
risks involved in these transactions proved to be much higher than the internal models had
26) One of the mistakes made was that insufficient attention was given to the liquidity of
markets. In addition, too much attention was paid to each individual firm and too little to
the impact of general developments on sectors or markets as a whole. These problems
occurred in very many markets and countries, and aggregated together contributed
substantially to the developing problems. Once problems escalated into specific crises,
there were real problems of information exchange and collective decision making
involving central banks, supervisors and finance ministries.
27) Derivatives markets rapidly expanded (especially credit derivatives markets) and off-
balance sheet vehicles were allowed to proliferate– with credit derivatives playing a
significant role triggering the crisis. While US supervisors should have been able to
identify (and prevent) the marked deterioration in mortgage lending standards and
intervene accordingly, EU supervisors had a more difficult task in assessing the extent to
which exposure to subprime risk had seeped into EU-based financial institutions.
Nevertheless, they failed to spot the degree to which a number of EU financial institutions
had accumulated – often in off balance-sheet constructions- exceptionally high exposure
to highly complex, later to become illiquid financial assets. Taken together, these
developments led over time to opacity and a lack of transparency.
28) This points to serious limitations in the existing supervisory framework globally, both in a
national and cross-border context. It suggests that financial supervisors frequently did not
have and in some cases did not insist in getting, or received too late, all the relevant
information on the global magnitude of the excess leveraging; that they did not fully
understand or evaluate the size of the risks; and that they did not seem to share their
information properly with their counterparts in other Member States or with the US. In
fact, the business model of US-type investment banks and the way they expanded was not
really challenged by supervisors and standard setters. Insufficient supervisory and
regulatory resources combined with an inadequate mix of skills as well as different
national systems of supervision made the situation worse.
29) Regulators and supervisors focused on the micro-prudential supervision of individual
financial institutions and not sufficiently on the macro-systemic risks of a contagion of
correlated horizontal shocks. Strong international competition among financial centres
also contributed to national regulators and supervisors being reluctant to take unilateral
30) Whilst the building up of imbalances and risks was widely acknowledged and commented
upon, there was little consensus among policy makers or regulators at the highest level on
the seriousness of the problem, or on the measures to be taken. There was little impact of
early warning in terms of action – and most early warnings were feeble anyway.
31) Multilateral surveillance (IMF) did not function efficiently, as it did not lead to a timely
correction of macroeconomic imbalances and exchange rate misalignments. Nor did
concerns about the stability of the international financial system lead to sufficient
coordinated action, for example through the IMF, FSF, G8 or anywhere else.
The dynamics of the crisis
32) The crisis eventually erupted when inflation pressures in the US economy required a
tightening of monetary policy from mid-2006 and it became apparent that the sub-prime
housing bubble in the US was going to burst amid rising interest rates. Starting in July
2007, accumulating losses on US sub-prime mortgages triggered widespread disruption of
credit markets, as uncertainty about the ultimate size and location of credit losses
undermined investor confidence. Exposure to these losses had been spread among
financial institutions around the world, including Europe, inter alia via credit derivative
33) The pro-cyclical nature of some aspects of the regulatory framework was then brought
into sharp relief. Financial institutions understandably tried to dispose of assets once they
realised that they had overstretched their leverage, thus lowering market prices for these
assets. Regulatory requirements (accounting rules and capital requirements) helped trigger
a negative feed-back loop amplified by major impacts in the credit markets.
34) Financial institutions, required to value their trading book according to mark-to-market
principles, (which pushed up profits and reserves during the bull-run) were required to
write down the assets in their balance sheet as markets deleveraged. Already excessively
leveraged, they were required to either sell further assets to maintain capital levels, or to
reduce their loan volume. "Fire sales" made by one financial institution in turn forced all
other financial institutions holding similar assets to mark the value of these assets down
"to market". Many hedge funds acted similarly and margin calls intensified liquidity
35) Once credit rating agencies started to revise their credit ratings for CDOs downwards,
banks were required to adjust their risk-weighted capital requirements upwards. Once
again, already highly leveraged, and faced with increasing difficulties in raising equity, a
range of financial institutions hastened to dispose of assets, putting further pressure on
asset prices. When, despite the fear of possible negative signalling effects, banks tried to
raise fresh capital, more or less at the same time, they were faced by weakening equity
markets. This obliged them to look for funding from sovereign wealth funds and, in due
course, from heavy state intervention. What was initially a liquidity problem rapidly, for a
number of institutions, turned into a solvency problem.
36) The lack of market transparency, combined with the sudden downgrade of credit ratings,
and the US Government's decision not to save Lehman Brothers led to a wide-spread
breakdown of trust and a crisis of confidence that, in autumn 2008, practically shut down
inter-bank money markets, thus creating a large-scale liquidity crisis, which still weighs
heavily on financial markets in the EU and beyond. The complexity of a number of
financial instruments and the intrinsic vulnerability of the underlying assets also explain
why problems in the relatively small US sub-prime market brought the global financial
system to the verge of a full-scale dislocation. The longer it took to reveal the true amount
of losses, the more widespread and entrenched the crisis of confidence has become. And it
remains largely unresolved to this day.
37) The regulatory response to this worsening situation was weakened by an inadequate crisis
management infrastructure in the EU, both in terms of the cooperation between national
supervisors and between public authorities. The ECB was among the first to react swiftly
by provide liquidity to the inter-bank market. In the absence of a common framework for
crisis management, Member States were faced with a very difficult situation. Especially
for the larger financial institutions they had to react quickly and pragmatically to avoid a
banking failure. These actions, given the speed of events, for obvious reasons were not
fully coordinated and led sometimes to negative spill-over effects on other Member
CHAPTER II: POLICY AND REGULATORY REPAIR
The present report draws a distinction between financial regulation and supervision.
38) Regulation is the set of rules and standards that govern financial institutions; their main
objective is to foster financial stability and to protect the customers of financial services.
Regulation can take different forms, ranging from information requirements to strict
measures such as capital requirements. On the other hand, supervision is the process
designed to oversee financial institutions in order to ensure that rules and standards are
properly applied. This being said, in practice, regulation and supervision are intertwined
and will therefore, in some instances, have to be assessed together in this chapter and the
39) As underlined in the previous chapter, the present crisis results from the complex
interaction of market failures, global financial and monetary imbalances, inappropriate
regulation, weak supervision and poor macro-prudential oversight. It would be simplistic
to believe therefore that these problems can be "resolved" just by more regulation.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that good regulation is a necessary condition for the
preservation of financial stability.
40) A robust and competitive financial system should facilitate intermediation between those
with financial resources and those with investment needs. This process relies on
confidence in the integrity of institutions and the continuity of markets. "This confidence,
taken for granted in well-functioning financial systems, has been lost in the present crisis
in substantial part due to its recent complexity and opacity,…weak credit standards,
mis-judged maturity mismatches, wildly excessive use of leverage on and off-balance
sheet, gaps in regulatory oversight, accounting and risk management practices that
exaggerated cycles, a flawed system of credit ratings and weakness of governance ".
All must be addressed.
41) This chapter outlines some changes in regulation that are required to strengthen financial
stability and the protection of customers so to avoid – if not the occurrence of crises,
which are unavoidable – at least a repetition of the extraordinary type of systemic
breakdown that we are now witnessing. Most of the issues are global in nature, and not
just specific to the EU.
42) What should be the right focus when designing regulation? It should concentrate on the
major sources of weaknesses of the present set-up (e.g. dealing with financial bubbles,
strengthening regulatory oversight on institutions that have proven to be poorly regulated,
adapting regulatory and accounting practices that have aggravated pro-cyclicality,
promoting correct incentives to good governance and transparency, ensuring international
consistency in standards and rules as well as much stronger coordination between
regulators and supervisors). Over-regulation, of course, should be avoided because it
2 G30 report, Washington, January 2009. 13
slows down financial innovation and thereby undermines economic growth in the wider
economy. Furthermore, the enforcement of existing regulation, when adequate (or
improving it where necessary), and better supervision, can be as important as creating new
II. THE LINK BETWEEN MACROECONOMIC AND REGULATORY
43) The fundamental underlying factor which made the crisis possible was the ample liquidity
and the related low interest rate conditions which prevailed globally since the mid-
nineties. These conditions fuelled risk taking by investors, banks and other financial
institutions, leading ultimately to the crisis.
44) The low level of long term interest rate over the last five years – period of sustained
growth – is an important factor that contrasts with previous expansionary periods.
45) As industrial economies recovered during this period, corporate investment did not pick
up as would have been expected. "As a result, the worldwide excess of desired savings
over actual investment … pushed its way into the main markets that were opened to
investment, housing in industrial countries, lifting house prices and rising residential
construction ". This phenomenon, which affected also financial assets, took place in the
US but also in the EU, where significant housing bubbles developed in the UK, Ireland
46) This explanation is not inconsistent with the one focusing on excessive liquidity fuelled
by too loose monetary policy. Actually the two lines of reasoning complement each other:
too low interest rates encouraged investment in housing and financial assets, but had
monetary policy been stricter, there would have been somewhat less expansion in the US,
more limited house prices increases and smaller current account deficits. By the same
token, if countries with big surpluses had allowed their currencies to appreciate, smaller
current account deficits and surpluses would have been the consequence. This raises the
question of what competent authorities can do in order to at least mitigate the risks of
bubbles building up, instead of simply intervening ex-post by injecting liquidity to limit
the damage from a macro-economic standpoint.
47) The lack of precise and credible information on whether a given state of asset markets is
already a bubble is not a sufficient argument against trying to prevent a serious bubble.
48) It is commonly agreed today that monetary authorities cannot avoid the creation of
bubbles by targeting asset prices and they should not try to prick bubbles. However, they
can and should adequately communicate their concerns on the sustainability of strong
increases in asset prices and contribute to a more objective assessment of systemic risks.
Equally, they can and should implement a monetary policy that looks not only at
consumer prices, but also at overall monetary and credit developments, and they should be
ready to gradually tighten monetary policy when money or credit grow in an excessive
and unsustainable manner. Other competent authorities can also use certain tools to
contain money and credit growth. These are of particular importance in the context of the
3 See "the global roots of the current financial crisis and its implications for regulation" by Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and
euro zone, where country-specific monetary policies tailored to countries' positions in the
economic cycle, and especially in the asset market cycle, cannot be implemented. The
following are examples of regulatory tools which can help meet counter-cyclical
- introducing dynamic provisioning or counter-cyclical reserves on banks in "good
times" to limit credit expansion and so alleviate pro-cyclicality effects in the "bad
- making rules on loans to value more restrictive;
- modifying tax rules that excessively stimulate the demand for assets.
49) These tools were not, or were hardly, used by monetary and regulatory authorities in the
run-up to the present crisis. This should be a lesson for the future. Overall cooperation
between monetary and regulatory authorities will have to be strengthened, with a view to
defining and implementing the policy-mix that can best maintain a stable and balanced
macro-economic framework. In this context, it will be important for the ECB to become
more involved in over-seeing the macro-prudential aspects of banking activities (see next
chapter on supervision). Banks should be subject to more and more intense scrutiny as the
bubble builds up.
50) Finally, a far more effective and symmetric "multilateral surveillance" by the IMF
covering exchange rates and underlying economic policies is called for if one wants to
avoid the continuation of unsustainable deficits (see chapter on global issues).
III. CORRECTING REGULATORY WEAKNESSES
Reforming certain key-aspects of the present regulatory framework
51) Although the relative importance assigned to regulation (versus institutional incentives -
such as governance and risk assessment, - or monetary conditions…) can be discussed, it
is a fact that global financial services regulation did not prevent or at least contain the
crisis as well as market aberrations. A profound review of regulatory policy is therefore
needed. A consensus, both in Europe and internationally, needs to be developed on which
financial services regulatory measures are needed for the protection of customers, the
safeguarding of financial stability, and the sustainability of economic growth.
52) This should be done being mindful of the usefulness of self-regulation by the private
sector. Public and self-regulation should complement each other and supervisors should
check that where there is self-regulation it is being properly implemented. This was not
sufficiently carried out in the recent past.
The following issues must be addressed as a matter of urgency.
a) The Basel 2 framework
53) It is wrong to blame the Basel 2 rules per se for being one of the major causes of the
crisis. These rules entered into force only on 1 January 2008 in the EU and will only be
applicable in the US on 1 April 2010. Furthermore, the Basel 2 framework contains
several improvements which would have helped mitigate to some extent the emergence of
the crisis had they been fully applied in the preceding years. For example, had the capital
treatment for liquidity lines given to special purpose vehicles been in application then they
might have mitigated some of the difficulties. In this regard Basel 2 is an improvement
relative to the previous "leverage ratios" that failed to deal effectively with off-balance
54) The Basel 2 framework nevertheless needs fundamental review. It underestimated some
important risks and over-estimated banks' ability to handle them. The perceived wisdom
that distribution of risks through securitisation took risk away from the banks turned out,
on a global basis, also to be incorrect. These mistakes led to too little capital being
required. This must be changed. The Basel methodology seems to have been too much
based on recent past economic data and good liquidity conditions.
55) Liquidity issues are important in the context both of individual financial firms and of the
regulatory system. The Group believes that both require greater attention than they have
hitherto been afforded. Supervisors need to pay greater attention to the specific maturity
mismatches of the firms they supervise, and those drawing up capital regulations need to
incorporate more fully the impact on capital of liquidity pressures on banks' behaviour.
56) A reflection is also needed with regard to the reliance of Basel 2 on external ratings. There
has undoubtedly been excessive reliance by many buy-side firms on ratings provided by
CRAs. If CRAs perform to a proper level of competence and of integrity, their services
will be of significant value and should form a helpful part of financial markets. These
arguments support Recommendation 3. But the use of ratings should never eliminate the
need for those making investment decisions to apply their own judgement. A particular
failing has been the acceptance by investors of ratings of structured products without
understanding the basis on which those products were provided.
57) The use by sophisticated banks of internal risk models for trading and banking book
exposures has been another fundamental problem. These models were often not properly
understood by board members (even though the Basel 2 rules increased the demands on
boards to understand the risk management of the institutions). Whilst the models may pass
the test for normal conditions, they were clearly based on too short statistical horizons and
this proved inadequate for the recent exceptional circumstances.
58) Future rules will have to be better complemented by more reliance on judgement, instead
of being exclusively based on internal risk models. Supervisors, board members and
managers should understand fully new financial products and the nature and extent of the
risks that are being taken; stress testing should be undertaken without undue constraints;
professional due diligence should be put right at the centre of their daily work.
59) Against this background, the Group is of the view that the review of the Basel 2
framework should be articulated around the following elements:
- The crisis has shown that there should be more capital, and more high quality capital,
in the banking system, over and above the present regulatory minimum levels. Banks
should hold more capital, especially in good times, not only to cover idiosyncratic
risks but also to incorporate the broader macro-prudential risks. The goal should be to
increase minimum requirements. This should be done gradually in order to avoid pro-
cyclical drawbacks and an aggravation of the present credit crunch.
- The crisis has revealed the strong pro-cyclical impact of the current regulatory
framework, stemming in particular from the interaction of risk-sensitive capital
requirements and the application of the mark-to-market principle in distressed market
conditions. Instead of having a dampening effect, the rules have amplified market
trends upwards and downwards - both in the banking and insurance sectors.
60) How to reduce the pro-cyclical effect of Basel 2? Of course, it is inevitable that a system
based on risk-sensitivity is to some extent pro-cyclical: during a recession, the quality of
credit deteriorates and capital requirements rise. The opposite happens during an upswing.
But there is a significant measure of "excessive" pro-cyclicality in the Basel framework
that must be reduced by using several methods .
- concerning the banking book, it is important that banks, as is the present rule,
effectively assess risks using "through the cycle" approaches which would reduce the
pro-cyclicality of the present measurement of probability of losses and default;
- more generally, regulation should introduce specific counter-cyclical measures. The
general principle should be to slow down the inherent tendency to build up risk-taking
and over-extension in times of high growth in demand for credit and expanding bank
profits. In this respect, the "dynamic provisioning" introduced by the Bank of Spain
appears as a practical way of dealing with this issue: building up counter-cyclical
buffers, which rise during expansions and allow them under certain circumstances to
be drawn down in recessions. This would be facilitated if fiscal authorities would treat
reserves taken against future expected losses in a sensible way. Another method would
be to move capital requirements in a similar anti-cyclical way;
- this approach makes sense from a micro-prudential point of view because it reduces
the risk of bank failures. But it is also desirable from a macro-prudential and macro-
economic perspective. Indeed, such a measure would tend to place some restraint on
over rapid credit expansion and reduce the dangers of market over-reactions during
- with respect to the trading book of banks, there is a need to reduce pro-cyclicality and
to increase capital requirements. The present statistical VaR models are clearly pro-
cyclical (too often derived, as they are, from observations of too short time periods to
capture fully market prices movements and from other questionable assumptions). If
volatility goes down in a year, the models combined with the accounting rules tend to
understate the risks involved (often low volatility and credit growth are signs of
irrational low risk aversion and hence of upcoming reversals). More generally, the
level of capital required against trading books has been well too low relative to the
risks being taken in a system where banks heavily relied on liquidity through
"marketable instruments" which eventually, when liquidity evaporated, proved not to
be marketable. If banks engage in proprietary activities for a significant part of their
total activities, much higher capital requirements will be needed.
4 See Lord Turner, The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation, Economoist's inaugural city Lecture,
21 January 2009. 17
It is important that such recommendations be quickly adopted at international level by the
Basel committee and the FSF who should define the appropriate details.
61) Measuring and limiting liquidity risk is crucial, but cannot be achieved merely through
quantitative criteria. Indeed the "originate-and-distribute" model which has developed
hand in hand with securitisation has introduced a new dimension to the liquidity issue.
That dimension has not sufficiently been taken into account by the existing framework.
The assessment by institutions and regulators of the "right" liquidity levels is difficult
because it much depends on the assumptions made on the liquidity of specific assets and
complex securities as well as secured funding. Therefore the assets of the banking system
should be examined in terms not only of their levels, but also of their quality (counterparty
risk, transparency of complex instruments…) and of their maturity transformation risk
(e.g. dependence on short term funding). These liquidity constraints should be carefully
assessed by supervisors. Indeed a "mismatch ratio" or increases in liquidity ratios must be
consistent with the nature of assets and the time horizons of their holdings by banks.
The Basel committee should in the future concentrate more on liquidity risk management.
Even though this is a very difficult task, it should come forward with a set of norms to
complement the existing qualitative criteria (these norms should cover the need to
maintain, given the nature of the risk portfolio, an appropriate mix of long term funding
and liquid assets).
62) There should be stricter rules (as has been recommended by the FSF) for off-balance sheet
vehicles. This means clarifying the scope of prudential regulation applicable to these
vehicles and determining, if needed, higher capital requirements. Better transparency
should also be ensured.
63) The EU should agree on a clear, common and comprehensive definition of own funds.
This definition should in particular clarify whether, and if so which, hybrid instruments
should be considered as Tier 1. This definition would have to be confirmed at
international level by the Basel committee and applied globally. Consideration should
also be given to the possibility of limiting Tier 1 instruments in the future to equity and
64) In order to ensure that management and banks' board members possess the necessary
competence to fully understand complex instruments and methods, the "fit and proper"
criteria should be reviewed and strengthened. Also, internationally harmonized rules
should be implemented for strengthening the mandates and resources for banks’ internal
control and audit functions. Regulators and supervisors should also be better trained to
understand risk assessment models.
65) The Group supports the work initiated by the Basel committee on the above issues. It will
however be important that the Basel committee works as expeditiously as possible. It took
8 years to revise Basel 1. This is far too long, especially given the speed at which the
banking sector evolves. It will be important for the Basel committee to find ways to agree
on the details of the above reforms far more quickly. 18
The Group sees the need for a fundamental review of the Basel 2
rules. The Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors should therefore be invited to urgently
amend the rules with a view to:
- gradually increase minimum capital requirements;
- reduce pro-cyclicality, by e.g. encouraging dynamic provisioning or capital buffers;
- introduce stricter rules for off-balance sheet items;
- tighten norms on liquidity management; and
- strengthen the rules for bank’s internal control and risk management, notably by
reinforcing the "fit and proper" criteria for management and board members.
Furthermore, it is essential that rules are complemented by more reliance on judgement.
Recommendation 2: In the EU, a common definition of regulatory capital should be
adopted, clarifying whether, and if so which, hybrid instruments should be considered as
tier 1 capital. This definition should be confirmed by the Basel Committee.
b) Credit Rating Agencies
66) Given the pivotal and quasi-regulatory role that they play in today's financial markets,
Credit Rating Agencies must be regulated effectively to ensure that their ratings are
independent, objective and of the highest possible quality. This is all the more true given
the oligopolistic nature of this business. The stability and functioning of financial markets
should not depend on the opinions of a small number of agencies – whose opinions often
were proven wrong, and who have much too frequently substituted for rigorous due
diligence by firms.
67) The Commission has made a proposal for a Regulation on CRAs. However, the system of
licensing and oversight contained in this proposal is too cumbersome. The allocation of
work between the home and host authorities, in particular, is likely to lack effectiveness
and efficiency. The Group is of the view that it would be far more rational to entrust the
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) with the task of licensing CRAs in
the EU, monitoring their performance, and in the light of this imposing changes (as is
proposed in the new supervisory framework proposed in the next chapter).
68) Beyond this proposal for a Regulation, a fundamental review of CRAs economic model
should be conducted, notably in order to eliminate the conflicts of interests that currently
exist. One drawback of the present model is that CRAs are entirely financed by the issuers
and not by the users, which is a source of conflict of interest. The modalities of a switch
from the current "issuer pays" model to a "buyer pays" model should be considered at
international level. Furthermore, and even though this may well be a difficult task in
practice, consideration should be given to the ways in which the formulation of ratings
could be completely separated from the advice given to issuers on the engineering of
complex products. 19
69) The use of ratings required by some financial regulations raises a number of problems, but
is probably unavoidable at this stage. However, it should be significantly reduced over
70) Regulators should have a close eye on the performance of CRAs with the recognition and
allowable use of their ratings made dependent on their performance. This role should be
entrusted to CESR, who should on an annual basis approve those CRAs whose ratings can
be used for regulatory purposes. Should the performance of a given CRA be insufficient,
its activities could be restricted or its licence withdrawn by CESR.
71) Finally, the rating of structured products should be transformed with a new, distinct code
alerting investors about the complexity of the instrument.
72) These recommendations will of course have to dovetail with increased due diligence from
the buy-side. Supervisors should check that financial institutions have the capacity to
complement the use of external ratings (on which they should no longer excessively rely
upon) with sound independent evaluations.
Recommendation 3: Concerning the regulation of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs), the
Group recommends that:
- within the EU, a strengthened CESR should be in charge of registering and supervising
- a fundamental review of CRAs' business model, its financing and of the scope for
separating rating and advisory activities should be undertaken;
- the use of ratings in financial regulations should be significantly reduced over time;
- the rating for structured products should be transformed by introducing distinct codes
for such products.
It is crucial that these regulatory changes are accompanied by increased due diligence and
judgement by investors and improved supervision.
c) The mark-to-market principle
73) The crisis has brought into relief the difficulty to apply the mark-to-market principle in
certain market conditions as well as the strong pro-cyclical impact that this principle can
have. The Group considers that a wide reflection is needed on the mark-to-market
principle. Whilst in general this principle makes sense, there may be specific conditions
where this principle should not apply because it can mislead investors and distort
74) It is particularly important that banks can retain the possibility to keep assets, accounted
for amortised cost at historical or original fair value (corrected, of course, for future
impairments), over a long period in the banking book - which does not mean that banks
should have the discretion to switch assets at will from the banking to the trading book.
The swift October 2008 decision by the EU to modify IAS-39, thereby introducing more
flexibility as well as convergence with US GAAP, is to be commended. It is irrelevant to
mark-to-market, on a daily basis, assets that are intended to be held and managed on a
long-term horizon provided that they are reasonably matched by financing.
75) Differences between business models must also be taken into account. For example,
intermediation of credit and liquidity requires disclosure and transparency but not
necessarily mark-to-market rules which, while being appropriate for investment banks and
trading activities, are not consistent with the traditional loan activity and the policy of
holding long term investments. Long-term economic value should be central to any
valuation method: it may be based, for instance, on an assessment of the future cash flows
deriving from the security as long as there is an explicit minimum holding period and as
long as the cash flows can be considered as sustainable over a long period.
76) Another matter to be addressed relates to situations where assets can no longer be marked-
to-market because there is no active market for the assets concerned. Financial institutions
in such circumstances have no other solution than to use internal modelling processes. The
quality and adequacy of these processes should of course be assessed by auditors. The
methodologies used should be transparent. Furthermore internal modelling processes
should also be overseen by the level 3 committees, in order to ensure consistency and
avoid competitive distortions.
77) To ensure convergence of accounting practices and a level playing-field at the global
level, it should be the role of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) to
foster the emergence of a consensus as to where and how the mark-to-market principle
should apply – and where it should not. The IASB must, to this end, open itself up more to
the views of the regulatory, supervisory and business communities. This should be
coupled with developing a far more responsive, open, accountable and balanced
governance structure. If such a consensus does not emerge, it should be the role of the
international community to set limits to the application of the mark-to-market principle.
78) The valuation of impaired assets is now at the centre of the political debate. It is of crucial
importance that valuation of these assets is carried-out on the basis of common
methodologies at international level. The Group encourages all parties to arrive at a
solution which will minimise competition distortions and costs for taxpayers. If there are
widely variant solutions – market uncertainty will not be improved.
79) Regarding the issue of pro-cylicality, as a matter of principle, the accounting system
should be neutral and not be allowed to change business models – which it has been doing
in the past by "incentivising" banks to act short term. The public good of financial
stability must be embedded in accounting standard setting. This would be facilitated if the
regulatory community would have a permanent seat in the IASB (see chapter on global
Recommendation 4: With respect to accounting rules the Group considers that a wider
reflection on the mark-to-market principle is needed and in particular recommends that:
- expeditious solutions should be found to the remaining accounting issues concerning
- accounting standards should not bias business models, promote pro-cyclical behaviour
or discourage long-term investment; 21
- the IASB and other accounting standard setters should clarify and agree on a common,
transparent methodology for the valuation of assets in illiquid markets where mark-to-
market cannot be applied;
- the IASB further opens its standard-setting process to the regulatory, supervisory and
- the oversight and governance structure of the IASB be strengthened.
80) The crisis originated and developed in the banking sector. But the insurance sector has
been far from immune. The largest insurance company in the world has had to be bailed
out because of its entanglement with the entire financial sector, inter alia through credit
default swaps activities. In addition, the failure of the business models of monoline
insurers has created significant market and regulatory concern. It is therefore important,
especially at a time where Europe is in the process of overhauling its regulatory
framework for the entire insurance sector, to draw the lessons from the crisis in the US
insurance sector. Insurance companies can in particular be subject to major market and
concentration risks. Compared to banks, insurance companies tend to be more sensitive to
stock market developments (and less to liquidity and credit risks, even if the crisis has
shown that they are not immune to those risks either).
81) Solvency 2 is an important step forward in the effort to improve insurance regulation, to
foster risk assessments and to rationalise the management of large firms. Solvency 2
should therefore be adopted urgently. The directive, especially if complemented by
measures which draw the lessons from the crisis, would remedy the present fragmentation
of rules in the EU and allow for a more comprehensive, qualitative and economic
assessment of the risks mentioned above. The directive would also facilitate the
management and supervision of large insurance groups. With colleges of supervisors for
all cross-border groups the directive would strengthen and organise better supervisory
cooperation – something lacking up to now in spite of the efforts made by the Committee
of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS). The AIG case
in the US has illustrated in dramatic terms what happens when there is a lack of
82) Differences of views between "home" and "host" Member States on the operation of the
group support regime have so far prevented a successful conclusion of the negotiation of
the directive. This should be addressed by providing adequate safeguards for host Member
States. In addition, the Group believes that the new supervisory framework proposed in
the chapter on supervision (and in particular, the setting up of a binding mediation
mechanism between home and host supervisors) plus the development of harmonised
insurance guarantees schemes could contribute to finding a solution for the current
deadlock. All the above measures (safeguards, binding mediation, insurance guarantee
schemes) should be implemented together concurrently with Solvency 2. It would be
highly desirable to agree the above package by May 2009 when the European Parliament
breaks for its elections. 22
Recommendation 5: The Group considers that the Solvency 2 directive must be adopted and
include a balanced group support regime, coupled with sufficient safeguards for host
Member States, a binding mediation process between supervisors and the setting-up of
harmonised insurance guarantee schemes.
e) Supervisory and sanctioning powers
83) A sound prudential and conduct of business framework for the financial sector must rest
on strong supervisory and sanctioning regimes. Supervisory authorities must be equipped
with sufficient powers to act when financial institutions have inadequate risk management
and control mechanisms as well as inadequate solvency of liquidity positions. There
should also be equal, strong and deterrent sanctions regimes against all financial crimes -
sanctions which should be enforced effectively.
84) Neither of these exist for the time being in the EU. Member States sanctioning regimes are
in general weak and heterogeneous. Sanctions for insider trading range from a few
thousands of euros in one Member State to millions of euros or jail in another. This can
induce regulatory arbitrage in a single market. Sanctions should therefore be urgently
strengthened and harmonised. The huge pecuniary differences between the level of fines
that can be levied in the competition area and financial fraud penalties is striking.
Furthermore, Member States should review their capacity to adequately detect financial
crimes when they occur. Where needed, more resources and more sophisticated detection
processes should be deployed.
Recommendation 6: The Group considers that:
- Competent authorities in all Member States must have sufficient supervisory powers,
including sanctions, to ensure the compliance of financial institutions with the
- Competent authorities should also be equipped with strong, equivalent and deterrent
sanction regimes to counter all types of financial crime.
Closing the gaps in regulation
a) The "parallel banking system"
85) In addition to the weaknesses identified in the present regulatory framework, and in
particular in the Basel 2 framework, it is advisable to look into the activities of the
"parallel banking system" (encompassing hedge funds, investment banks, other funds,
various off-balance sheet items, mortgage brokers in some jurisdictions). The Group
considers that appropriate regulation must be extended, in a proportionate manner, to all
firms or entities conducting financial activities which may have a systemic impact (i.e. in
the form of counterparty, maturity, interest rate risks…) even if they have no direct links
with the public at large. This is all the more important since such institutions, having no
deposit base, can be very vulnerable when liquidity evaporates – resulting in major
impacts in the real economy. 23
86) Concerning hedge funds, the Group considers they did not play a major role in the
emergence of the crisis. Their role has largely been limited to a transmission function,
notably through massive selling of shares and short-selling transactions. We should also
recognise that in the EU, unlike the US, the great bulk of hedge fund managers are
registered and subject to information requirements. This is the case in particular in the
UK, where all hedge funds managers are subject to registration and regulation, as all fund
managers are, and where the largest 30 are subject to direct information requirements
often obtained on a global basis as well as to indirect monitoring via the banks and prime
87) It would be desirable that all other Member States as well as the US adopt a comparable
set of measures. Indeed, hedge funds can add to the leverage of the system and, given the
scale at which they can operate, should a problem arise, the concentrated unwinding of
their positions could cause major dislocation.
88) There is a need for greater transparency since banks, the main lenders to hedge funds, and
their supervisors have not been able to obtain a global view of the risks they were
engaging in. At the very least, supervisors need to know which hedge funds are of
systemic importance. And they should have a clear on-going view on the strategies, risk
structure and leverage of these systemically important funds. This need for supervisory
information requires the introduction of a formal authority to register these funds, to
assess their strategies, their methods and their leverage. This is necessary for the exercise
of macro-prudential oversight and therefore essential for financial stability.
89) Appropriate regulation in the US must also be redesigned for large investment banks and
broker dealers when they are not organised as bank holding companies.
90) In this context, particular attention has to be paid to institutions which engage in
proprietary trading to create value for their shareholders, i.e. investment banks and
commercial banks who have engaged in these activities (that are not essentially different
from some hedge funds). The conventional wisdom has been that light regulatory
principles could apply to these because they were trading "at their own risk". Evidence has
shown that the investment banks were subject to very thin capital requirements, became
highly leveraged and then created severe systemic problems. Furthermore, it turned out
that these institutions were subject to only very weak supervision by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which meant that no one had a precise view on their
involvement with hedge funds and SPVs; nor had the competent authorities a view on the
magnitude of the proprietary investments of these institutions, in particular in the US real
91) While these institutions should not be controlled like ordinary banks, adequate capital
requirements should be set for proprietary trading and reporting obligations should be
applied in order to assess their degree of leverage. Furthermore, the wrong incentives that
induced excessive risk taking (in particular because of the way in which bonuses are
structured) must be rectified.
92) Where a bank actually owns a hedge fund (or a private equity fund), the Group does not
believe that such ownership should be necessarily prohibited. It believes however that this
situation should induce very strict capital requirements and very close monitoring by the
supervisory authorities. 24
Recommendation 7: Concerning the "parallel banking system" the Group recommends to:
- extend appropriate regulation, in a proportionate manner, to all firms or entities
conducting financial activities of a potentially systemic nature, even if they have no
direct dealings with the public at large;
- improve transparency in all financial markets - and notably for systemically important
hedge funds - by imposing, in all EU Member States and internationally, registration
and information requirements on hedge fund managers, concerning their strategies,
methods and leverage, including their worldwide activities;
- introduce appropriate capital requirements on banks owning or operating a hedge fund
or being otherwise engaged in significant proprietary trading and to closely monitor
b) Securitised products and derivatives markets
93) The crisis has revealed that there will be a need to take a wide look at the functioning of
derivative markets. The simplification and standardisation of most over-the-counter
(OTC) derivatives and the development of appropriate risk-mitigation techniques plus
transparency measures could go a long way towards restoring trust in the functioning of
these markets. It might also be worth considering whether there are any benefits in
extending the relevant parts of the current code of conduct on clearing and settlement
from cash equities to derivatives.
94) In the short-run, an important goal should be to reduce the counterparty risks that exist in
the system. This should be done by the creation in the EU of at least one well-capitalised
central clearing house for over-the-counter credit-default swaps (CDS), which would have
to be simplified and standardized. This clearing house should be supervised by CESR and
by the relevant monetary authorities, and notably the ECB (about 80% of the CDS market
is denominated in euros ). This is vital to realize the highly needed reduction from gross
to net positions in counterparty risks, particularly in cases of default such as Lehman
95) To restore confidence in securitized markets, it is important to oblige at the international
level issuers of complex securities to retain on their books for the life of the instrument a
meaningful amount of the underlying risk (non-hedged).
Concerning securitised products and derivatives markets, the Group
- simplify and standardise over-the-counter derivatives;
- introduce and require the use of at least one well-capitalised central clearing house for
credit default swaps in the EU;
- guarantee that issuers of securitised products retain on their books for the life of the
instrument a meaningful amount of the underlying risk (non-hedged).
5 Use of central bank money should be made for securities settlement, as proposed by Target 2 securities. 25
c) Investment funds
i) Money market funds issues
96) Another area which deserves attention is the regulation of the investment fund industry. A
small number of investment funds in the EU have faced temporary difficulties in meeting
investor redemption demands because of the unexpected contraction of liquidity in
previously highly liquid markets (e.g. asset backed commercial paper, short-term banking
97) This highlights in particular the need for a common EU definition of money market funds,
and a stricter codification of the assets in which they can invest in order to limit exposure
to credit, market and liquidity risks.
ii) Depository issues
98) The Madoff case has illustrated the importance of better controlling the quality of
processes and functions in the case of funds, funds of funds and delegations of
responsibilities. Several measures seem appropriate:
- delegation of investment management functions should only take place after proper
due diligence and continuous monitoring by the "delegator";
- an independent depository should be appointed, preferably a third party;
- The depository institution, as custodians, should remain responsible for safe-keeping
duties of all the funds assets at all times, in order to be able to perform effectively its
compliance-control functions. Delegation of depository functions to a third party
should therefore be forbidden. Nevertheless, the depositary institution may have to use
sub-custodians to safe-keep foreign assets. Sub-custodians must be completely
independent of the fund or the manager. The depositary must continue to perform
effective duties as is presently requested. The quality of this duties should be the
object of supervision;
- delegation practices to institutions outside of the EU should not be used to pervert EU
legislation (UCITS provides strict "Chinese walls" between asset management
functions and depositary-safe-keeping functions. This segregation should be respected
whatever the delegation model is used).
Recommendation 9: With respect to investment funds, the Group proposes to further
develop common rules for investment funds in the EU, notably concerning definitions,
codification of assets and rules for delegation. This should be accompanied by a tighter
supervisory control over the independent role of depositories and custodians. 26
IV. EQUIPPING EUROPE WITH A CONSISTENT SET OF RULES
99) While the above areas for regulatory repair are relevant for all major jurisdictions in the
world, and should be addressed internationally, Europe suffers from an additional
problem in comparison to all single jurisdictions: the lack of a consistent set of rules.
100) An efficient Single Market should have a harmonised set of core rules.
101) There are at least four reasons for this:
- a single financial market - which is one of the key-features of the Union - cannot
function properly if national rules and regulations are significantly different from
one country to the other;
- such a diversity is bound to lead to competitive distortions among financial
institutions and encourage regulatory arbitrage;
- for cross-border groups, regulatory diversity goes against efficiency and the normal
group approaches to risk management and capital allocation;
- in cases of institutional failures, the management of crises in case of cross-border
institutions is made all the more difficult.
102) The present regulatory framework in Europe lacks cohesiveness. The main cause of this
situation stems from the options provided to EU members in the enforcement of
common directives. These options lead to a wide diversity of national transpositions
related to local traditions, legislations and practices.
103) This problem has been well-identified since the very beginning of the single financial
market process. But the solutions have not always met the challenges. The fundamental
cause for this lack of harmonisation is that the level 1directives have too often left, as a
political choice, a range of national options. In these circumstances, it is unreasonable to
expect the level 3 committees to be able to impose a single solution. Even when a
directive does not include national options, it can lead to diverse interpretations which
cannot be eliminated at level 3 in the present legal set-up.
104) As has been pointed out above, most of these issues relate to the effectiveness of the
single financial market more than to the crisis. But three observations can be made here:
firstly, the mandate of this Group is not limited to recommendations directly related to
the issues that have arisen in the crisis; secondly, a number of important differences
between Member States (different bankruptcy laws, different reporting obligations,
different definitions of economic capital…) have compounded the problems of crisis
prevention and management; thirdly, the crisis has shown that financial policy actions in
one country can have detrimental effects on other countries. To avoid as much as
possible spill-over effects and build the necessary trust, some institutionalised and
binding arrangements are needed. 27
a) Examples of current regulatory inconsistencies
105) A few examples of excessive diversity can be stressed:
- the differences regarding the sectoral extent of EU supervision. Some EU countries
have an extended definition of credit institutions (i.e. "établissements de crédit"),
while other members have much more limited definitions. This is a source of
problematic divergences between members that can lead to laxer supervision and
- reporting obligations are very diverse in the EU, some institutions -especially the
non-listed ones- have no obligation to issue accounting reports. The transparency of
the system is negatively affected by such differences;
- the definition of core capital differs from one Member State to another, with an
impact in terms of communication. Some companies do not subtract goodwill from
the definition of core capital;
- there are different accounting practices for provisions related to pensions. These
differences create serious distortions in the calculation of prudential own funds in
- the directive on insurance mediation has led to highly divergent transpositions in the
Member States. Some Member States have transposed the directive as it is with
almost no national additions, while others have complemented the directive with
very extensive national rules. Given that the directive grants a single passport to
insurance intermediaries, these different transpositions induce competition
- there is limited harmonisation of the way in which insurance companies have to
calculate their technical provisions, which makes it difficult to compare the solvency
standing of insurance companies across the Community;
- the differences in the definition of regulatory capital regarding financial institutions
are striking within the EU (for example, the treatment of subordinated debt as core
tier 1 is the object of different adaptations). This goes at the heart of the efficiency
and the enforcement of the Basel directive on capital requirements;
- there is no single agreed methodology to validate risks assessments by financial
- there are still substantial differences in the modalities related to deposit insurance;
- there is no harmonisation whatsoever for insurance guarantee schemes.
106) This brief analysis, based on concrete examples, leads to the conclusion that keeping
intact the "present arrangements" is not the best option in the context of the Single
b) The way forward
107) How to correct such a situation?
First of all, it must be noted that harmonisation is not an end in itself and that
consistency does not need identical rules everywhere. There are national approaches that
can be beneficial to the interested countries while not falling into the drawbacks
mentioned above. National exceptions should be looked at with this in mind.
108) Furthermore, allowing a country, under appropriate circumstances, to adopt safeguards
or regulatory measures stricter than the common framework should not be rejected. As
long as agreed minimum core standards are harmonized and enforced, a country could
take more restrictive measures if it considers they are domestically appropriate to
safeguard financial stability. This should of course be done while respecting the
principles of the internal market.
109) This being said the problem of regulatory inconsistencies must be solved at two
- the global level. The EU participates in a number of international arrangements (e.g.
Basel committee, FSF) and multilateral institutions (e.g. IMF) that cannot be
unilaterally changed by the EU. If and when some changes in those global rules
appeared necessary, Europe should "speak with one voice" as we will mention in the
- the European level. The European Institutions and the level 3 committees should
equip the EU financial sector with a set of consistent core rules. Future legislation
should be based, wherever possible, on regulations (which are of direct application).
When directives are used, the co-legislator should strive to achieve maximum
harmonisation of the core issues. Furthermore, a process should be launched to
remove key-differences stemming from the derogations, exceptions and vague
provisions currently contained in some directives (see chapter on supervision).
Recommendation 10: In order to tackle the current absence of a truly harmonised set of
core rules in the EU, the Group recommends that:
- Member States and the European Parliament should avoid in the future legislation that
permits inconsistent transposition and application;
- the Commission and the level 3 Committees should identify those national exceptions,
the removal of which would improve the functioning of the single financial market;
reduce distortions of competition and regulatory arbitrage; or improve the efficiency of
cross-border financial activity in the EU. Notwithstanding, a Member State should be
able to adopt more stringent national regulatory measures considered to be domestically
appropriate for safeguarding financial stability as long as the principles of the internal
market and agreed minimum core standards are respected.
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
110) This is one of the most important failures of the present crisis.
111) Corporate governance has never been spoken about as much as over the last decade.
Procedural progress has no doubt been achieved (establishment of board committees,
standards set by the banking supervision committee) but looking back at the causes of
the crisis, it is clear that the financial system at large did not carry out its tasks with
enough consideration for the long-term interest of its stakeholders. Most of the
incentives – many of them being the result of official action – encouraged financial
institutions to act in a short-term perspective and to make as much profit as possible to
the detriment of credit quality and prudence; interest rates were low and funding
plentiful; the new accounting rules were systematically biased towards short-term
performance (indeed these rules led to immediate mark-to-market recognition of profit
without allowing a discount for future potential losses). As a result of all this, the long-
term, "through the cycle" perspective has been neglected.
112) In such an environment, investors and shareholders became accustomed to higher and
higher revenues and returns on equity which hugely outpaced for many years real
economic growth rates. Few managers avoided the "herd instinct" – leading them to join
the competitive race even if they might have suspected (or should have known) that risk
premia were falling and that securitisation as it was applied could not shield the
financial system against bad risks.
113) This is a sombre picture and not an easy one to correct; much of this behaviour was
ingrained in the incentive structure mentioned above.
114) There should be no illusion that regulation alone can solve all these problems and
transform the mindset that presided over the functioning (and downward spiral) of the
115) However, good, well-targeted measures could help mitigate or eliminate a number of
misled incentives; the Group believes that several recommendations put forward in this
report would be useful in this respect. They are:
- reform of the accounting system;
- a building-up of buffers in the form of dynamic provisioning or higher capital
requirements in the good times;
- closing of regulatory gaps (e.g. off-balance sheet operations, oversight of hedge
116) The Group however wishes to stress two further aspects of corporate governance that
require specific attention: remuneration and risk management.
117) The crisis has launched a debate on remuneration in the financial services industry.
There are two dimensions to this problem: one is the often excessive level of
remuneration in the financial sector; the other one is the structure of this remuneration,
notably the fact that they induce too high risk-taking and encourage short-termism to the
detriment of long-term performance. Social-political dissatisfaction has tended recently
to focus, for understandable reasons, on the former. However, it is primarily the latter
issue which has had an adverse impact on risk management and has thereby contributed
to the crisis. It is therefore on the structure of remuneration that policy-makers should
concentrate reforms going forward. 30
118) It is extremely important to re-align compensation incentives with shareholder interests
and long-term, firm-wide profitability. Compensation schemes must become fully
transparent. Industry has already come up with various sets of useful principles to try
and achieve this. The principles agreed in 2008 by the Institute of International Finance,
for example, are a first step.
119) Without dealing with remuneration in financial institutions that have received public
support, nor impinging on the responsibility of financial institutions in this field, it
seems appropriate to outline a few principles that should guide compensation policies.
Such principles include:
- the assessment of bonuses should be set in a multi-year framework. This would
allow, say over five years, to spread out the actual payment of the bonus pool of
each trading unit through the cycle and to deduct any potential losses occurring
during the period. This would be a more realistic and less short-term incentivised
method than present practice;
- these standards should apply not only to proprietary trading but also to asset
- bonuses should reflect actual performance and therefore should not be "guaranteed"
120) Supervisors should oversee the adequacy of financial institutions' compensation
policies. And if they consider that these policies conflict with sound underwriting
practice, adequate risk management or are systematically encouraging short-term risk-
taking, they should require the institutions concerned to reassess their remuneration
policies. If supervisors are not satisfied by the measures taken they should use the
possibility opened by pillar 2 of the Basel framework to require the financial institutions
concerned to provide additional capital.
121) Of course the same guidelines should apply in relation to other financial institutions in
order to avoid competitive distortions and loopholes. As suggested in the "global repair"
chapter of this report, consistent enforcement of these measures at global level should be
ensured to avoid excessive risk-taking.
Recommendation 11: In view of the corporate governance failures revealed by the current
financial crisis, the Group considers that compensation incentives must be better aligned
with shareholder interests and long-term firm-wide profitability by basing the structure of
financial sector compensation schemes on the following principles:
- the assessment of bonuses should be set in a multi-year framework, spreading bonus
payments over the cycle;
- the same principles should apply to proprietary traders and asset managers;
- bonuses should reflect actual performance and not be guaranteed in advance.
Supervisors should oversee the suitability of financial institutions' compensation policies,
require changes where compensation policies encourage excessive risk-taking and, where
necessary, impose additional capital requirements under pillar 2 of Basel 2 in case no
adequate remedial action is being taken. 31
Internal risk management
122) In many cases, risk monitoring and management practices within financial institutions
have dramatically failed in the crisis.
123) In the future, the risk management function must be fully independent within the firms
and it should carry out effective and not arbitrarily constrained stress testing exercises.
Firms should organise themselves internally so that incentives are not too much tilted
towards risk taking – neglecting risk control. To contribute to this, the Senior Risk
Officer in an institution should hold a very high rank in the hierarchy (at senior
management level with direct access to the board). Changes to remuneration structures
will also be needed: effective checks and balances are indeed unlikely to work if those
who are supposed to control risk remain under-paid compared to those whose job it is to
124) But all this must not be construed as exonerating issuers and investors from their duties.
For issuers, transparency and clarity in the description of assets put on the market is of
the essence as this report has often stressed; but investors and in particular asset
managers must not rely (as has too often been the case) on credit rating agencies
assessments; they must exercise informed judgement; penalties should be enforced by
supervisors when this is not applied. Supervisory control of firms' risk management
should be considerably reinforced through rigorous and frequent inspection regimes.
Recommendation 12: With respect to internal risk management, the Group recommends
- the risk management function within financial institutions must be made independent
and responsible for effective, independent stress testing;
- senior risk officers should hold a very high rank in the company hierarchy, and
- internal risk assessment and proper due diligence must not be neglected by over-
reliance on external ratings.
Supervisors are called upon to frequently inspect financial institutions' internal risk
VI. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION
125) As a general observation, it has been clearly demonstrated that the stakes in a banking
crisis are high for Governments and society at large because such a situation has the
potential to jeopardise financial stability and the real economy. The crisis has also
shown that crisis prevention, crisis management and crisis resolution tools should all be
handled in a consistent regulatory framework.
126) Of course, crisis prevention should be the first preoccupation of national and EU
authorities (see chapter on supervision). Supervisors should act as early as possible in
order to address the vulnerabilities identified in a given institution, and use all means
available to them to this effect (e.g. calling on contributions from shareholders, fostering
the acquisition of the institution concerned by a stronger one). In this respect, the role of
central banks which are by essence well placed to observe the first signs of vulnerability
of a bank is of crucial importance. Therefore in countries where supervision is not in the
hands of the central bank, a close collaboration must be ensured between supervisors
and central banks. But crises will always occur and recent experiences in managing
crises have shown that many improvements to the present system are called for.
a) Dealing with the moral hazard issue
127) “Constructive ambiguity” regarding decisions whether or not public sector support will
be made available can be useful to contain moral hazard. However, the cure for moral
hazard is not to be ambiguous on the issue of public sector involvement as such in crisis
management. Two aspects need to be distinguished and require different treatment. On
the one hand, a clear and consistent framework for crisis management is required with
full transparency and certainty that the authorities have developed concrete crisis
management plans to be used in cases where absence of such public sector support is
likely to create uncertainty and threaten financial stability. On the other hand,
constructive ambiguity and uncertainty is appropriate in the application of these
arrangements in future individual cases of distressed banks .
b) Framework for dealing with distressed banks
128) In the management of a crisis, priority should always be given to private-sector
solutions (e.g. restructuring). When these solutions appear insufficient, then public
authorities have to play a more prominent role and the injection of public money
becomes often inevitable.
129) As far as domestic national banks are concerned, crisis management should be kept at
the national level. National supervisors know the banks well, the political authorities
have at their disposal a consistent legal framework and taxpayers' concerns can be dealt
with in the democratic framework of an elected government. For cross-border
institutions at EU level, because of different supervisory, crisis management and
resolution tools as well as different company and insolvency laws, the situation is much
more complex to handle. There are inconsistencies between national legislation
preventing an orderly and efficient handling of an institution in difficulty.
130) For example, company law provisions in some countries prevent in times of crisis the
transfer of assets from one legal entity to another within the same group. This makes it
impossible to transfer assets where they are needed, even though this may be crucial to
safeguard the viability of the group as a whole. Another problem is that some countries
place, in their national laws, emphasis on the protection of the institution while other
countries attach a greater priority to the protection of creditors. In the crisis resolution
phase, other problems appear: for example, the ranks of creditors are different from one
Member State to the other.
6 This approach is recommended by Charles Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, “Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross Border
Banking Crises”, in International Journal of Central Banking, to be published early 2009. 33
131) The lack of consistent crisis management and resolution tools across the Single Market
places Europe at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the US and these issues should be addressed
by the adoption at EU level of adequate measures.
c) Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS)
132) The crisis has demonstrated that the current organisation of DGSs in the Member States
was a major weakness in the EU banking regulatory framework . The Commission
recent proposal is an important step to improve the current regime, as it will improve the
protection of depositors.
133) A critical element of this proposal is the requirement that all Member States apply the
same amount of DGS protection for each depositor. The EU cannot indeed continue to
rely on the principle of a minimum coverage level, which can be topped-up at national
level. This principle presents two major flaws: first, in a situation where a national
banking sector is perceived as becoming fragile, there is the risk that deposits would be
moved to the countries with the most protective regime (thus weakening banks in the
first country even further); second, it would mean that in the same Member State the
customers of a local bank and those using the services of a third country branch could
enjoy different coverage levels. As the crisis has shown, this cannot be reconciled with
the notion of a well-functioning Single Market.
134) Another important element to be taken into account is the way in which the DGSs are
funded. In this respect, the Group is of the view that preference should be given to
schemes which are pre-funded by the financial sector. Such schemes are better to foster
confidence and help avoiding pro-cyclical effects resulting from banks having to pay
into the schemes at a time where they are already in difficulty.
135) Normally, pre-funded DGSs should take care in the future of losses incurred by
depositors. Nonetheless, it is probable that for very large and cross border institutions,
pre-funded mechanisms might not be sufficient to cover these guarantees. In order to
preserve trust in the system, it should be made clear that in those cases pre-funded
schemes would have to be topped-up by the State.
7 The Commission's recent proposal is an important step to improve the current DGS-regime, as it strengthens harmonisation
and improves the protection of depositors. However, the directive still leaves a large degree of discretion to member states,
particularly in relation to funding arrangements, administrative responsibility and the role of DGS in the overall crisis
management framework. Leaving these issues unresolved at EU-level implies that significant weaknesses remain in the DGS-
framework, including inter alia:
− Unsustainable funding – the current lack of sophisticated and risk sensitive funding arrangements involves a significant
risk that governments will have to carry the financial burden indented for the banks, or worse, that the DGS fails on their
commitments (both of which illustrated by the Icelandic case). In particular, in relation to the any of the 43 European
LFCIs identified earlier in the chapter, no current scheme can be expected to have the capacity to make reimbursements
without involving public funds.
− Limited use in crisis management – Even if DGS’ had that capacity, the pay box nature of most schemes makes it
unlikely that they ever will be utilised for LFCIs, because of the large externalities associated with letting such
− Negative effects on financial stability – reliance on ex-post funding and lack of risk sensitive premiums weakens market
discipline (moral hazard), distort the efficient allocation of deposits, as well as it may be a source of pro-cyclicality.
Obstacle to efficient crisis management – due to incompatible schemes (trigger points, early intervention powers etc.) and
diverging incentives among member. 34
136) The idea of a pooled EU fund, composed of the national deposit guarantee funds, has
been discussed by the Group, but has not been supported. The setting-up and
management of such a fund would raise numerous political and practical problems.
Furthermore, one fails to see the added-value that such a fund would have in comparison
to national funds operating under well-harmonised rules (notably for coverage levels
and the triggering of the scheme).
EU harmonization should not go as far either as laying down rules on the possible use of
DGSs in the management of a crisis. It should not prohibit additional roles beyond the
base task for a DGS to act ex post, in the crisis resolution phase, as a pay box by
reimbursing the guaranteed amount to depositors in a defaulted bank. Most member
countries limit their national DGS to this pay box function. Some countries, however,
extend the activities by giving their DGS also a rescue function. The Group did not see
any need for EU harmonization in this respect.
137) There is a specific case (of the Icelandic type) when a supervisory authority allows some
of its banks to mushroom large branches in other EU countries, whilst the home
Member State is not able to honour the deposit guarantee schemes which are inadequate
for such exposures. The guarantee responsibilities then de facto fall into the jurisdiction
of the host country. This is not acceptable and should at least be addressed, for example,
in the following way: the host Member State should have the right to inquire whether
the funds available in the DGS of the home Member State are indeed sufficient to
protect fully the depositors in the host Member State. Should the host Member State not
have sufficient guarantees that this is indeed the case, the only way to address this kind
of problem is to give sufficient powers to the host supervisory authorities to take
measures that would at the very beginning curtail the expansive trends observed.
138) The Group has not entered into the specifics of the protection of policy-holders and
investors. It nevertheless considers that the above general principles, and in particular
the equal protection of all customers in the Single Market, should also be implemented
in the insurance and investment sectors.
d) Burden sharing
139) The issue of burden sharing in cases of crisis resolution is extremely complicated for
two reasons. First, cases where financial support from both public sector and private
sector is needed to reach an acceptable solution are more complex than rescues where
either private or public money is involved. Second, agreement on burden sharing on an
ex post basis, at the moment of the rescue operation, is more difficult to reach than when
one can rely on predetermined, ex ante arrangements.
140) As noted above, the current lack of pan-EU mechanism to resolve a crisis affecting a
cross-border group implies that there is no choice but to resolve this crisis at national
entity-level or to agree on improvised, ad hoc cross-border solutions. The lack of a
financing mechanism to support the resolution of a cross-border group further
complicates the situation.
141) On the basis of the experiences learnt from the crisis, the Group believes that the
Member States should become able to manage a crisis in a more adequate way than is
feasible today. There would be merit, in order to achieve this, in developing more
detailed criteria on burden sharing than the principles established in the current
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which limits the sharing of a fiscal burden to
two main principles: the economic impact of the crisis on the Member States concerned
(equity principle) and the allocation of home/host supervisory powers (accountability
142) Burden sharing arrangements could, in addition, include one of the following criteria, or
a combination thereof:
- the deposits of the institution;
- the assets (either in terms of accounting values, market values or risk-weighted
values) of the institution;
- the revenue flows of the institution;
- the share of payment system flows of the institution;
- the division of supervisory responsibility; the party responsible for supervisory
work, analysis and decision being also responsible for an appropriately larger share
of the costs.
143) These criteria would preferably be implemented by amending the 2008 MoU. Where
needed, additional criteria could be agreed.
Recommendation 13: The Group calls for a coherent and workable regulatory framework
for crisis management in the EU:
- without pre-judging the intervention in future individual cases of distressed financial
institutions, a transparent and clear framework for managing crises should be
- all relevant authorities in the EU should be equipped with appropriate and equivalent
crisis prevention and crisis intervention tools;
- legal obstacles which stand in the way of using these tools in a cross-border context
should be removed, with adequate measures to be adopted at EU level.
Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in the EU should be harmonised
and preferably be pre-funded by the private sector (in exceptional cases topped up by the
State) and provide high, equal protection to all bank customers throughout the EU.
The principle of high, equal protection of all customers should also be implemented in the
insurance and investment sectors.
The Group recognises that the present arrangements for safeguarding the interests of
depositors in host countries have not proved robust in all cases, and recommends that the
existing powers of host countries in respect of branches be reviewed to deal with the
problems which have occurred in this context. 36
Recommendation 15: In view of the absence of an EU-level mechanisms for financing
cross-border crisis resolution efforts, Member States should agree on more detailed criteria
for burden sharing than those contained in the existing Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) and amend the MoU accordingly. 37
CHAPTER III: EU SUPERVISORY REPAIR
144) The previous chapter proposed changes to the European regulation of financial services.
This chapter examines the policies and practices of supervision of financial services
within the EU and proposes both short and longer term changes. Regulation and
supervision are interdependent: competent supervision cannot make good failures in
financial regulatory policy; but without competent and well designed supervision good
regulatory policies will be ineffective. High standards in both are therefore required.
Macro and Micro prudential supervision
145) The experience of the past few years has brought to the fore the important distinction
between micro-prudential and macro-prudential supervision. Both are clearly
intertwined, in substance as well as in operational terms. Both are necessary and will be
covered in this chapter.
146) Micro-prudential supervision has traditionally been the centre of the attention of
supervisors around the world. The main objective of micro-prudential supervision is to
supervise and limit the distress of individual financial institutions, thus protecting the
customers of the institution in question. The fact that the financial system as a whole
may be exposed to common risks is not always fully taken into account. However, by
preventing the failure of individual financial institutions, micro-prudential supervision
attempts to prevent (or at least mitigate) the risk of contagion and the subsequent
negative externalities in terms of confidence in the overall financial system.
147) The objective of macro-prudential supervision is to limit the distress of the financial
system as a whole in order to protect the overall economy from significant losses in real
output. While risks to the financial system can in principle arise from the failure of one
financial institution alone if it is large enough in relation to the country concerned
and/or with multiple branches/subsidiaries in other countries, the much more important
global systemic risk arises from a common exposure of many financial institutions to the
same risk factors. Macro-prudential analysis therefore must pay particular attention to
common or correlated shocks and to shocks to those parts of the financial system that
trigger contagious knock-on or feedback effects.
148) Macro-prudential supervision cannot be meaningful unless it can somehow impact on
supervision at the micro-level; whilst micro-prudential supervision cannot effectively
safeguard financial stability without adequately taking account of macro-level
The objective of supervision
149) The prime objective of supervision is to ensure that the rules applicable to the financial
sector are adequately implemented, in order to preserve financial stability and thereby to
ensure confidence in the financial system as a whole and sufficient protection for the
customers of financial services. One function of supervisors is to detect problems at an
early stage to prevent crises from occurring. However, it is inevitable that there will be
failures from time to time, and the arrangements for supervision have to be seen with
this in mind. But once a crisis has broken out, supervisors have a critical role to play
(together with central banks and finance ministries) to manage the crisis as effectively as
possible to limit the damage to the wider economy and society as a whole.
150) Supervision must ensure that all supervised entities are subject to a high minimum set of
core standards. When carrying-out their duties, supervisors should not favour a
particular institution, or type of institution, to the detriment of others. Competition
distortions and regulatory arbitrage stemming from different supervisory practices must
be avoided, because they have the potential of undermining financial stability – inter
alia by encouraging a shift of financial activity to countries with lax supervision. The
supervisory system has to be perceived as fair and balanced. Furthermore, a level
playing field is vital for the credibility of supervisory arrangements, their acceptance by
market operators big and small and for generating optimal cooperation between
supervisors and financial institutions. This is of particular importance in the context of
the Single Market, built as it is, inter alia, on the principles of undistorted competition,
freedom of establishment and the free flow of capital. Confidence will be gained in the
European Union from common approaches by all Member States.
151) The supervisory objective of maintaining financial stability must take into account an
important constraint which is to allow the financial industry to perform its allocative
economic function with the greatest possible efficiency, and thereby contribute to
sustainable economic growth. Supervision should aim to encourage the smooth
functioning of markets and the development of a competitive industry. Poor supervisory
organisation or unduly intrusive supervisory rules and practices will translate into costs
for the financial sector and, in turn, for customers, taxpayers and the wider economy.
Therefore supervision should be carried-out as effectively as possible and at the lowest
possible cost. This, again, is crucial if the Single Market is to deliver all its benefits to
customers and companies.
II. LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS: WHAT WENT WRONG?
152) Chapter 1 examined in detail the causes of the crisis. These were many; often with a
global dimension. Although the way in which the financial sector has been supervised
in the EU has not been one of the primary causes behind the crisis, there have been real
and important supervisory failures, from both a macro and micro-prudential standpoint.
The following significant problems have come to light:
a) Lack of adequate macro-prudential supervision
153) The present EU supervisory arrangements place too much emphasis on the supervision
of individual firms, and too little on the macro-prudential side. The fact that this failing
is duplicated elsewhere in the world makes it a greater, not a lesser, issue. The Group
believes that to be effective macro-prudential supervision must encompass all sectors of
finance and not be confined to banks, as well as the wider macro-economic context.
This oversight also should take account of global issues. Macro-prudential supervision
requires, in addition to the judgements made by individual Member States, a judgement
+1 anno fa
Materiale didattico per il corso di Theories of Regulation della prof.ssa Laura Ammannati. Trattasi del rapporto dal titolo "The Hight Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU", stilato dal gruppo presieduto da Jacques de Larosiére e avente riguardo al ruolo delle autorità di regolazione dei mercati nella prevenzione delle speculazioni e degli squilibri economici generatori di crisi.
I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Theories of Regulation e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Milano - Unimi o del prof Ammannati Laura.
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