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battlefield enemies. Global Witness has uncovered substantial evidence

3 The question of whether

resource wars are driven in DRC of the government army and the FDLR collaborating in their

by ‘grievance’ or ‘greed’ has looting of North and South Kivu’s mineral wealth. In the latter stages of

been vigorously debated by Cambodia’s civil war, the illegal log exports that bankrolled the Khmer

academics and analysts. Rouge were facilitated by permits provided by the government in

Phnom Penh.

• Lootable resources are worth seizing only if there is a market for them.

Trading natural resources to make war inevitably increases the number

of stakeholders in a conflict – bringing in a range of international

companies that trade, transport, process and sell, plus end consumers in

the West and, increasingly, the East. Governments of countries that host

these activities may benefit from the continuation of the war.

These two broad categories of resource-related conflicts overlap to a

considerable degree. Popular discontent at the stripping of natural resources

by kleptocratic regimes was part of the backdrop to conflicts in Liberia, Sierra

Leone and DRC. These conflicts then saw the same resources being hijacked

by combatants seeking to fill their war chests.

Why aren’t natural

2 resources more prominent

in peace agreements?

The second statistic highlighted in the recent UNEP report – that only a

quarter of peace agreements for conflicts with links to natural resources

address natural-resource management and governance – suggests a reluctance

on the part of mediators to engage with these questions of economic agendas.

Why might this be?

Some of likely reasons are set out in Céline Yvon’s paper ‘Mediators and


Economics: Should they care?’ :

4 This paper was written for the

African Mediators’ Retreat 2009

and is downloadable on the Oslo • mediators’ understandable focus on political and security-related issues

forum webpage www.osloforum. • a perception that economic issues are in any case best addressed after

org. peace agreements

• the sensitivity of discussing the profit motives of parties directly and

indirectly involved in the conflict.

This last point could reflect the fact that warring parties may find it more

palatable to lay down their guns than to give up the means to buy new ones a

few weeks in future. In addition, resource-related financing may be important

to leaders not only for their pursuit of publicly declared political objectives,

but also for maintaining the loyalty of their supporters. As one participant at

the Retreat put it, this may add up to a sense on the part of mediators that

tackling this issue is ‘above their pay grade’.

Aside from the possible reluctance of mediators to raise a sensitive issue, they

may come to the negotiations with a predisposition – conditioned by their own

professional experience – to focus on political and security issues. Moreover,

given how the international community has approached peacebuilding since the

end of the Cold War, mediators may feel that they are expected to focus on what

are perceived as successful, tangible outcomes, such as timetables for the holding

of national elections. In addition, mediators may face some very practical

constraints in terms of their mandate, not least lack of time and support to probe

the economic agendas of the parties around the table.

What if natural resources

3 are inadequately addressed

in peace agreements?

UNEP’s claim that intrastate conflicts linked to natural resources are twice as

likely to relapse within five years raises the question of what risks there might

be in overlooking resource-related issues when framing peace agreements.

Here we look briefly at three sets of issues.

i) Opportunities for spoilers

Peace deals that do not effectively address the role of lootable natural resources

risk leaving warring parties with the economic means to resume fighting as

soon as they decide peace no longer suits them. Agreements such as the Lusaka

Protocol of 1994, which sought to end the Angolan civil war, and Cambodia’s

1991 Paris Peace Accords failed to dislodge fully the main insurgent groups

from the resource-rich areas they controlled. When these accords broke down,

UNITA was quick to harness diamonds to its war effort once more, and the

Khmer Rouge began tapping the reserves of timber, rubies and sapphires

under its control.

In the cases of both Angola and Cambodia it must be stressed that the political

context offered limited scope for negotiating the groups concerned into

surrendering all the resources under their control. This is a common problem.

The 2007 Ouagadougou Agreement aimed at ending Côte d’Ivoire’s resource-

fuelled war makes no reference to natural resources. Subsequently, there have

been few substantive steps taken to change the way in which natural resources

are controlled and exploited. While the agreement is widely regarded as a

success, it remains too early to say whether it provides the basis for a lasting

peace. One of the few certainties is that, should the Forces Nouvelles rebels go

back to war, they will once again finance themselves via the trade in natural

resources. This group retains control of the country’s diamond mines and, more

importantly, a share of the cocoa trade which, as Global Witness investigations

have demonstrated, has provided it with around US$30 million per year.

ii) Causes of conflict left unresolved

If competition for access to resources or resource revenues contributed

to the outbreak of conflict, the need to address the issue in the context of

building peace is self-evident. Even relatively successful examples of peace

agreements dealing with grievances related to natural resources – such

as Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) – can leave a political

landscape littered with potential flashpoints. It is no coincidence that

the most serious recent clashes between the Sudan People’s Liberation

Movement and National Congress Party forces have taken place in the oil-

rich Abyei region, whose boundaries are still contested. The CPA’s silence

on the question of how oil revenues might be shared beyond the South’s

referendum on secession in 2011 will be one of a number of factors

increasing the tension between Khartoum and Juba over the course of the

next two years.

iii) Entrenching elite capture

Warring parties that have turned to resource looting as a means of

financing conflict are disinclined to end this practice when they stop

fighting. They frequently approach the negotiating table determined to

control as many resources as possible. A famous example of a rebel leader

using a peace deal to formalise his seizure of key public assets is that of

RUF leader Foday Sankoh, who emerged from the 1999 Lomé Agreement

as head of a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources (that

is, diamonds).

As noted, popular resentment of elite capture of natural resources has been

a precursor to a range of recent intrastate conflicts. Peace agreements that

treat natural resources as spoils to be divided between competing elites may

inadvertently introduce, or reintroduce, a form of money politics based around

the capture of state assets. Such political systems are typically associated with

the collapse of those state institutions most critical to peacebuilding. As such,

they tend to undermine economic and democratic development and may also

sow the seeds of future instability.

In the short term, this approach of ‘rewarding the victors’ can encourage

transitional authorities to rush for personal gain, ahead of the country’s

population exercising its right to choose a government at the polls. Such was

the case in Liberia, after the 2003 Accra Peace Agreement created a National

Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), in which the Movement

for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel group was awarded ministerial

5 For an analysis of the Mittal

Steel contract, see Global Witness portfolios controlling forest and mineral reserves. The NTGL wasted little

‘Heavy Mittal’ (http://www. time in selling off the country’s key mineral assets (notably via a staggeringly inequitable contract for iron-ore exploitation awarded to Mittal Steel),

detail.php/156/en/heavy_ mittal).

Following the publication of this which ended only with the inauguration of President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

report, the company was forced to 5

in January 2009. The new government was obliged to add to its already

renegotiate its overcrowded agenda the politically risky process of reviewing, renegotiating

and annulling contracts issued by the NTGL.

4 Recommendations

So, what are mediators to do? There are always likely to be limits to the scope

of peacemakers to address the economic dimensions of conflict, and there is

certainly a risk of advocating approaches that seem overly prescriptive and

unrealistic. These considerations notwithstanding, there remain some basic

preparatory steps that peace brokers can take – and also certain outcomes that

they can aim to achieve or to avoid.

i) Avoiding vested interests when choosing

the mediators themselves

In selecting a mediator and/or a ‘group of friends’, influence may be a

desired quality but may also be accompanied by a stake in the conflict.

Conflicts in which natural resources are being exploited and traded tend

to spawn opaque networks of economic and political interests regionally

and globally. Mediators who are associated with these interests may have

a stake in the continuation of the conflict, or at least in maintaining those

aspects of the war economy that bring them profit.

ii) Mapping the warring parties’ economic

agendas and alliances

Just as they identify the political interests and alliances of the key players,

mediators should also map out the parties’ economic agendas and relationships.

In crude terms, they need to know not just how many guns the protagonists

have, but also what capacity they have to replace them as soon as the next

deal is made in timber, diamonds or cassiterite. Mediators are typically under

pressure to move quickly and to prioritise what might seem to be the core

issues of peace and security. In light of the linkages between natural resources

and conflict, however, this kind of mapping and intelligence-gathering exercise

does need to be given much higher priority, and mediators need more support

to do it effectively. 10

iii) Not apportioning natural resources as

spoils of war

Given the connection between aggressively rent-seeking forms of

government on the one hand, and threats to development, democracy

and stability on the other, mediators should do all that their mandate

permits to avoid establishing arrangements for renewed elite capture of

the country’s natural resources.

iv) Creating mechanisms to monitor

economic issues post-agreement

While it may not be possible or wise to address all aspects of post-conflict

resource management in the content of a peace agreement itself, Sudan’s

CPA shows that peace agreements can establish useful institutional

mechanisms to oversee implementation of those provisions dealing with

natural-resource management.

v) Placing limits on transitional


Mediators should endeavour to set limits not only on the tenure

of transitional governments, but also on their authority to allocate

resource-exploitation rights to themselves or third parties. They should

seek to complement these restrictions with incentives and support to

lay the foundations for a sustainable and equitable system of resource


vi) Putting lootable natural resources out

of reach

In some cases, where the connection between resource-looting and

conflict-financing is particularly strong, mediators should endeavour to

take natural resources off the table completely by having resource-rich

areas secured by peacekeepers. This might be framed within the peace

agreement as a measure to help the state restore its sovereignty over its

natural resources. Such an approach has been taken in Liberia recently,

with some success.

vii) Ensuring accountability

While the brokers of peace agreements clearly need to balance considerations

of peace and justice, they should seek to use their influence to ensure that

those responsible for economic crimes, as well as other kinds, are held

accountable. In some cases this could extend to referrals to the ICC for war

crimes such as pillage. Equally, the peacemaking community should encourage

states to hold to account those companies based within their jurisdictions that

have committed or facilitated crimes in the conflict-affected country.





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Dispensa al corso di Teorie e tecniche della trasformazione dei conflitti della Prof.ssa Maria Luisa Maniscalco. Trattasi del saggio di Mike Davis dal titolo "Why should mediators consider the economic dimensions of conflicts?" all'interno del quale si discute dell'importanza della distribuzione delle risorse economiche e naturali nelle situazioni di conflitto e nel possibile ruolo conciliatorio della re-distribuzione.

Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea magistrale in relazioni internazionali
A.A.: 2010-2011

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Teorie e tecniche della trasformazione dei conflitti e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Roma Tre - Uniroma3 o del prof Maniscalco Maria Luisa.

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