Che materia stai cercando?

Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies - Siaroff Appunti scolastici Premium

Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement", all'interno del quale è analizzato il concetto di corporativismo e se ne forniscono delle misurazioni concrete riguardanti il... Vedi di più

Esame di Politica comparata docente Prof. M. Giuliani

Anteprima

ESTRATTO DOCUMENTO

184 ALAN SIAROFF

Table 2. Agreed corporatist rankings

Mean Standard (N) Lijphart/Crepaz

deviation score

Nations considered to be strongly corporatist: +1.600

Austria 5.000 0.000 (23) +1.531

Norway 4.864 0.351 (22) +1.396

Sweden 4.674 0.556 (23)

Nations considered to be moderately-to-strongly corporatist:

+1.006

Netherlands 4.000 0.989 (23) +0.518

Denmark 3.545 0.999 (22) +0.480

Germany (West) 3.543 0.940 (23)

Nations considered to be moderately corporatist: +0.427

Finland 3.295 1.043 (22) +0.258

Belgium 2.841 0.793 (22)

Nations considered to be weakly or only somewhat corporatist:

−0.528

Ireland 2.000 1.015 (18) −1.106

New Zealand 1.955 0.907 (11) −1.025

Australia 1.688 0.873 (16) −0.862

UK 1.652 0.818 (23) −0.851

Italy 1.477 0.748 (22)

Nations considered to be not at all corporatist, but rather pluralist:

−1.335

Canada 1.150 0.489 (20) −1.341

USA 1.150 0.489 (20)

Nations classified too infrequently for an agreed placement:

Luxembourg 3.000 0.000 (1) n.d.

Iceland 3.000 0.000 (1) n.d.

Israel 3.000 0.000 (1) n.d.

Portugal 1.500 1.000 (4) n.d.

Spain 1.250 0.500 (4) n.d.

Greece 1.000 0.000 (2) n.d.

Nations without agreement on placement or even on conceptualisation:

+0.505

Switzerland 3.375 1.286 (20) +0.053

Japan 2.912 1.603 (17) −0.725

France 1.674 0.792 (23)

Source: Table 1. 185

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Table 3. Corporatist rankings by the nature of emphasis

Maximum ‘N’ Corporatism Power Consensus Wage

proper resources bargaining

(13) (3) (5) (2)

Australia 1.375 2.50 1.50 2.50

Austria 5.000 5.00 5.00 5.00

Belgium 2.750 3.50 2.60 3.00

Canada 1.100 1.00 1.40 1.00

Denmark 3.583 4.17 2.80 4.25

Finland 3.458 3.83 2.20 4.25

France 1.462 1.33 2.00 2.75

Germany (West) 3.308 2.67 4.60 3.75

Greece 1.000 n.d. 1.00 n.d.

Iceland 3.000 n.d. n.d. n.d.

Ireland 2.050 1.50 2.00 2.25

Israel 3.000 n.d. n.d. n.d.

Italy 1.583 1.00 1.20 2.25

Japan 2.688 1.00 4.20 2.50

Luxembourg 3.000 n.d. n.d. n.d.

Netherlands 4.269 3.00 4.20 3.25

New Zealand 1.900 n.d. 1.75 2.50

Norway 4.917 5.00 4.80 4.50

Portugal 1.000 n.d. 1.00 3.00

Spain 1.000 n.d. 1.00 2.00

Sweden 4.808 4.67 4.40 4.50

Switzerland 3.375 2.50 4.25 2.50

UK 1.577 2.67 1.20 1.75

USA 1.100 1.00 1.40 1.00

Source: Table 1.

are seen as low in ‘power resources’ by those who essentially conceptualise

corporatism as such, whereas they are seen as high in consensus by those with

8

this sort of operationalisation.

Indeed, Shalev (1990: 65) refers to Japan dramatically as ‘the veritable

Achilles heel of empirical operationalizations of corporatism’. Even Lijphart

& Crepaz’s (1991) ranking of Japan is hardly decisive. The reality is that

Japan and Switzerland have exhibited the co-operative behavioural patterns

of corporatism, at least economically [factors (9) through (14)]; a ‘free rider’

role in the world (factor 17); and (most of the time) a high level of economic

186 ALAN SIAROFF

success (factor 21), perhaps at others’ expense (factor 22); whilst only having

selected other factors.

Japan has a centralised business community (factor 3), an activist state

(factor 6) but one with minimal defence spending (factor 17 again), and a very

strong blurring of the boundaries between the public and the private sector

(factor 15). This produces a ‘total’ of only twelve factors, or just over ‘half’

of the ideal type (not that each are necessarily equal). Given the very different

nature of Japan’s labour relations, welfare programmes, and policy formation

in comparison with the social democratic nations of Western Europe, Shalev

(1990) explicitly rejects the concept of corporatism as applicable to Japan,

and thus criticises the various scholarly attempts to treat Japan as such. He

concludes that Japan’s

[l]abour quiescence since the middle of the 1970s is better explained by

the whip of market conditions, the pressure of unified opponents, and the

reinvigoration of the dual labour market, than by the elevation of peak

labour organizations to the status of guardians of public order. (Shalev

1990: 87)

Compared to Japan, Switzerland exhibits slightly more factors beyond

consensual economic behaviour, a centralised business community, a blurring

of the state/society distinction, and economic success; in particular, Switzer-

land is a small open economy (factor 16) which is neutral (factor 17) and

consociational (factor 18), and it does score highly on corporatist decision-

making and implementation (factors 7 and 8). This is symbolised in the use of

ad hoc commissions to prepare initial legislative proposals, followed by the

government receiving the formal written opinion of the main interest groups

(and other actors) before the proposal is finally submitted to parliament. Such

a pattern of policy-formation is given a legal basis in the Swiss constitution,

such as in article 32/3 (1947), which states that ‘[t]he interested economic

associations have to be consulted with regard to the elaboration of the laws

of execution and may be called to co-operate with the implementation of the

executive rules’ (quoted in Parri 1987: 89). Furthermore, the ability of organ-

ised interests to amass the necessary signatures for national policy referenda

is an additional reason to include them in the policy process.

At the same time as one notes these decision-making patterns, one must

also note the lack of centralised interest intermediation between business and

labour, the general weakness of the left, a very non-activist state (that is, no

factor 6, unlike even Japan), and indeed the extremely decentralised nature

of the Swiss nation (Parri 1987; Kriesi 1990). In summary, Switzerland has

(just) thirteen of the 22 ideal factors associated with the Austro-Scandinavian

version of corporatism. Yet is this enough for a partial – or alternative – type?

187

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Katzenstein (1984, 1985) would say so, for he calls Switzerland, Belgium,

and the Netherlands examples of ‘liberal corporatism’ implying bourgeois

dominance and an outward-looking business community. Of these three na-

tions, Switzerland is the epitome of such ‘liberal corporatism’. This system

can be contrasted with the ‘social corporatism’ best exemplified by Austria.

Moreover, Katzenstein may have raised various differences (especially

the national role in the world economy) between Switzerland and Japan,

but he does not seem to object to parallels being raised between Japan and

the (liberal) corporatist systems of the small European states (Katzenstein

1988: 298). Thus for Katzenstein there seems to be three catagories: social

corporatism, liberal corporatism and (liberal) pluralism.

In contrast, Pekkarinen et al. (1992) imply that corporatism must be ‘so-

cial’ in nature. This would seem to exclude Switzerland, and indeed a major

analysis of corporatism and Switzerland concludes by stressing the following:

If corporatism is defined as a pluridimensional concept, embracing cent-

ralization of government, employers, and unions, public involvement in

relations between the government and the two classes, and class co-

operation, then it seems more appropriate to think of the Swiss system as

liberal capitalism. In the Swiss model, centralization of unions is absent

and centralization of government is only weak; furthermore, public in-

volvement is essentially lacking in matters of class conflicts. The Swiss

model more closely resembles paternalistic-liberal capitalism of the Ja-

panese type and may not therefore be considered a corporatist economy

as such. (Blaas 1992: 369)

Certainly, in addition to or perhaps as part of ‘concordance’ (Lehner),

Switzerland and Japan do seem to have more parallels with each other, espe-

cially a dualistic labour market, the paternalistic nature of employers (at least

vis-à-vis core employees), a small welfare state, and a generally unique route

to full employment and general economic success (Schmidt 1988a; Shalev

1990: 88). They thus have produced economic success without corporatism,

or at least without ‘proper’ corporatism. The analytical effect of these two

nations, though, implies that the macro distinction between corporatism and

pluralism may not be able to capture the full range of advanced industrial

political economies. Another approach is thus needed.

Alternatives to the corporatist paradigm

One such attempt is that of Hicks (1988b) who suggests a preliminary frame-

work of national collective economic action which involves the following five

types: the capitalist pluralism of the USA and the UK; the capitalist statism

188 ALAN SIAROFF

of Japan, France, and Italy; the social democratic corporatism of Austria,

Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden; the consociationalism (or effect-

ively liberal corporatism) of Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands; and

the quadripartite corporatism of Germany. Hicks (1988b: 150) defines ‘quad-

ripartite corporatism’ as involving not just the state, business, and labour but

also a powerful financial actor, and he considers this four-actor pattern to be

unique to Germany. However, in such a model not only are neither Japan

nor Switzerland called corporatist, but they are each considered a separate

paradigmatic type. This result, combined with the equivocal and even incom-

plete nature of many classifications, renders Hicks’ framework more useful

as a heuristic device than as a new paradigm.

Yet Hicks is certainly justified in raising the issue of national financial act-

ors as they relate to business, labour, and the state. Moreover, his conclusion

that the more successful economies all involve some macro-societal means

for rational collective action implies that there is more than one successful

organisational alternative to pluralism (Hicks 1988b: 150–151). Although in-

triguing, this conclusion, which parallels Manfred Schmidt’s (1988a) notion

of ‘two routes to full employment’, again leaves us with multiple categories.

A similar problem arises with the analysis of Korpi (1991: 336–339),

who in a study of eighteen OECD nations discerns three different dom-

inant patterns of conflict settlements in the period 1973–1986. First, there

is the societal bargaining found in Sweden, Norway, Austria, Finland, and

9

Switzerland. This arose either through left-wing dominance as in the first

three cases, or via special constitutional factors which give veto power to the

moderately strong left found in both Finland and Switzerland. The second

pattern is one of pluralism, which is zero-sum and lacks the long-term

business-labour understanding of societal bargaining. Korpi ascribes this pat-

tern to most OECD nations, specifically the USA, Canada, Ireland, France,

Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, the UK,

and Denmark. One should stress that Korpi is the only scholar to consider

(West) Germany and the Netherlands as essentially pluralist. Lastly, as was

noted earlier, Korpi defines the dominant pattern in Japan, and only Japan,

as one of state-led capitalism, involving the close co-operation of state and

business, but not labour, elites.

Korpi notes the problems with the open unemployment rates of Japan and

Switzerland, but still concludes that the average level of unemployment has

been much lower since 1973 in nations with either societal bargaining or

state-led capitalism than in the pluralist nations. Indeed, the largest increases

in unemployment have come in nations Korpi calls pluralist with a left of

medium strength, such as Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

The comparative unemployment performance of OECD nations has largely

189

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

been as Korpi has described. Moreover, his cases of societal bargaining –

Sweden, Norway, Austria, Finland, and Switzerland – have generally been

post-war economic successes. However, so has West Germany (despite its

lack of full employment) and Luxembourg (not discussed by Korpi but ap-

10

parently pluralist on his definitions). One also has the same problem as in

Hicks (1988b) of a merely nominal typology of advanced industrial political

economies.

Integrated economies

Thus the issue remains as to whether it is at all possible to come up with a uni-

dimensional and at least ordinal-level alternative to the corporatist-pluralist

continuum which is also not problematic with regards to Japan and Switzer-

land – not coincidently the two most difficult-to-classify advanced industrial

economies. Although far from settling the debate, we would argue for an

alternative term – integration – defined as follows:

a long-term co-operative pattern of shared economic management in-

volving the social partners and existing at various levels such as

plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of

national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social

policy, etc.)

It should thus be noted that the level(s) at which such behaviour occur(s)

may not be the same in every nation. More generally, integration speaks

to the functional roles and behavioural patterns noted in the ideal types of

corporatism outlined earlier; however, it does not speak to – nor is it condi-

tional on – structural features (such as the level of unionisation) or favourable

contexts (such as the size or openness of a country, or the political role of

social democracy).

Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d set out to measure the levels of such integration at

four sequential time periods: the late 1960s (during the ‘golden age of capit-

alism’); the late 1970s (after the OPEC shock), the late 1980s (with increased

globalisation), and the current situation (as of the mid-1990s). Integration

scores are calculated based on eight measures which we have averaged into a

summary index. All measures are given on a scale from 5 (indicating greatest

integration) to 1 (indicating least). Scores for 21 democracies are given for

the first two time periods; with the addition of Greece, Portugal, and Spain,

11

the N increases to 24 democracies for the last two time periods.

The first three columns indicate aspects of social partnership. First, there

is the level of strikes, wherein the fewer the strikes the higher the integration.

190 ALAN SIAROFF

Table 4a. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1960s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4.750

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Israel 4 4 (5) 5 2 4 (5) (5) 4.500

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 4 5 3 4.375

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Netherlands 5 3 5 5 3 4 5 4 4.250

Belgium 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 4.125

Germany (West) 5 5 3 5 3 4 5 3 4.125

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 4 (4) (4) 4.000

Finland 4 3 4 3 5 4 2 3 3.500

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 2 (2) 5 3.375

Iceland 1 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.750

Australia 3 2 5 1 1 3 (2) 3 2.500

New Zealand 4 2 5 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.375

Ireland 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.250

Italy 1 1 2 1 5 3 1 2 2.000

UK 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2.000

France 4 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1.875

USA 2 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.750

Canada 2 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.625

Period mean 3.321

Standard deviation 1.133

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4a

(two-tailed significance, N = 21)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.483 1.000

(0.026)

[3] 0.396 0.258 1.000

(0.075) (0.259)

[4] 0.725 0.718 0.528 1.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)

[5] 0.257 0.091 0.332 0.503 1.000

(0.262) (0.695) (0.141) (0.020)

[6] 0.516 0.600 0.483 0.633 0.349 1.000

(0.017) (0.004) (0.027) (0.002) (0.121)

[7] 0.689 0.657 0.589 0.892 0.478 0.759 1.000

(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)

[8] 0.577 0.622 0.561 0.811 0.207 0.540 0.683 1.000

(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.369) (0.011) (0.001)

Mean 0.749 0.699 0.679 0.952 0.540 0.767 0.941 0.813 1.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 191

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Table 4b. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1970s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4.750

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 4 5 3 4.375

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Finland 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 3 4.250

Israel 4 4 (5) 5 2 4 (5) (5) 4.250

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 5 (4) (5) 4.250

Belgium 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 4.125

Germany (West) 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 3 4.125

Netherlands 5 3 4 5 3 4 3 4 3.875

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 2 (2) 5 3.375

Iceland 1 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.750

Australia 3 2 5 1 1 3 (2) 3 2.500

New Zealand 4 2 5 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.375

Ireland 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.250

Italy 1 1 3 1 5 3 1 2 2.125

UK 4 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 2.125

France 4 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1.875

USA 2 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.750

Canada 2 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.625

Period mean 3.351

Standard deviation 1.122

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4b

(two-tailed significance, N = 21)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.483 1.000

(0.026)

[3] 0.337 0.177 1.000

(0.135) (0.443)

[4] 0.719 0.701 0.487 1.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.025)

[5] 0.257 0.091 0.420 0.563 1.000

(0.262) (0.695) (0.058) (0.008)

[6] 0.537 0.598 0.454 0.682 0.375 1.000

(0.012) (0.004) (0.039) (0.001) (0.094)

[7] 0.662 0.647 0.611 0.871 0.582 0.778 1.000

(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)

[8] 0.586 0.593 0.504 0.792 0.202 0.529 0.674 1.000

(0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.000) (0.381) (0.014) (0.001)

Mean 0.745 0.679 0.646 0.953 0.597 0.789 0.949 0.786 1.000

(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

192 ALAN SIAROFF

Table 4c. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1980s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Finland 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 4.250

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 5 (4) (4) 4.125

Germany (West) 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 3 4.125

Netherlands 5 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4.000

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 2 3 3 3.875

Belgium 4 3 4 5 5 2 3 3 3.625

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 4 (2) 5 3.625

Israel 2 4 (5) 5 2 4 (3) (3) 3.500

Australia 4 4 5 1 (2) 4 (4) (3) 3.375

Iceland 1 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.750

Italy 2 1 3 3 5 4 2 2 2.750

Ireland 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.375

Portugal 5 1 3 1 3 3 (2) (1) 2.375

France 5 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 2.250

New Zealand 3 2 4 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.125

USA 5 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 2.125

Spain 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 (1) 1.875

Canada 3 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.750

UK 3 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1.750

Greece 1 1 3 1 3 2 (1) (1) 1.625

Period mean 3.188

Standard deviation 1.048

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4c

(two-tailed significance, N = 24)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.470 1.000

(0.021)

[3] 0.055 0.372 1.000

(0.799) (0.074)

[4] 0.392 0.632 0.569 1.000

(0.058) (0.001) (0.004)

−0.004

[5] 0.119 0.515 0.562 1.000

(0.579) (0.986) (0.010) (0.004)

[6] 0.399 0.612 0.292 0.570 0.052 1.000

(0.054) (0.001) (0.167) (0.004) (0.808)

[7] 0.475 0.630 0.734 0.757 0.560 0.683 1.000

(0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)

[8] 0.422 0.721 0.540 0.811 0.221 0.632 0.703 1.000

(0.040) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.299) (0.001) (0.000)

Mean 0.559 0.736 0.690 0.910 0.539 0.694 0.932 0.849 1.000

(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 193

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Table 4d. Integrated versus pluralist economies, mid-1990s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Finland 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 4.375

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 3 4.250

Germany 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 3 4.125

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 5 (4) (4) 4.125

Netherlands 5 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4.000

Belgium 5 3 4 5 5 2 3 3 3.750

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 4 (2) 5 3.625

Israel 2 4 (5) 5 2 4 (3) (3) 3.500

Australia 5 2 5 1 (2) 3 (3) (3) 3.000

Italy 4 1 3 3 5 4 2 2 3.000

Iceland 2 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.875

Ireland 5 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.625

New Zealand 5 2 4 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.375

Portugal 5 1 3 1 3 3 (2) (1) 2.375

France 5 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 2.250

USA 5 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 2.125

Greece 3 1 3 1 3 3 (1) (1) 2.000

Spain 3 1 3 1 3 3 1 (1) 2.000

UK 5 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2.000

Canada 4 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.875

Period mean 3.271

Standard deviation 0.995

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4d

(two-tailed significance, N = 24)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.204 1.000

(0.340)

−0.147

[3] 0.304 1.000

(0.492) (0.148)

[4] 0.095 0.712 0.569 1.000

(0.658) (0.000) (0.004)

−0.003

[5] 0.039 0.515 0.562 1.000

(0.990) (0.855) (0.010) (0.004)

[6] 0.209 0.572 0.330 0.679 0.222 1.000

(0.326) (0.003) (0.115) (0.000) (0.298)

[7] 0.281 0.629 0.729 0.830 0.605 0.694 1.000

(0.184) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)

[8] 0.267 0.712 0.540 0.811 0.221 0.604 0.724 1.000

(0.208) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.299) (0.002) (0.000)

Mean 0.275 0.719 0.691 0.934 0.585 0.727 0.956 0.844 1.000

(0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

194 ALAN SIAROFF

Notes to Tables 4a–d:

Indicators of social partnership:

[1] Annual average level of strike volumes, 1963–1970 [Table 4a]/1973–1980 [Table 4b]/1983–1990

[Table 4c]/1993–1996 [Table 4d] (averaged from ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1971, 1981,

1991, 1997; cf. Cornwall 1990: 121)

5 = less than 100 person-days per 1000 workers; 4 = 100 to 200 person-days per 1000 workers; 3

= 200 to 400 person-days per 1000 workers; 2 = 400 to 600 person-days per 1000 workers; 1 =

more than 600 person-days per 1000 workers

[2] Nature and goals of trade unions (Piehl 1978 [as cited in Czada 1984: 161]) with additions; cf.

Slomp 1990; Armingeon 1994)

5 = reformist – balance of class forces (Germanic type); 4 = reformist – hegemonic (Scandinavian

type) or acquiescent system conformation without active participation; 3 = conflictual – reformist

with participatory goals (Belgian type); 2 = reformist – conflictual with goal of self-control rather

than participation (British type); 1 = revolutionary – confrontational (Latin type)

[3] Legal and state support for unions and union power (from Armingeon 1994, chapter 2, with

Israel from Shalev 1992)

5 = full support (highest score on each component); 4 = strong support; 3 = moderate support; 2

= some (additional) support; 1 = only the basic rights of existence

Indicators of industry-level co-ordination:

[4] Nature of economic ties and outlook of firms (Soskice 1990 and private communication)

5 = co-ordinated market economy; 3 = co-ordinated only in key regions; 1 = non-co-ordinated

market economy

[5] extent of co-determination in the workplace (from Armingeon 1994, chapter 2; Israel from

Bar-Haim 1988)

5 = required and regulated, with broad involvement, and with the councils dependent on unions;

3 = required and regulated, with broad involvement, but without workers’ representatives

necessarily being from unions; 2 = permitted and common, but not regulated; 1 = permitted but

rare

Overall national policy-making patterns:

[6] Nature of (conflict resolution in) national industrial adjustment and wage setting (based on

Zysman 1983, Lindberg 1985, Traxler & Unger 1990, Korpi 1991, and Compston 1997, with

additions)

5 = bargained or networked; 4 = bargained or networked, with some state imposition of policies, or

some pluralism; 3 = pluralist or liberal (generally hands-off state); 2 = statist, with some inclusion

of economic actors; or pluralist, with some state imposition of policies; 1 = statist, with the state

often imposing policies

[7] Extent of ‘generalized political exchange’ in industrial relations and national policymaking

(Crouch 1990, with additions)

5 = extensive, both at the sectoral and the national level; 4 = extensive at either the sectoral or

the national level; 3 = formerly extensive, but now clearly weaker in various ways and at various

levels; 2 = incipient or weak; 1 = none

[8] general nature of public-private interaction (Lehner 1987/1988, with additions)

5 = concordance (encompassing co-ordination); 4 = strong corporatism; 3 = moderate corpora-

tism; 2 = weak corporatism; 1 = pluralism 195

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Indeed, a low level of strikes has often been used as a central feature of cor-

poratism, yet this may be more of a reflection of broader consensus. In any

case, both Cameron (1984: 152–157) and Blaas & Guger (1985: 268–273)

have found clear relationships between high strike levels and ‘stagflation’

(high inflation combined with high unemployment). Since strike levels can

ebb and surge, an average was taken in each case for an eight-year period.

The second indicator of social partnership is the nature and orientation

of a nation’s trade unions – generally reflecting historical patterns which are

decades if not indeed a century old. Integration is higher when unions are

reformist rather then conflictual (or revolutionary), and where unions seek

to be integrated into the political-economic system or are totally acquiescent

rather than seeking to preserve a strong autonomy. However, unions which are

reformist and integrated but seek ultimately to dominate the system (such as

the Scandinavian labour movements) have somewhat more underlying con-

flict than reformist-integrated unions which are ‘content’ with a balance of

class forces. This latter pattern is found in the Germanic nations, which are

the paradigmatic cases here. This point relates to the fact that these nations

are the ones wherein capital and labour are called ‘social partners’, a term

less common in (and for Therborn inappropriate for) Scandinavia.

Of course, trade union behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. The third

indicator, based on Armingeon (1994: 29–30), measures the extent to which

unions are not merely permitted to exist and to strike, but are also legally

recognised and supported in terms of their achieving centralised control, hav-

ing the right to arbitration, and having broad influence (such as the extension

of contracts to non-unionised workers). To be precise, Armingeon measures

four factors, the first three of which are added together and then re-calibrated.

Next there are two indicators of industry-level co-ordination. David

Soskice (1990, 1991) has developed the concept of a ‘co-ordinated market

economy’, which is contrasted with a ‘non-co-ordinated market economy’

(factor [4]). This concept is concerned with the nature of firms, and reflects

the following features: in terms of the major companies the extent to which

there is a ‘virtuous circle of innovation, retraining and employment security’

(Soskice 1990: 196) arising from: (1) a long-term perspective of the firm

itself; (2) an equally long-term perspective of related actors in finance, mar-

keting, and research and development; and (3) the flexibility and co-operation

of managers and employees, especially regarding (a) the need for interna-

tional competitiveness and (b) skills formation, on which the firms spend

significant sums.

A more macro-level version of the same point is made by Hart (1992:

284) who stresses that both the German and Japanese political economies can

diffuse new technologies more easily and quickly than is possible in the UK,

196 ALAN SIAROFF

the USA, or France. In Germany this occurs because labour is highly skilled

and integrated into policy-making, thus comprising part of what Katzenstein

(1977) would call Germany’s ruling coalition. In Japan, in contrast, only the

‘core’ labour force is highly skilled, however non-core labour is too weak

and divided to resist technological change. Moreover, not only is the business

sector in both Germany and Japan well-organised (as Hart discusses) but each

also has a long-term outlook as Soskice stresses. A similar focus on Germany

and Japan as the major (in terms of size) co-ordinated and long-term oriented

economies can be found in the more journalistic analysis of Keegan (1992,

especially chapters 7 and 8). Michel Albert (1991) also focusses on the su-

perior performance of what he calls the ‘Rhinish’ capitalism of Germany, its

smaller neighbours, and Japan over the Anglo-Saxon and French versions of

capitalism. Both Keegan and Albert note the irony that it was the more seduct-

ive but ultimately less successful Anglo-Saxon version of capitalism that was

in the upswing in the Thatcherite–Reaganite 1980s, as well as being what has

normally been stressed in the post-communist ‘triumph of capitalism’. Since,

as noted, at least ‘core’ labour must be part of the process for such patterns

of co-ordination to occur, factor [5] of integration is the extent to which this

is institutionalised through employee co-determination at the plant level and

on company boards of directors. Armingeon’s (1994: 30) fourth measure of

labour relations is used here, with a slight modification.

Finally, there are three measures which define overall policy-making pat-

terns in advanced industrial nations. These patterns, one should note, reflect

some of the aspects of the corporatist paradigm. Factor [6] focusses on the

tendency of the state to include, leave to, or override the social partners

in the areas of national economic/industrial adjustment and wage setting.

Perhaps ironically, many of the scholars cited here consider a strong state

to be the most effective route to economic adjustment. Nevertheless, for

our purposes such state-led imposition of change is the clearest antithesis

of integration in this regard. Next, there is Crouch’s (1990: 72) measure of

‘generalized political exchange’, that is to say, ‘a dense web of interactions

binding together a small number of actors’ as applied to industrial relations

and socio-economic policy-making. This tends to be the mode of exchange

characteristic of neo-corporatism.

Lastly, factor [8] utilises Lehner’s (1987, 1988) scale of public-private in-

teraction, but in contrast to corporatism rankings the most integrated category

here is that of the concordance which he finds in Japan and Switzerland. This

factor, perhaps more than any other, speaks to the basic (but somewhat vague)

notion of ‘consensus’.

However, all of these factors contribute to an understanding of integration,

the component measures of which almost always correleate significantly (at

197

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 12

least at the 0.01 level) with the mean in every or almost every time period.

Perhaps more crucially, there are no negative correlations between any of the

component scores (cumulatively across the time periods). For the late 1960s,

with an N of 21, the cumulative measure of integration has a mean of 3.321

and a standard deviation of 1.133. For the late 1970s, still with an N of 21,

the cumulative measure of integration has a mean of 3.351 and a standard

deviation of 1.122. In the late 1980s, with the full sample, the mean is down

to 3.188 and the standard deviation is 1.048. Finally, in the 1990s the mean is

3.271 and the standard deviation is 0.995. In terms of extremes, in each time

period Sweden, Austria, and Norway are clearly at the top. The very bottom

is less sharp, but it includes Canada and later Greece. More crucially, in each

time period the advanced industrial economies can in fact be grouped into

two clear clusters: the integrated economies (those clearly above the mean in

the period) and the non-integrated or shall we say pluralist economies (those

below the mean). The only nation that has (temporarily) shifted between

clusters is Australia, which by the late 1980s was into the (bottom of the)

rank of integrated nations. This shift reflected the various Accords between

the Labor government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU),

but perhaps even more importantly the adoption of a ‘Scandinavian’ outlook

by the ACTU. In 1986 senior unionists visited Europe, resulting in a com-

prehensive report (Australia Reconstructed) which recommended a shift to

‘strategic unionism’ with an integrated long-term strategy à la Sweden and

Norway. The next year the ACTU adopted this as policy (Archer 1992: 405).

However, by the 1990s the Accords became less substantive, and the return

to power of the Australian conservatives in 1996 led to the ACTU returning

to its traditional labourist outlook.

Although Australia has been the only case to cross clusters, there has been

some movement within each cluster. On the one hand, Israel and Finland

have basically changed places within the integrated cluster. Furthermore,

after the 1970s integration clearly fell off in Belgium. From the 1960s to

the 1970s, integration also weakened in the Netherlands, although it would

recover somewhat from the early 1980s (Visser & Hemerijck 1997). On the

other hand, within the pluralist cluster Italy has become clearly less pluralist;

indeed, it may be the most likely candidate to become integrated at some fu-

ture date. In any case, it is our view that the dichotomy of advanced industrial

economies remains more crucial than any (sub-)movements. In particular,

it is important to stress that Japan, Switzerland, and Luxembourg have all

been integrated political economies, despite the fact that they may not be

corporatist in the traditional sense.

Indeed, one of the realities of both Japan and Switzerland is the fact that

co-operation between business and (core) labour occurs there in a much more


PAGINE

32

PESO

135.94 KB

AUTORE

Atreyu

PUBBLICATO

+1 anno fa


DESCRIZIONE DISPENSA

Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement", all'interno del quale è analizzato il concetto di corporativismo e se ne forniscono delle misurazioni concrete riguardanti il periodo 1960 - 1990.


DETTAGLI
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea in scienze internazionali e istituzioni europee
SSD:
Università: Milano - Unimi
A.A.: 2011-2012

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Politica comparata e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Milano - Unimi o del prof Giuliani Marco.

Acquista con carta o conto PayPal

Scarica il file tutte le volte che vuoi

Paga con un conto PayPal per usufruire della garanzia Soddisfatto o rimborsato

Recensioni
Ti è piaciuto questo appunto? Valutalo!

Altri appunti di Politica comparata

Democrazia - Dahl
Dispensa
Scala di astrazione dei concetti
Dispensa
Sistema istituzionale ed elettorale in Bosnia - Erzegovina
Dispensa
Democrazia maggioritaria e consensuale - Lijphart
Dispensa