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Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies - Siaroff Appunti scolastici Premium

Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement", all'interno del quale è analizzato il concetto di corporativismo e se ne forniscono delle misurazioni concrete riguardanti il... Vedi di più

Esame di Politica comparata docente Prof. M. Giuliani

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189

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

been as Korpi has described. Moreover, his cases of societal bargaining –

Sweden, Norway, Austria, Finland, and Switzerland – have generally been

post-war economic successes. However, so has West Germany (despite its

lack of full employment) and Luxembourg (not discussed by Korpi but ap-

10

parently pluralist on his definitions). One also has the same problem as in

Hicks (1988b) of a merely nominal typology of advanced industrial political

economies.

Integrated economies

Thus the issue remains as to whether it is at all possible to come up with a uni-

dimensional and at least ordinal-level alternative to the corporatist-pluralist

continuum which is also not problematic with regards to Japan and Switzer-

land – not coincidently the two most difficult-to-classify advanced industrial

economies. Although far from settling the debate, we would argue for an

alternative term – integration – defined as follows:

a long-term co-operative pattern of shared economic management in-

volving the social partners and existing at various levels such as

plant-level management, sectoral wage bargaining, and joint shaping of

national policies in competitiveness-related matters (education, social

policy, etc.)

It should thus be noted that the level(s) at which such behaviour occur(s)

may not be the same in every nation. More generally, integration speaks

to the functional roles and behavioural patterns noted in the ideal types of

corporatism outlined earlier; however, it does not speak to – nor is it condi-

tional on – structural features (such as the level of unionisation) or favourable

contexts (such as the size or openness of a country, or the political role of

social democracy).

Tables 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d set out to measure the levels of such integration at

four sequential time periods: the late 1960s (during the ‘golden age of capit-

alism’); the late 1970s (after the OPEC shock), the late 1980s (with increased

globalisation), and the current situation (as of the mid-1990s). Integration

scores are calculated based on eight measures which we have averaged into a

summary index. All measures are given on a scale from 5 (indicating greatest

integration) to 1 (indicating least). Scores for 21 democracies are given for

the first two time periods; with the addition of Greece, Portugal, and Spain,

11

the N increases to 24 democracies for the last two time periods.

The first three columns indicate aspects of social partnership. First, there

is the level of strikes, wherein the fewer the strikes the higher the integration.

190 ALAN SIAROFF

Table 4a. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1960s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4.750

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Israel 4 4 (5) 5 2 4 (5) (5) 4.500

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 4 5 3 4.375

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Netherlands 5 3 5 5 3 4 5 4 4.250

Belgium 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 4.125

Germany (West) 5 5 3 5 3 4 5 3 4.125

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 4 (4) (4) 4.000

Finland 4 3 4 3 5 4 2 3 3.500

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 2 (2) 5 3.375

Iceland 1 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.750

Australia 3 2 5 1 1 3 (2) 3 2.500

New Zealand 4 2 5 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.375

Ireland 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.250

Italy 1 1 2 1 5 3 1 2 2.000

UK 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 2.000

France 4 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1.875

USA 2 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.750

Canada 2 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.625

Period mean 3.321

Standard deviation 1.133

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4a

(two-tailed significance, N = 21)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.483 1.000

(0.026)

[3] 0.396 0.258 1.000

(0.075) (0.259)

[4] 0.725 0.718 0.528 1.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.014)

[5] 0.257 0.091 0.332 0.503 1.000

(0.262) (0.695) (0.141) (0.020)

[6] 0.516 0.600 0.483 0.633 0.349 1.000

(0.017) (0.004) (0.027) (0.002) (0.121)

[7] 0.689 0.657 0.589 0.892 0.478 0.759 1.000

(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)

[8] 0.577 0.622 0.561 0.811 0.207 0.540 0.683 1.000

(0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.000) (0.369) (0.011) (0.001)

Mean 0.749 0.699 0.679 0.952 0.540 0.767 0.941 0.813 1.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 191

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Table 4b. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1970s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4.750

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 4 5 3 4.375

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Finland 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 3 4.250

Israel 4 4 (5) 5 2 4 (5) (5) 4.250

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 5 (4) (5) 4.250

Belgium 4 3 4 5 5 4 5 3 4.125

Germany (West) 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 3 4.125

Netherlands 5 3 4 5 3 4 3 4 3.875

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 2 (2) 5 3.375

Iceland 1 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.750

Australia 3 2 5 1 1 3 (2) 3 2.500

New Zealand 4 2 5 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.375

Ireland 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.250

Italy 1 1 3 1 5 3 1 2 2.125

UK 4 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 2.125

France 4 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1.875

USA 2 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.750

Canada 2 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.625

Period mean 3.351

Standard deviation 1.122

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4b

(two-tailed significance, N = 21)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.483 1.000

(0.026)

[3] 0.337 0.177 1.000

(0.135) (0.443)

[4] 0.719 0.701 0.487 1.000

(0.000) (0.000) (0.025)

[5] 0.257 0.091 0.420 0.563 1.000

(0.262) (0.695) (0.058) (0.008)

[6] 0.537 0.598 0.454 0.682 0.375 1.000

(0.012) (0.004) (0.039) (0.001) (0.094)

[7] 0.662 0.647 0.611 0.871 0.582 0.778 1.000

(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)

[8] 0.586 0.593 0.504 0.792 0.202 0.529 0.674 1.000

(0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.000) (0.381) (0.014) (0.001)

Mean 0.745 0.679 0.646 0.953 0.597 0.789 0.949 0.786 1.000

(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

192 ALAN SIAROFF

Table 4c. Integrated versus pluralist economies, late 1980s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Finland 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 4.250

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 5 (4) (4) 4.125

Germany (West) 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 3 4.125

Netherlands 5 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4.000

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 2 3 3 3.875

Belgium 4 3 4 5 5 2 3 3 3.625

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 4 (2) 5 3.625

Israel 2 4 (5) 5 2 4 (3) (3) 3.500

Australia 4 4 5 1 (2) 4 (4) (3) 3.375

Iceland 1 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.750

Italy 2 1 3 3 5 4 2 2 2.750

Ireland 3 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.375

Portugal 5 1 3 1 3 3 (2) (1) 2.375

France 5 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 2.250

New Zealand 3 2 4 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.125

USA 5 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 2.125

Spain 2 1 3 1 3 2 2 (1) 1.875

Canada 3 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.750

UK 3 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1.750

Greece 1 1 3 1 3 2 (1) (1) 1.625

Period mean 3.188

Standard deviation 1.048

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4c

(two-tailed significance, N = 24)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.470 1.000

(0.021)

[3] 0.055 0.372 1.000

(0.799) (0.074)

[4] 0.392 0.632 0.569 1.000

(0.058) (0.001) (0.004)

−0.004

[5] 0.119 0.515 0.562 1.000

(0.579) (0.986) (0.010) (0.004)

[6] 0.399 0.612 0.292 0.570 0.052 1.000

(0.054) (0.001) (0.167) (0.004) (0.808)

[7] 0.475 0.630 0.734 0.757 0.560 0.683 1.000

(0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)

[8] 0.422 0.721 0.540 0.811 0.221 0.632 0.703 1.000

(0.040) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.299) (0.001) (0.000)

Mean 0.559 0.736 0.690 0.910 0.539 0.694 0.932 0.849 1.000

(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 193

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Table 4d. Integrated versus pluralist economies, mid-1990s

Factor [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

Austria 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4.625

Norway 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Sweden 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.625

Finland 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 4.375

Switzerland 5 4 5 5 2 5 4 5 4.375

Denmark 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 3 4.250

Germany 5 5 3 5 3 5 4 3 4.125

Luxembourg 5 3 (4) 5 (3) 5 (4) (4) 4.125

Netherlands 5 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 4.000

Belgium 5 3 4 5 5 2 3 3 3.750

Japan 5 4 2 5 2 4 (2) 5 3.625

Israel 2 4 (5) 5 2 4 (3) (3) 3.500

Australia 5 2 5 1 (2) 3 (3) (3) 3.000

Italy 4 1 3 3 5 4 2 2 3.000

Iceland 2 3 (5) 3 3 2 (2) (3) 2.875

Ireland 5 3 3 1 1 3 2 3 2.625

New Zealand 5 2 4 1 1 3 (1) (2) 2.375

Portugal 5 1 3 1 3 3 (2) (1) 2.375

France 5 1 3 1 3 2 2 1 2.250

USA 5 4 1 1 1 3 (1) 1 2.125

Greece 3 1 3 1 3 3 (1) (1) 2.000

Spain 3 1 3 1 3 3 1 (1) 2.000

UK 5 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 2.000

Canada 4 2 2 1 1 3 (1) 1 1.875

Period mean 3.271

Standard deviation 0.995

Intercorrelations of the factors in Table 4d

(two-tailed significance, N = 24)

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] Mean

[1] 1.000

[2] 0.204 1.000

(0.340)

−0.147

[3] 0.304 1.000

(0.492) (0.148)

[4] 0.095 0.712 0.569 1.000

(0.658) (0.000) (0.004)

−0.003

[5] 0.039 0.515 0.562 1.000

(0.990) (0.855) (0.010) (0.004)

[6] 0.209 0.572 0.330 0.679 0.222 1.000

(0.326) (0.003) (0.115) (0.000) (0.298)

[7] 0.281 0.629 0.729 0.830 0.605 0.694 1.000

(0.184) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)

[8] 0.267 0.712 0.540 0.811 0.221 0.604 0.724 1.000

(0.208) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.299) (0.002) (0.000)

Mean 0.275 0.719 0.691 0.934 0.585 0.727 0.956 0.844 1.000

(0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)

194 ALAN SIAROFF

Notes to Tables 4a–d:

Indicators of social partnership:

[1] Annual average level of strike volumes, 1963–1970 [Table 4a]/1973–1980 [Table 4b]/1983–1990

[Table 4c]/1993–1996 [Table 4d] (averaged from ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1971, 1981,

1991, 1997; cf. Cornwall 1990: 121)

5 = less than 100 person-days per 1000 workers; 4 = 100 to 200 person-days per 1000 workers; 3

= 200 to 400 person-days per 1000 workers; 2 = 400 to 600 person-days per 1000 workers; 1 =

more than 600 person-days per 1000 workers

[2] Nature and goals of trade unions (Piehl 1978 [as cited in Czada 1984: 161]) with additions; cf.

Slomp 1990; Armingeon 1994)

5 = reformist – balance of class forces (Germanic type); 4 = reformist – hegemonic (Scandinavian

type) or acquiescent system conformation without active participation; 3 = conflictual – reformist

with participatory goals (Belgian type); 2 = reformist – conflictual with goal of self-control rather

than participation (British type); 1 = revolutionary – confrontational (Latin type)

[3] Legal and state support for unions and union power (from Armingeon 1994, chapter 2, with

Israel from Shalev 1992)

5 = full support (highest score on each component); 4 = strong support; 3 = moderate support; 2

= some (additional) support; 1 = only the basic rights of existence

Indicators of industry-level co-ordination:

[4] Nature of economic ties and outlook of firms (Soskice 1990 and private communication)

5 = co-ordinated market economy; 3 = co-ordinated only in key regions; 1 = non-co-ordinated

market economy

[5] extent of co-determination in the workplace (from Armingeon 1994, chapter 2; Israel from

Bar-Haim 1988)

5 = required and regulated, with broad involvement, and with the councils dependent on unions;

3 = required and regulated, with broad involvement, but without workers’ representatives

necessarily being from unions; 2 = permitted and common, but not regulated; 1 = permitted but

rare

Overall national policy-making patterns:

[6] Nature of (conflict resolution in) national industrial adjustment and wage setting (based on

Zysman 1983, Lindberg 1985, Traxler & Unger 1990, Korpi 1991, and Compston 1997, with

additions)

5 = bargained or networked; 4 = bargained or networked, with some state imposition of policies, or

some pluralism; 3 = pluralist or liberal (generally hands-off state); 2 = statist, with some inclusion

of economic actors; or pluralist, with some state imposition of policies; 1 = statist, with the state

often imposing policies

[7] Extent of ‘generalized political exchange’ in industrial relations and national policymaking

(Crouch 1990, with additions)

5 = extensive, both at the sectoral and the national level; 4 = extensive at either the sectoral or

the national level; 3 = formerly extensive, but now clearly weaker in various ways and at various

levels; 2 = incipient or weak; 1 = none

[8] general nature of public-private interaction (Lehner 1987/1988, with additions)

5 = concordance (encompassing co-ordination); 4 = strong corporatism; 3 = moderate corpora-

tism; 2 = weak corporatism; 1 = pluralism 195

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

Indeed, a low level of strikes has often been used as a central feature of cor-

poratism, yet this may be more of a reflection of broader consensus. In any

case, both Cameron (1984: 152–157) and Blaas & Guger (1985: 268–273)

have found clear relationships between high strike levels and ‘stagflation’

(high inflation combined with high unemployment). Since strike levels can

ebb and surge, an average was taken in each case for an eight-year period.

The second indicator of social partnership is the nature and orientation

of a nation’s trade unions – generally reflecting historical patterns which are

decades if not indeed a century old. Integration is higher when unions are

reformist rather then conflictual (or revolutionary), and where unions seek

to be integrated into the political-economic system or are totally acquiescent

rather than seeking to preserve a strong autonomy. However, unions which are

reformist and integrated but seek ultimately to dominate the system (such as

the Scandinavian labour movements) have somewhat more underlying con-

flict than reformist-integrated unions which are ‘content’ with a balance of

class forces. This latter pattern is found in the Germanic nations, which are

the paradigmatic cases here. This point relates to the fact that these nations

are the ones wherein capital and labour are called ‘social partners’, a term

less common in (and for Therborn inappropriate for) Scandinavia.

Of course, trade union behaviour does not occur in a vacuum. The third

indicator, based on Armingeon (1994: 29–30), measures the extent to which

unions are not merely permitted to exist and to strike, but are also legally

recognised and supported in terms of their achieving centralised control, hav-

ing the right to arbitration, and having broad influence (such as the extension

of contracts to non-unionised workers). To be precise, Armingeon measures

four factors, the first three of which are added together and then re-calibrated.

Next there are two indicators of industry-level co-ordination. David

Soskice (1990, 1991) has developed the concept of a ‘co-ordinated market

economy’, which is contrasted with a ‘non-co-ordinated market economy’

(factor [4]). This concept is concerned with the nature of firms, and reflects

the following features: in terms of the major companies the extent to which

there is a ‘virtuous circle of innovation, retraining and employment security’

(Soskice 1990: 196) arising from: (1) a long-term perspective of the firm

itself; (2) an equally long-term perspective of related actors in finance, mar-

keting, and research and development; and (3) the flexibility and co-operation

of managers and employees, especially regarding (a) the need for interna-

tional competitiveness and (b) skills formation, on which the firms spend

significant sums.

A more macro-level version of the same point is made by Hart (1992:

284) who stresses that both the German and Japanese political economies can

diffuse new technologies more easily and quickly than is possible in the UK,

196 ALAN SIAROFF

the USA, or France. In Germany this occurs because labour is highly skilled

and integrated into policy-making, thus comprising part of what Katzenstein

(1977) would call Germany’s ruling coalition. In Japan, in contrast, only the

‘core’ labour force is highly skilled, however non-core labour is too weak

and divided to resist technological change. Moreover, not only is the business

sector in both Germany and Japan well-organised (as Hart discusses) but each

also has a long-term outlook as Soskice stresses. A similar focus on Germany

and Japan as the major (in terms of size) co-ordinated and long-term oriented

economies can be found in the more journalistic analysis of Keegan (1992,

especially chapters 7 and 8). Michel Albert (1991) also focusses on the su-

perior performance of what he calls the ‘Rhinish’ capitalism of Germany, its

smaller neighbours, and Japan over the Anglo-Saxon and French versions of

capitalism. Both Keegan and Albert note the irony that it was the more seduct-

ive but ultimately less successful Anglo-Saxon version of capitalism that was

in the upswing in the Thatcherite–Reaganite 1980s, as well as being what has

normally been stressed in the post-communist ‘triumph of capitalism’. Since,

as noted, at least ‘core’ labour must be part of the process for such patterns

of co-ordination to occur, factor [5] of integration is the extent to which this

is institutionalised through employee co-determination at the plant level and

on company boards of directors. Armingeon’s (1994: 30) fourth measure of

labour relations is used here, with a slight modification.

Finally, there are three measures which define overall policy-making pat-

terns in advanced industrial nations. These patterns, one should note, reflect

some of the aspects of the corporatist paradigm. Factor [6] focusses on the

tendency of the state to include, leave to, or override the social partners

in the areas of national economic/industrial adjustment and wage setting.

Perhaps ironically, many of the scholars cited here consider a strong state

to be the most effective route to economic adjustment. Nevertheless, for

our purposes such state-led imposition of change is the clearest antithesis

of integration in this regard. Next, there is Crouch’s (1990: 72) measure of

‘generalized political exchange’, that is to say, ‘a dense web of interactions

binding together a small number of actors’ as applied to industrial relations

and socio-economic policy-making. This tends to be the mode of exchange

characteristic of neo-corporatism.

Lastly, factor [8] utilises Lehner’s (1987, 1988) scale of public-private in-

teraction, but in contrast to corporatism rankings the most integrated category

here is that of the concordance which he finds in Japan and Switzerland. This

factor, perhaps more than any other, speaks to the basic (but somewhat vague)

notion of ‘consensus’.

However, all of these factors contribute to an understanding of integration,

the component measures of which almost always correleate significantly (at

197

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 12

least at the 0.01 level) with the mean in every or almost every time period.

Perhaps more crucially, there are no negative correlations between any of the

component scores (cumulatively across the time periods). For the late 1960s,

with an N of 21, the cumulative measure of integration has a mean of 3.321

and a standard deviation of 1.133. For the late 1970s, still with an N of 21,

the cumulative measure of integration has a mean of 3.351 and a standard

deviation of 1.122. In the late 1980s, with the full sample, the mean is down

to 3.188 and the standard deviation is 1.048. Finally, in the 1990s the mean is

3.271 and the standard deviation is 0.995. In terms of extremes, in each time

period Sweden, Austria, and Norway are clearly at the top. The very bottom

is less sharp, but it includes Canada and later Greece. More crucially, in each

time period the advanced industrial economies can in fact be grouped into

two clear clusters: the integrated economies (those clearly above the mean in

the period) and the non-integrated or shall we say pluralist economies (those

below the mean). The only nation that has (temporarily) shifted between

clusters is Australia, which by the late 1980s was into the (bottom of the)

rank of integrated nations. This shift reflected the various Accords between

the Labor government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU),

but perhaps even more importantly the adoption of a ‘Scandinavian’ outlook

by the ACTU. In 1986 senior unionists visited Europe, resulting in a com-

prehensive report (Australia Reconstructed) which recommended a shift to

‘strategic unionism’ with an integrated long-term strategy à la Sweden and

Norway. The next year the ACTU adopted this as policy (Archer 1992: 405).

However, by the 1990s the Accords became less substantive, and the return

to power of the Australian conservatives in 1996 led to the ACTU returning

to its traditional labourist outlook.

Although Australia has been the only case to cross clusters, there has been

some movement within each cluster. On the one hand, Israel and Finland

have basically changed places within the integrated cluster. Furthermore,

after the 1970s integration clearly fell off in Belgium. From the 1960s to

the 1970s, integration also weakened in the Netherlands, although it would

recover somewhat from the early 1980s (Visser & Hemerijck 1997). On the

other hand, within the pluralist cluster Italy has become clearly less pluralist;

indeed, it may be the most likely candidate to become integrated at some fu-

ture date. In any case, it is our view that the dichotomy of advanced industrial

economies remains more crucial than any (sub-)movements. In particular,

it is important to stress that Japan, Switzerland, and Luxembourg have all

been integrated political economies, despite the fact that they may not be

corporatist in the traditional sense.

Indeed, one of the realities of both Japan and Switzerland is the fact that

co-operation between business and (core) labour occurs there in a much more

198 ALAN SIAROFF

Table 5. Corporatism versus integration scores

Corporatism scores Integration scores

mean (std. dev.) Late Late Late Mid-

1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s

Austria 5.000 (0.000) 4.625 4.625 4.625 4.625

Norway 4.864 (0.351) 4.625 4.625 4.625 4.625

Sweden 4.674 (0.556) 4.750 4.750 4.625 4.625

Netherlands 4.000 (0.989) 4.250 3.875 4.000 4.000

Denmark 3.545 (0.999) 4.375 4.375 3.875 4.250

Germany (West) 3.543 (0.940) 4.125 4.125 4.125 4.125

Switzerland 3.375 (1.286) 4.125 4.125 4.125 4.125

Finland 3.295 (1.043) 3.500 4.250 4.250 4.375

Iceland 3.000 (0.000) 2.750 2.750 2.750 2.875

Israel 3.000 (0.000) 4.500 4.250 3.500 3.500

Luxembourg 3.000 (0.000) 4.000 4.250 4.125 4.125

Japan 2.912 (1.603) 3.375 3.375 3.625 3.625

Belgium 2.841 (0.793) 4.125 4.125 3.625 3.750

Ireland 2.000 (1.015) 2.250 2.250 2.375 2.625

New Zealand 1.955 (0.907) 2.375 2.375 2.125 2.375

Australia 1.680 (0.873) 2.500 2.500 3.375 3.000

France 1.674 (0.792) 1.875 1.875 2.250 2.250

UK 1.652 (0.818) 2.000 2.125 1.750 2.000

Portugal 1.500 (1.000) – – 2.375 2.375

Italy 1.477 (0.748) 2.000 2.125 2.750 3.000

Spain 1.250 (0.500) – – 1.875 2.000

Canada 1.150 (0.489) 1.625 1.625 1.750 1.875

USA 1.150 (0.489) 1.750 1.750 2.125 2.125

Greece 1.000 (0.000) – – 1.625 2.000

Mean 2.648 3.321 3.351 3.188 3.271

Standard deviation 1.234 1.133 1.122 1.048 0.995

Sources: Table 2, Table 4a, Table 4b, Table 4c, Table 4d.

decentralised way than in purely ‘corporatist’ nations with national tripartism

(Armingeon 1997: 171–172). This situation has proven to be a comparative

outlier or even a puzzle. In part this is because of the stress in the corporatist

literature on centralisation – and indeed the fact that certain authors define

corporatism in this way. In contrast, the concept of integration has no such

presumption of centralisation. Yet it is relevant to note that the causal pattern

‘corporatist centralisation leads to economic success’ contains an assump-

199

CORPORATISM IN 24 INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES

tion of an intervening variable, that of a high degree of communication and

goal sharing. In fact, as Hancock & Shimada (1993: 230–231) note, Japan

ranks very highly in terms of positive-sum information sharing and goal co-

ordination. Tsujinika (1993: 202) would agree with Hancock and Shimada;

indeed he argues that there are ‘osmotic networks’ involving the Rengō la-

bour confederation, large firms, and the state. However, whereas all of these

authors would thus see Japan as having ‘functional corporatism’ because of

this pattern, an alternative way of viewing Japan is to consider it as a highly

integrated political economy.

Finally, it certainly is true that the nations about which there is gen-

eral agreement on the presence of corporatism – such as Sweden, Austria,

and Norway – are integrated nations. Equally, clearly pluralist nations like

Canada, Greece, and the USA are also pluralist in the sense of being non-

integrated. For the purposes of comparison, Table 5 gives our integration

scores alongside the overall mean corporatism scores. The correlations with

the aforementioned mean score of corporatism are in fact extremely high: the

value (r) here is 0.914 for the late 1960s, 0.907 for the late 1970s, 0.911 for

the late 1980s, and 0.924 for the mid-1990s. The differences, however, are

crucial ones: as stressed above, by focusing essentially on roles and beha-

viour rather than the broader supposedly favourable structures and contexts,

we have established the clear ordinal ranking of the long-term democracies,

and the certainty of the integrated nature of the Japanese, Swiss, and Luxem-

bourg economies. Consequently, we feel that the integration scores are a clear

improvement in terms of comparative analysis.

Notes

1. Keman & Pennings (1995: 279) disagree, concluding that ‘corporatism should not be con-

sidered as an intrinsic component of consensus democracy’. Crepaz and Lijphart (1995:

288) hold to their argument, noting how corporatism correlates reasonably well with four

of the five traditional measures of consensus democracy.

2. See also Therborn (1987).

3. One exception here is Golden (1986), who sees two types of policy-making networks

at the opposite extreme from corporatism: pluralism and competitive symbiosis. These

patterns (as well as the form of corporatism, and patterns of labour exclusion and de-

mobilized democracy) are distinguished in large part by the unity or lack thereof of the

political left, in particular the presence of a strong communist party. Such categorisations

undoubtedly reflect Golden’s focus on post-war Italy; however, they do not seem broadly

applicable.

4. The following analysis generally draws on Schmidt (1982b: 253); Bornstein (1984: 57–

58); Held & Krieger (1984: 13–14); Paloheimo (1984a: 22–23); Bruno & Sachs (1985:

224–227); Scholten (1987: 124); Pekkarinen (1992: 298–301); and Woldendorp (1997:

54–61).

200 ALAN SIAROFF

5. Indeed, Mitchell (1996: 422) argues that the number of unions is a better, and certainly a

simpler, measure of labour concentration than the number of union confederations.

6. Of course, such durable consensual or even consociational patterns may only be a

post-World War Two phenomenon. Indeed, in nations like Austria and Finland the pre-

war behaviour or ‘alternative’ was often not so much liberal pluralism as it was class

polarisation and even civil war (for example, 1934 Austria).

7. Pryor (1988: 326–327) has done a similar procedure, but only for six authors (and using

a three-point scale).

8. Indeed, if the alternative measure ‘concordance’ used by Lehner [CN5] is re-scored with

a ‘5’ rather than a ‘2’ so as to reflect his argument that these are the most consensual

nations (even more so than the strongly corporatist cases), then the average sub-score for

an emphasis on consensus would increase to 4.80 for Japan and 5.00 for Switzerland. The

difference between these values and the sub-scores for an emphasis on power resources

would thus increase correspondingly.

9. Indeed, in The Democratic Class Struggle Korpi also prefers the use of the term ‘societal

bargaining’ to that of ‘corporatism’, which he associates with fascistic state corporatism.

However, the patterns of behaviour associated with ‘societal bargaining’ as used by Korpi

clearly parallel most usages of the concept of (liberal) corporatism (Korpi 1983: 20–21).

Moreover, ‘societal bargaining’ seems to have as one precondition the effective power

of the political left, factor (18) of our ideal type of corporatism. There is thus a clear

relationship in Korpi’s analysis (1991: 339 [Table 4]) between the dominant pattern of

conflict settlement and the long-term strength of the political left – a narrower version of

his notion of ‘power resources’.

10. Iceland is another OECD nation which would seem to be pluralist in terms of Korpi’s

(1991) classifications – yet which had almost no unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s.

The addition of both Luxembourg and Iceland would thus seem to weaken Korpi’s overall

conclusions, or else question his categorisation.

11. Even though Greece, Portugal, and Spain had each undergone a transition to demo-

cracy by the late 1970s, it was not until the 1980s that democracy was considered to

be consolidated in each case. Consequently they are first scored for the late 1980s.

12. The main exception here is the level of strike volumes in the mid-1990s, where the cor-

relation with the mean is only 0.275 (compared with 0.559 in the late 1980s) and which

correlates negatively with factor 3 (although not at a significant level). This weakened

relationship has arisen largely due to sharp drops in strike volumes in traditionally strike-

prone pluralist nations, specifically Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, and the UK. One may

thus question the (continued) utility of this measure. However, given that strike volumes

are measured for a shorter period (of four years) for the final time period, there does not

(yet) seem to be sufficient justification to discard the factor.

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Materiale didattico per il corso di Politica comparata del prof. Marco Giuliani. Trattasi dell'articolo di Alan Siaroff dal titolo "Corporatism in 24 industrial democracies: Meaning and measurement", all'interno del quale è analizzato il concetto di corporativismo e se ne forniscono delle misurazioni concrete riguardanti il periodo 1960 - 1990.


DETTAGLI
Corso di laurea: Corso di laurea in scienze internazionali e istituzioni europee
SSD:
Università: Milano - Unimi
A.A.: 2011-2012

I contenuti di questa pagina costituiscono rielaborazioni personali del Publisher Atreyu di informazioni apprese con la frequenza delle lezioni di Politica comparata e studio autonomo di eventuali libri di riferimento in preparazione dell'esame finale o della tesi. Non devono intendersi come materiale ufficiale dell'università Milano - Unimi o del prof Giuliani Marco.

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